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ABSTRACT 
_____________________ 
 
1. Object of the enquiry 
 
 The arrival of the Human Rights Act 1998 (the “HRA”) stimulated much 
speculation as to the effect that the Act would have on judicial approaches to the 
relationship between the individual and State.1  In particular, the Act generated 
expectations that it would raise rights consciousness within judicial thinking.2  
Consequently, the potential effect this change would have on freedom of speech in 
the UK was intriguing.  It had been said that the common law already recognised a 
‘constitutional right to free speech’,3 although the strongest statements for its 
protection seemed reserved for freedom to publish, in particular4 and, furthermore, 
the common law could not interfere with contrary statutory measures.5  There had 
been speculation that the obstacle to the fullest protection for free speech would be 
removed if a constitutional measure was introduced that allowed the judiciary to 
protect free speech where the common law would otherwise be impotent.6  Yet it was 
                                                 
1
 See Section 3(b) of Chapter One, pages 33 to 35. 
2
 Lord Irvine, Third Reading, February 5, 1998, H.L. Debates, vol. 585, col. 840.; Francesca Klug, 
'The Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v. Hart and All That' (1999) Public Law 246 
3
 Broome v. Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027, 1133, per Lord Kilbrandon 
4
 Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743; X (A Minor) (Wardship: Restrictions on 
publication) (1975) Fam 47; R. v. Central Independent Television plc (1994) Fam 192.  Although see 
discussion of R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms (2000) 2 AC 115, at 
pages 29-35, decided on the cusp of the HRA’s inception, in which freedom to publish is not the 
primary focus of the free speech claim.  As will be shown, this claim contains important common law 
free speech principles. 
5
 Although the decision in ex parte Simms, ibid., demonstrates that liberal approaches to statutory 
interpretation so as to secure a pro-free speech reading of the statute was possible pre-HRA 
6
 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (OUP, 1985, 1st edn.), 304. 
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also argued, pre-HRA, that, in addition, judicial attitudes toward freedom of speech 
required addressing.  It was argued that the judicial approach to freedom of speech 
was inconsistent: the judiciary did not seem to treat free speech claims equally and so 
certain speakers seemed better placed than others.7  Certainly, uncompromisingly 
pro-free speech judgments were rare where the freedom to publish was not 
implicated.8  Thus, it was argued that the common law approach to free speech had 
developed incoherently and that there seemed to be a judicial readiness to allow 
restrictions on flimsy grounds.9  These criticisms implicated the UK judiciary’s 
conceptual understanding of free speech, suggesting failings in the court’s 
engagement with the moral and philosophical arguments underpinning the nature of 
the right.10  However, there was an expectation amongst some commentators that 
greater consistency of free speech protection would occur as a result of the provisions 
in section 2 of the HRA.11 
It has now been almost nine years since the substantive provisions of the HRA 
came into force12 (not counting the further two years of judicial preparation).  By 
surveying the post-HRA landscape, the object of this enquiry is to ascertain whether 
the judiciary has realised protection for freedom of speech in its fullest terms.  Prior 
to the HRA, Barendt, for example, had argued that in order to maximise protection, 
the judiciary ought to engage with the theoretical arguments for the free speech 
                                                 
7
 See Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Public Protest, the Human Rights Act and Judicial Responses to 
Political Expression,’ [2000] Public Law 625 
8
 In this sense, Brutus v. Cozens (1973) AC 854 is a notable exception. 
9
 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties, (Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 1998, 2nd edn.), 144. 
10
 See ex parte Simms, fn. 4, 126, per Lord Steyn. 
11
 See, in particular, Fenwick and Phillipson, fn. 7.  See, further, the discussion on s. 2 in Chapter Four. 
12
 These provisions came fully into force on October 2, 2000. 
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protection.13  This thesis seeks to understand what the judiciary’s approach to Article 
10 is and how this compares to both established theory and the rationale underpinning 
the Strasbourg Article 10 jurisprudence.  Thus, it will examine whether the judiciary 
has become acclimatised to the language of ‘rights’ in a free speech context and, 
furthermore, whether it has recognised the significance of underlying theories of free 
speech in this regard.  As is well-established in the academic literature, there are 
several dominant theories which seek to explain and justify the concept of free speech 
as a right.14  Each of these offers different perspectives on the scope of free speech 
and approaches to protecting it.  In raising free speech from a liberty to a right in all 
circumstances, has the judiciary demonstrably engaged with those theories and, if so, 
to what extent?  In other words, what value or values has the judiciary identified as 
being served by freedom of expression?  Does the jurisprudence suggest the judiciary 
is simply absorbing Strasbourg jurisprudence and, if so, how does this affect the UK 
judiciary’s engagement with theory?  In other words, even if minded to do so, what 
obstacles stand in the judiciary’s way toward a more principled approach to Article 
10 to fit theoretical understandings of the right? 
By virtue of this critique, it will be argued that the UK judiciary has not 
developed the Article 10 jurisprudence in a principled manner, i.e., one that fully 
engages with the established theoretical approaches to freedom of expression.  
Instead, due to, amongst other things, its limited approach to the obligations 
contained within s. 2 of the HRA,15 the UK Article 10 jurisprudence demonstrates a 
particularly narrow approach to the consequentialist rationale for protecting 
                                                 
13
 Barendt, fn. 6, 1-8. 
14
 See discussion in Chapter Two, pages 54-90. 
15
 see Chapter Four, pages 132-169. 
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expression that, consequently, neglects other rationales based on broader 
instrumentalist grounds or, indeed, protection based on the intrinsic value of free 
speech.  Thus, it will be argued that in the UK, the Article 10 lens has been focussed 
too sharply on narrow forms of political expression.16  This is disappointing from a 
free speech advocate’s perspective not just because the concept of free speech is 
stunted in this environment but also because it suggests the promised ‘rights 
culture’17 has not fully taken nor the constitutional significance of free speech fully 
secured. 
 
2. Place of the enquiry within the academic literature 
 
 There are many commentators within the field who have produced notable 
research on legal approaches to freedom of speech.  The leading general work on 
theoretical and practical approaches to free speech is Eric Barendt’s second edition of 
Freedom of Speech.18  Other academics have also written extensively on the subject 
in particular contexts.  Helen Fenwick has written on the judicial treatment of public 
protest19 and both she and Gavin Phillipson, separately and in collaboration, have 
written on the limits of media freedom;20 Eric Heinze21 and Ivan Hare22 have written 
                                                 
16
 In particular, see discussion in Chapter Five, pages 172-218 
17
 Fn. 2. 
18
 OUP, 2005. 
19
 Civil Liberties and Human Rights, (4th ed Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 659-802; ‘The Right to 
Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation’ (1999) 62(4) MLR 491; see also 
Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Public Protest, the Human Rights Act and Judicial Responses to Political 
Expression,’ fn. 7; Fenwick and Phillipson, “Direct action, Convention values and the Human Rights 
Act”, (2001) 21 Legal Studies 535 
20
 Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act, (OUP, 2006); ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy 
Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (2000) 63(5) MLR 660; Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of 
Confidence?  Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66(5) 
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about ‘hate speech’ from a UK perspective whilst James Weinstein23 has also written 
about the topic (predominantly) from a US perspective; Ian Leigh has written about 
freedom of speech from a religious perspective;24 Roger Shiner has written 
specifically about commercial speech;25 Ronald Dworkin26 and, amongst others, 
Catherine McKinnon27 have written (and duelled) on legal approaches to 
pornographic expression, whilst Ian Cram,28 Andrew Geddis,29 and Merris Amos,30 
amongst others, have also made notable contributions.   A common theme in these 
                                                                                                                                           
MLR 726; Phillipson, ‘Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases under the Human Rights 
Act: Not Taking Privacy Seriously’ (2003) EHRLR 53; Fenwick, ‘Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the 
Child and the HRA’ (2004) 67(6) MLR 889 
21
 ‘Cumulative Jurisprudence and Hate Speech: Sexual Orientation and Analogies to Disability, Age 
and Obesity’ in Extreme Speech and Democracy, Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, eds., (OUP, 2009); 
‘Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech’ (2006) 69 MLR 543;  
22
 ‘Inflammatory Speech: Cross Burning and the First Amendment,’ [2003] Public Law 408; ‘Crosses, 
crescents and sacred cows: criminalising incitement to religious hatred,’ [2006] Public Law 521; see 
also, Extreme Speech and Democracy, above, fn. 21 and ‘Debating abortion – the right to offend 
gratuitously’ (2003) 62(3) Cambridge Law Journal 525 
23
 ‘An Overview of American Free Speech Doctrine and its Application to Extreme Speech’ in 
Extreme Speech and Democracy, above, fn. 21; Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Radical Attack on 
Free Speech Doctrine, (Westview Press, 1999); ‘An American’s View of the Canadian Hate Speech 
Decisions’ in Free Expression: Essays in Law and Philosophy, W. Waluchow, ed., (Clarendon Press, 
1994); ‘Hate Crime and Punishment’ (1994) 73 Oregon Law Review 345; ‘First Amendment 
Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation: Where’s the Speech?’ (1992) 11(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 6;  
24
 ‘Homophobic Speech, Equality Denial and Religious Expression,’ in Extreme Speech and 
Democracy (above, fn. 23); see also ‘Hatred, Sexual Orientation, Free Speech and Religious Liberty’ 
(2008) 10(3) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 337. 
25
 Freedom of Commercial Expression (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) 
26
 ‘Is there a right to pornography?’ (1981) 1 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 177; ‘Pornography and Hate,’ in 
Freedom’s Law (Oxford University Press, 1996);  
27
 Only Words, (Harvard University Press, 1993);  
28
 ‘The Danish Cartoons, Offensive Expression, and Democratic Legitimacy’ in Extreme Speech and 
Democracy, above, fn. 21; Contested Words – Legal Restrictions on Freedom of Expression in Liberal 
Democracies (Ashgate, 2006); ‘Regulating the media: some neglected freedom of expression issues in 
the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy’ (2006) 18 Terrorism and Political Violence 335; 
‘Political Expression, Qualified Privilege and Investigative Journalism – An Analysis of Developments 
in English Defamation Law post Reynolds v. Times Newspapers’ (2005) 11 Canterbury Law Review 
143; A Virtue Less Cloistered – Courts, Speech and Constitutions, (Hart Publishing, 2002); ‘Beyond 
Madison? The US Supreme Court and the regulation of sexually explicit expression’ [2002] Public 
Law 743. 
29
 “Free Speech Martyrs or Unreasonable Threats to Social Peace? – ‘Insulting’ Expression and s. 5 of 
the Public Order Act 1986,” [2004] PL 853; ‘If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out: R v. BBC (ex p. 
ProLife Alliance) (2003) 66 MLR 885; ‘What future for political advertising on the UK’s television 
screens?’ (2002) Public Law 615;  
30
 ‘Can we speak freely now?  Freedom of Expression under the Human Rights Act’ (2002) 6 EHRLR 
750; 
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contributions is the focus on the judicial treatment of Article 10, supported, to 
varying degrees, by discussion of the theoretical justifications for free speech.  
Meanwhile, other commentators (typically, though not exclusively, from the United 
States) have written more exclusively about underlying theories of freedom of speech 
with some consideration of their application in practice.  Arguably Frederick 
Schauer’s book, Free speech: a philosophical enquiry31 remains the leading work on 
philosophical approaches to the subject.  His book also includes his argument for 
protecting free speech based on distrust of government.  Other notable theoretical 
works include the contributions of Alexander Meiklejohn32 to the argument from 
democracy; Thomas Scanlon33 to the argument from autonomy; John Stuart Mill34 to 
the argument from truth; Thomas Emerson,35 C. Edwin Baker36 and Martin Redish37 
to the argument from self-realisation (or variations of it); and Lee Bollinger38 to the 
argument based on tolerance.  It is worth mentioning Kent Greenawalt and Larry 
Alexander who have also written from a theoretical perspective.  Greenawalt has 
made a number of significant contributions on the interaction between free speech 
arguments and the criminalisation of speech.39  Alexander, meanwhile, building on an 
                                                 
31
 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: a Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
32
 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government, (New York: Harper, 
1948); “The First Amendment is an absolute,” [1961] Supreme Court Review 245 
33
 Thomas Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression,” in The Philosophy of Law, R. M. Dworkin, 
ed., (OUP, 1977); “Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,” (1979) University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 519 
34
 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, (London: Routledge, 1991), (1st. ed., 1859) 
35
 Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, (New York: Random House, 1970) 
36
 C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech, (OUP, 1989) 
37
 Martin Redish, “The Value of Free Speech”, (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 591 
38
 The Tolerant Society, (OUP, 1986); see also Lee Bollinger and Geoffrey Stone, eds., Eternally 
Vigilant, (University of Chicago Press, 2002) 
39
 Speech, Crime and the Uses of Language, (Oxford University Press, 1989); Fighting Words, 
(Princeton University Press, 1995); ‘“Clear and Present Danger” and Criminal Speech’ in Bollinger 
and Stone, eds., Eternally Vigilant, (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 96-119. 
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earlier piece of collaborative research with Paul Horton,40 has questioned whether a 
coherent right to freedom of expression is possible in any event.41 
This thesis is set apart from those enquiries in the following ways.  Rather 
than concentrating on freedom of expression in a specific context, this thesis offers a 
thematic exposition, which seeks to chart judicial responses to Article 10 post-HRA.  
In this way, it builds on the enquiry by Barendt but differs by concentrating on the 
UK position (rather than being comparative, as Barendt’s work is) and is more up to 
date (Barendt’s second edition covers the law as at 31 December 2004).  None of this 
is to say that it is unique in considering free speech cases in the context of underlying 
justificatory theories (it is difficult to imagine how free speech could be considered 
without such). 
 
3. Parameters of the enquiry 
 
 Given that the significant aspects of the enquiry (set out above) are interlinked 
they are not examined sequentially but, instead, as they arise in relation to each of the 
areas to be explored.  These findings are set out in full in the conclusion where they 
are critiqued.  The parameters of this enquiry are set by its focal point, which, as 
stated, relates to judicial responses to the Article 10 right in the UK post-HRA.  In 
order to properly frame this enquiry, some discussion of the broader issues 
surrounding the nature and operation of freedom of speech, in theory and practice, is 
                                                 
40
 Paul Horton and Larry Alexander, “the Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle”, (1983) 78 
Northwestern University Law Review 1319 
41
 Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression?, (Cambridge University Press, 2005); see similarly 
Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing As Free Speech And It’s a Good Thing Too, (OUP, 1994) and 
‘The Dance of Theory’ in Bollinger and Stone, eds., Eternally Vigilant, above, fn. 38 
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necessary.  Consequently, there will be some discussion of the debate surrounding the 
development and application of the HRA and section 2 in particular (albeit in a free 
speech context); there will also be discussion of the Strasbourg approach to Article 
10; and, where relevant to the argument advanced, the dominant justificatory 
arguments for free speech will be considered.   
In overview, the first four chapters lay the foundations for the substantive 
discussion of judicial attitudes toward Article 10 in the UK in the later chapters.  
Chapter One establishes the object of the enquiry in more detail, including an 
exploration of the backdrop to the introduction of the HRA in which it will be argued 
that both the pre-HRA common law and Strasbourg jurisprudence generally tends to 
minimise (rather than maximise) the protection of free speech for varying reasons.  
Chapter Two discusses the justifications for the protection of free speech.  As noted 
above, these theories are well-established in the academic literature.  This chapter 
does not offer fresh insights into these theories but rather explores the use of them in 
the Article 10 jurisprudence (at both UK and Strasbourg level).  Following on from 
this discussion, Chapter Three pinpoints those established theories apparent in 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and, furthermore, argues that the limitations of the ECtHR 
as a court impairs those rationales from being fully realised in the outcomes of the 
ECtHR’s decisions.42  Finally in this first part, Chapter Four discusses the key issues 
concerning the HRA which impact on the UK courts’ approach to securing the right 
to freedom of expression under Article 10 domestically. 
                                                 
42
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 20, make a similar argument, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, pages 92-129. 
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Chapters Five to Seven explore the judiciary’s approach to freedom of speech 
based on the type of expression at stake.  Thus, Chapters Five and Six consider the 
approach to political expression whereas Chapter Seven explores the judicial 
treatment of ‘non-political’ speech.  In particular, Chapter Five explores the judicial 
commitment to protect political expression that shocks, offends and disturbs in order 
to understand what type of expression is included within this commitment and 
whether recent developments in the case law of a ‘right not to be offended’ 
jeopardises the realisation of this commitment.  Developing this argument, Chapter 
Six argues that the strongest form of protection does not depend entirely on 
determining the content of the speech in question but also the identity of the speaker 
and speech target.  Chapter Eight concludes by analysing the findings in previous 
chapters in order to argue that the UK judiciary has adopted a consequentialist 
approach to Article 10 that is arguably narrower in scope than both the discernible 
approach to Article 10 at Strasbourg and established theoretical approaches to 
freedom of expression.  The structure of the enquiry is set out more fully in Chapter 
One. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
______________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The chief concern of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (the “HRA”) – and, through it, the freedom of expression guarantee under 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”) – on the 
judicial approach to freedom of speech in the United Kingdom.1  In particular, it 
seeks to understand whether, as a result, the UK judiciary more readily engages with 
the established philosophical arguments for freedom of speech (evident in the 
extensive academic literature on the subject)2 in its attempts to secure the Article 10 
right as against competing societal interests and other Convention rights.  Thus, this 
thesis critiques the UK judiciary’s approach to what Fenwick and Phillipson term ‘the 
domestic Article 10 endeavour’3 and asks whether, as a result of this endeavour, the 
UK judiciary have adopted a more theorised approach to freedom of speech.  Thus, it 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis no distinction is made between ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘freedom of expression’ so that 
the two are used interchangeably.  See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 
2005), 75, who notes that if there were some difference, ‘one would expect courts such as those in 
Germany or the European Human Rights Court to give coverage to a wider range of expressive 
conduct than, say, US courts [on the basis that] the former are required to apply “freedom of 
expression” provisions, the latter the “freedom of speech” limb of the First Amendment [yet] there is 
no evidence that courts draw any distinction between the two concepts’. 
2
 As set out in Chapter Two, pages 54-90. 
3
 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act, (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 1-33. 
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is not the object of this thesis to provide an exposition of the law of free speech in the 
UK through systematic enquiry of every context in which freedom of expression 
arises as, say, Barendt4 or Fenwick and Phillipson (in the context of media freedom)5 
do.  Instead, this thesis is a thematic enquiry which principally explores the case law 
in order to discern themes in judicial reasoning on the topic of freedom of expression 
under Article 10 and how such compares to established free speech theory.  This 
thesis therefore covers a narrow specialised topic by limiting itself to considering 
domestic judicial responses to Article 10 under the HRA. 
Due to the nature of this enquiry, there are a number of issues that this thesis 
does not seek to engage with.  In particular, since this thesis focuses on judicial 
attitudes towards free speech rather than legislative or executive attitudes, this thesis 
does not specifically explore in any real depth the statutory provisions affecting 
freedom of expression in the UK except to the extent that it is argued the judiciary 
could interpret such measures more compatibility with free speech principles.6  So, 
for example, the recent Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is not covered on the 
basis that there have been no major decisions involving this legislation.7  Likewise, 
this thesis does not extensively tackle the various public order measures which also 
impinge upon freedom of speech in practice, primarily because the discussion of 
public order implicates other broader socio-legal issues, such as the allocation of 
                                                 
4
 Fn. 1 
5
 Fn. 3 
6
 See discussion in Chapters Five and Six. 
7
 For a critical discussion of this legislation, see Kay Goodall, ‘Incitement to Racial Hatred: All Talk 
and No Substance?’ (2007) 70(1) Modern Law Review 89-113.  See further, Ian Leigh, ‘Homophobic 
Speech, Equality Denial and Religious Expression’ in James Weinstein and Ivan Hare, ed., Extreme 
Speech and Democracy, (Oxford University Press, 2009); Ivan Hare ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred 
cows: criminalising incitement to religious hatred’ [2006] Public Law 521; and Ian Cram, ‘The Danish 
Cartoons, Offensive Expression and Democratic Legitimacy’ in Extreme Speech and Democracy 
(Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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public resources, which are outside the scope of this enquiry.8  Moreover, since this 
thesis is solely concerned with judicial influences on the development of Article 10, 
the discussion is limited to those areas of development that the judiciary can actively 
decide upon.  So, for example, there is no real discussion of the lack of protection for 
hate speech under Article 10.  Although there is extensive academic literature on the 
topic, including criticism of the European approach to it,9 both Parliament and the 
European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”) strictly prohibit the protection of 
such expression.  Consequently, the judiciary is bound by this position: there is little, 
if any, scope for the judiciary to find, for example, that the Race Relations Act 1976 
is incompatible with Article 10 because the ECtHR clearly endorses interference with 
racially motivated invective.10  Whilst these areas are excluded on the basis of the 
scope of the enquiry, it is also worth noting the pragmatic grounds for limiting the 
discussion in this way: freedom of speech is a mammoth topic that has been 
                                                 
8
 These issues are discussed extensively, for example, in the following: Helen Fenwick, ‘The Right to 
Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation’ (1999) 62(4) Modern Law Review 
491; Gavin Phillipson and Helen Fenwick, ‘Public protest, the Human Rights Act and judicial 
responses to political expression,’ [2000] Public Law 627; Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, 
‘Direct action, Convention values and the Human Rights Act,’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 535; Andrew 
Geddis, “Free Speech Martyrs or Unreasonable Threats to Social Peace? – ‘Insulting’ Expression and 
s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986,” [2004] PL 853; Ivan Hare, “Crosses, crescents and sacred cows: 
criminalising incitement to religious hatred,” [2006] Public Law 521; 
9
 For critical discussion of the European approach to hate speech see, for example, Ian Cram, 
Contested Words – Legal Restrictions on Freedom of Expression in Liberal Democracies (Ashgate, 
2006); Eric Heinze, ‘Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech’ (2006) 69 MLR 543.  For comparative 
analysis see Ian Cram, Contested Words; Ivan Hare, ‘Inflammatory Speech: Cross Burning and the 
First Amendment,’ [2003] Public Law 408; ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows: criminalising 
incitement to religious hatred,’ [2006] Public Law 521; James Weinstein, ‘An Overview of American 
Free Speech Doctrine and its Application to Extreme Speech’ in Extreme Speech and Democracy, and 
Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Radical Attack on Free Speech Doctrine, (Westview Press, 1999); 
Barendt, Freedom of Speech, fn. 1.  See further, Hare and Weinstein, eds., Extreme Speech and 
Democracy, Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, eds., (OUP, 2009). 
10
 See e.g., Norwood v. UK (2005) 40 EHRR SE 11; Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 3.  The 
limited exception to this principle is where the expression is reporting such speech as a matter of 
public interest, e.g., Jersild v. Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1.  See further discussion on this point in 
Chapter Three and Chapter Five. 
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extensively written about and, therefore, the discussion of all aspects of it is beyond 
the scope of a thesis in any event. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to set out the parameters of the 
enquiry in more detail, and so defend its confines, rather than to introduce the key 
theoretical issues (these are discussed in Chapter Two).  In particular, the discussion 
begins by defending the focus on the judiciary within this thesis to the exclusion of 
the other branches of government.  The discussion moves on to explore the UK 
judiciary’s pre-HRA attitudes toward freedom of speech followed by exploration of 
the expectations envisaged by the introduction of the HRA (since this, to some extent, 
contextualises the judiciary’s attitudes toward freedom of expression under Article 
10) before the final section introduces the key arguments of this thesis. 
 
2. Focusing on the judiciary 
 
 Whilst the protection of human rights is provided for by the terms of the 
HRA, the extent of protection is ultimately reliant upon the judiciary’s interpretation 
and application of those measures.11  The level of engagement by the judiciary to this 
process is therefore significant since, in the absence of further legislative measures, 
the UK courts are the gateway to the maximisation of protection afforded to human 
                                                 
11
 See, e.g., Fenwick and Phillipson, ‘Public Protest, the Human Rights Act and judicial responses to 
political expression’, fn. 8, who argued that the impact of the HRA on public protest would be 
determined not by the mechanics of the HRA nor the Strasbourg jurisprudence but by the extent to 
which the judiciary would be prepared to move away from established judicial attitudes by giving 
practical effect to the core values underlying the Convention. 
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rights under the HRA.12  This is clearly anticipated by both the provisions of the HRA 
and the rhetoric preceding its introduction.  Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the HRA are 
particularly significant in this respect.  Section 6 obliges public authorities – which is 
defined as including the courts – to act compatibly with those Convention rights 
recognised by the HRA, which includes Article 10.  Section 3 requires the judiciary 
to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention rights and, where unable to do 
so, section 4 empowers the higher courts to make a declaration of incompatibility.13  
Section 2 requires the judiciary to take the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account 
when determining cases brought under the HRA.14  Thus the judiciary’s interpretation 
and application of Article 10 is particularly significant.  Furthermore, as will be 
shown below, public statements on the HRA emanating from the executive stated that 
it would be the UK judiciary’s responsibility to ensure citizen’s rights under the 
Convention were secured since they would be the ‘front line’;15 that the HRA would 
create a human rights culture in which the judiciary would play a central and pivotal 
role.16  This aspect of the HRA raised concerns prior to its inception about the effect 
upon the judiciary’s constitutional role.17  Thus, whilst the role of Parliament and the 
executive in securing freedom of expression is important, it is the judiciary’s 
response to those expectations, presented by the HRA, which will be discussed.  In 
                                                 
12
 See, e.g., Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a 
“municipal law of human rights” under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 907.  See discussion in Chapter Four. 
13
 See, e.g., Conor Gearty, ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights’ (2002) 118 
Law Quarterly Review 248; Gavin Phillipson, ‘(Mis)-Reading Section 3 of the Human Rights Act’ 
(2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 183; Conor Gearty, ‘Revisiting Section 3 of the Human Rights Act’ 
(2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 551; D. Nicol, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after 
Anderson’ (2004) Public Law 274. 
14
 Section 2 is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
15
 See discussion at pages 33 to 35 below. 
16
 See, e.g., Lord Irvine’s statements on the HRA, which are discussed below at page 19. 
17
 See, e.g., A. Bradley, ‘Judicial Independence Under Attack’ (2003) Public Law 397. 
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this regard, the attitude of the judiciary toward freedom of speech prior to the 
implementation of the HRA is also significant. 
Yet, prior to exploring both the pre-HRA free speech case law and 
expectations for the HRA, the general approach of this thesis to gauging the 
judiciary’s response to Article 10 should be clarified.  It is acknowledged that to 
speak of the ‘judiciary’ as if it were some autonomous entity always moving in 
harmony, rather like a flock of birds in flight, may tinge the enquiry with a sense of 
unrealism before it has even commenced.  Since the judges are a divergent group of 
legal minds it is hardly surprising they may hold differing opinions on the protection 
to be afforded individual rights, particularly one as contentious as freedom of speech.  
Indeed, there is an extensive range of academic commentary which recognises that 
the attitudes of individual judges toward rights protection produces various 
approaches to decision-making in theoretical terms, particularly where the ‘separation 
of powers’ doctrine is implicated.  Some judges demonstrably cherish the opportunity 
to uphold and protect fundamental rights (‘activism’),18 whereas as some are more 
noticeably subdued about the requirements of the HRA to do so (‘restraint’);19 some 
may react differently depending on whether it is a public or private law issue at stake, 
in the former deferring to the primary decision-maker’s superior knowledge, etc., 
(‘deference’)20 whereas some react differently depending on the right at stake 
                                                 
18
 Sir John Laws, ‘Is the High Court the guardian of fundamental constitutional rights?’ (1993) Public 
Law 59; M. Cohn, ‘Judicial activism in the House of Lords: a composite constitutionalist approach,’ 
(2007) PL 95. 
19
 Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 MLR 159, 161. 
20
 R. Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and “Democratic Dialogue”: the legitimacy of judicial intervention 
under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) PL 33; T.R.S. Allan, ‘Human rights and judicial review: a 
critique of “due deference”’ (2006) Cambridge Law Journal 671. 
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(‘traditionalism’).21  Indeed, judges themselves have acknowledged both in case law22 
and extra-judicially23 that these attitudes exist.   
These differing attitudes might manifest in a number of ways.  As Lord Irvine 
explained prior to the main provisions of the HRA becoming operative, an activist 
judge would view themselves as ‘guardians of fundamental rights who serve a central 
role in ensuring accountable government’24 whereas a more restrained judge ‘less 
readily perceives that it is part of a constitutional machinery which secures 
individuals’ rights against legislative encroachment and executive abuse.’25  
Deferential judges recognise differences in institutional competence whereas 
restrained judges recognise the importance of maintaining the constitutional divide.26  
Thus ‘restraint’ is the difference between securing legality and deciding policy.27  
‘Deference’, meanwhile, Rivers argues, ‘incorporates other non-judicial bodies in 
determining the content of definitive Convention rights.  It does not necessarily imply 
a subordination of courts to those bodies; rather it is grounded in institutional 
competence’.28  It should not be assumed that judges falling within these two brackets 
have less or no interest in human rights protection.  Rather, it might be said that they 
are cautious not to overstep the mark beyond conceptions of their role in the 
separation of powers.  Thus Lord Hoffman has remarked: ‘I do not relish the role of a 
                                                 
21
 Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Public protest, the Human Rights Act and judicial responses to political 
expression,’ fn. 8, 644 
22
 E.g. R. (ProLife Alliance) v. British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23; R. (Animal 
Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (2008) UKHL 15. 
23
 Lord Irvine, ‘Activism and Restraint: Human Rights and the Interpretative Process’ (1999) EHRLR 
350, 354 
24
 Lord Irvine, fn. 23, 354 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 J. Rivers, ‘Proportionality and variable intensity of review’ (2006) CLJ 174. 
27
 See discussion in Rivers, ibid, 191-195. 
28
 Ibid., 192 
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Platonic guardian and I am pleased to live in a society that does not thrust it upon 
me’.29  The general concern, though, is that deference may lead judges to assume that 
certain subject-matter is outside judicial questioning.30  Yet deference need not, 
necessarily, deprive the HRA of force.  As Rivers argues, ‘to defer is not simply to 
accept another person’s assessment, it is to accept that the other person’s assessment 
is sufficiently reliable’.31 Principles of deference and restraint may also be applied to 
legislation or common law principles and so are not necessarily confined to cases 
involving government.32 
Judges may be more or less deferential or restrained according to the right in 
question and, more specifically, the context of desired application.  Fenwick and 
Phillipson term such judges: ‘traditionalists’.33  These judges may, for example, 
exhibit less restraint or deference when considering applications involving speech 
traditionally receiving higher protection than other ‘lesser’ forms of expression.  In A 
v. B plc,34 Dyson LJ, for example, upheld the media freedom claim (to report on a 
footballer’s extra-marital affairs), agreeing with Lord Woolf’s analysis, which placed 
great emphasis on the ideal of public interest in media freedom, yet showed scant 
regard to those free speech principles, premised on the public interest in speech, 
where an anti-abortion campaigner who targeted local pharmacies in order to 
                                                 
29
 Lord Hoffmann, fn. 19, 161. 
30
 Rivers, fn. 26, 194  
31
 Ibid, 204 
32
 A deferential approach is particularly apparent in Animal Defenders International and ProLife 
Alliance (fn. 22) in particular. These cases are discussed further in Chapters Five and Six. 
33
 Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Public protest, the Human Rights Act and judicial responses to political 
expression,’ fn. 8, 644 
34
 A v. B plc (2003) QB 195. 
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protest.35  As noted above, traditionally, media freedom has enjoyed a high level of 
protection whereas individual protest has not.36  Likewise, Lord Hoffmann and 
Baroness Hale, in Miss Behavin’ Ltd (which involved a failed sex establishment 
licence) afforded a high level of deference to the local authority.37  Both 
demonstrated a dim view of the Article 10 right engaged in vending pornography 
(which is also traditionally consistent).  Yet both have been significantly more vocal 
in protecting media freedom to report on matters of genuine public interest.38 
Definitions of activism, as with deference and restraint, may vary.  Activism 
may, for example, connote judicial intention to prioritise human rights but within the 
confines of legality39 or it may suggest the politicising of judges.40  Yet one critical 
caveat must be entered: whilst an ‘activist’ embraces the rights-based culture,41 a 
judge is not being ‘active’ simply by protecting those rights.  The HRA compels 
judges to do so; ‘rather, activism would occur when a court shirks this assigned 
function’.42  An active judge may view the HRA as representing ‘a decisive break 
                                                 
35
 Connolly v. DPP (2007) EWHC 237.  Dyson LJ saw no contribution to be made to public debate by 
this action; the contribution to public debate made by detailing the affairs of a premiership footballer, 
conversely, was a different matter, it seems.  See further discussion of this case in Chapters Five, Six 
and Eight. 
36
 See Fenwick, ‘The Right to Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation’, fn. 8.  
See further discussion in Chapter Six. 
37
 Belfast City Council v. Miss Behavin’ Ltd (2007) UKHL 19; see discussion in Chapter Two and Five 
about this case.  
38
 Lord Hoffman in R. v. Central Independent Television plc (1994) Fam 192 protecting the media 
freedom and both Lord Hoffman and Baroness Hale media freedom to report on matters of genuine 
public interest in Jameel v. Wall Street Europe Sprl (2007) 1 AC 359.  See further discussion in 
Chapter Six. 
39
 Laws, fn. 18; Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Developing constitutional principles of public law’ (2001) 
Public Law 684. 
40
 Beloff and Mountfield, ‘Unconventional Behaviour: Judicial uses of European Convention in 
England and Wales’ (1996) EHRLR 467; C. Gearty ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and 
Human Rights’ (2002) 118 LQR 248; A. Bradley, fn. 17. 
41
 E.g. Laws and Lester have long campaigned for greater protection of human rights.  See fn. 39 
42
 Cohn, fn. 18, 97. 
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from the past’43 and so, for example, may attach little or no weight to pre-HRA 
decisions.  Alternatively, the activist judge may seek to develop other Convention 
rights which conflict with free speech protection and so (potentially) limit the Article 
10 right.  For example, Eady J. has been particularly vociferous in developing privacy 
rights under Article 8, and, in doing so, has tended to find against the Article 10 claim 
in cases before him.44 
Thus to speak of the judiciary acting in an apparently unified manner may 
appear simplistic given that these competing attitudes exist.  Yet constant recognition 
of these models of judicial attitudes would only serve to cloud the issues to be 
discussed although all the time it is recognised that they exist.  Moreover, it will be 
argued that it is meaningful to discuss UK judges in this way because, at the risk of 
grossly oversimplifying the analysis, there is a sense, as will be shown, that the 
judiciary are not pulling in wildly different directions on freedom of speech issues but 
similar ones so that general themes are detectable.  It is speculated that the reason for 
this pattern is due to the growing maturity of the HRA and the Convention rights in 
the UK: that since a number of significant cases have now been decided by the Court 
of Appeal and House of Lords, the principles which govern the HRA generally and 
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 Phillipson and Fenwick, ‘Public protest, the Human Rights Act and judicial responses to political 
expression’, fn. 8, 645 
44
 Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd (2008) EWHC 1777 (held, no genuine public interest in 
clandestine sensationalist reporting of FIA chief’s sexual proclivity); P v. Quigley (2008) EWHC 1051 
(held, no conceivable public interest in allowing M, an individual, to write a ‘fictional’ account 
detailing sexual antics of P & Q, two other individuals); Prince Radu of Hohenzollern v. Houston 
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(2006) EWHC 3083 (an injunction granted to prevent disclosure of an adulterous affair; there was not 
necessarily any genuine public interest in the story and it was relevant that wife was acting out of spite 
or in revenge) cf. A v. B plc (2003), fn. 34; X v. Persons Unknown (2006) EWHC 2783 (injunctive 
relief granted to a couple in public eye going through marriage difficulties).  Incidentally, Eady J 
decided against Wall Street Europe Sprl in the first instance decision of Jameel (2004) EWHC 37 (see 
fn. 38). 
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Article 10 specifically are becoming settled.  Consequently, it is submitted, there is 
less scope for ‘maverick’ judges to depart from the orthodoxy and so reach radical 
decisions in the lower courts which might conflict with these principles.  In that 
sense, to examine the actions of the ‘judiciary’ is actually to comment on the actions 
of a select number of judges in deciding the key principles (i.e., in the Court of 
Appeal and House of Lords) and the reactions of those judges in the courts below 
who are bound to apply them.  Furthermore, given this growing maturity it is further 
possible to start mapping out the impression of the Article 10 landscape in the UK 
that these decisions have generated and in that sense critique its development. 
 
3. Backdrop to the UK judiciary’s approach to Article 10: the pre-
HRA case law and expectations for human rights development under 
the HRA 
 
a) Free speech in the pre-HRA case law 
 
It is well-established in the academic literature that freedom of speech had an 
uncertain status pre-HRA.45  Since it was not protected by any particular 
constitutional measure, it was characterised by the judiciary as belonging to the 
                                                 
45
 See, for example, Rabinder Singh, ‘The indirect regulation of speech: a time and a place for 
everything’ (1988) Public Law 212; Geoffrey Marshall, ‘Press Freedom and Free Speech Theory’ 
(1992) Public Law 40; Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is there a right to pornography?’ (1981) 1 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 177; Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (OUP, 1985, 1st edn.); Helen Fenwick, Civil 
Liberties, (Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 1998, 2nd edn.). 
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‘universal basic freedom of action’,46 occupying the realm untouched by conflicting 
statutory or common law measures.  As Donaldson MR observed in Spycatcher, ‘the 
starting point of our domestic law is that every citizen has a right to do what he likes, 
unless restrained by the common law…or by statute’.47  Consequently, since the 
realm free speech belonged to could be removed entirely (in theory at least), the 
attitude of the judiciary toward it was pivotal in determining the level of protection 
afforded to it.  However, as Barendt noted in 1985, the judiciary’s record in this area 
was ‘far from impressive; too often…free speech arguments are either ignored or 
belittled’.48  For instance, in Home Office v. Harman,49 which concerned disclosure of 
documents relating to prison facilities by a solicitor to a journalist, Lord Diplock was 
insistent – for reasons left unspoken – that the subsequent prosecution for contempt 
of court against the solicitor involved had nothing to do with freedom of speech or 
matters of public interest.50 
The context in which the speech arose was clearly significant.  For example, 
one Divisional Court judge declared that ‘the freedom to publish is one of the most 
important freedoms and the courts are jealous to preserve it’.51  Indeed, the desire to 
protect media freedom is a discernible theme in the common law jurisprudence.52  
The court tended toward protecting the press on the basis of its important 
contribution, for example, in ensuring open justice through the reporting of criminal 
                                                 
46
 AG v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) (1990) 1 AC 109. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 1st edn., fn. 45, 306. 
49
 (1983) 1 AC 280 
50
 ‘I start by saying what the case is not about.  It is not about freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
openness of justice…what this case is about is an aspect of the law of discovery of documents’, ibid., 
294. 
51
 Latey J, at first instance, reported in In Re X (A Minor)(Wardship: Jurisdiction) (1975) Fam 47, 53. 
52
 See discussion in Chapter Six, pages 225-247. 
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trials53 or to the public interest through scrutinising the affairs of government54 and so 
adopted a limited approach to interfering with that valuable contribution55 unless 
statutory provisions prevented it from doing such.56  This attitude is also generally 
evident in the case law concerning wardships,57 and, particularly, Derbyshire County 
Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd, which concerned a failed defamation claim by a 
public authority.58  Thus, in general terms, the Williams Committee found ‘the 
presumption in favour of freedom of expression is strong, but it is a presumption, and 
it can be overruled by considerations of harms which the speech or publication in 
question may cause’.59  This is evident from the case law, particularly where it 
involved breach of the peace,60 breach of confidence,61 commercial disputes,62 
blasphemy,63 and obscenity/outraging public decency.64  Even in wardship cases, the 
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 A principle commonly attributed to Scott v. Scott (1913) AC 417 in which reliance is placed on 
Jeremy Bentham’s argument that ‘publicity is the very soul of justice.  It is the keenest spur to 
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 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1993) AC 534 
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60
 Brutus v. Cozens (1973) AC 854 
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 Kaye v. Robertson (1991) FSR 62; Guardian Newspapers fn. 46; AG v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. (1976) 
QB 752; Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll (1967) Ch. 302;  
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 Schering Chemicals Ltd v. Falkman Ltd (1982) QB 1; Crest Homes Ltd. v. Ascott (1980) FSR 396; 
Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co. (1916) 1 Ch 261 
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 Chief Metropolitan Magistrate ex p. Choudhury (1991) 1 QB 429; R. v. Lemon (1979) AC 617 
64
 R. v Gibson & Sylveire (1990) 2 QB 619 (the public display of earrings made from freeze dried 
foetuses); Wiggins v. Field (1968) Crim L.R. 503 (failed prosecution against poet reciting line “Go 
fuck yourself with your atom bomb” during public recital); R. v Penguin Books Ltd. (1961) Crim. L.R. 
176 (failed prosecution concerning D.H Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover) 
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court could be persuaded that the harm to the child outweighed publication in the 
public interest.65 
Of course, even before the inception of the HRA, the UK courts had 
international obligations toward freedom of speech, having ratified the European 
Convention on Human Rights in 1951.  Although Article 10 was not directly 
enforceable in the UK prior to the HRA, the judiciary could have regard to it where 
there was ‘any ambiguity in our statutes or uncertainty in our law’66 and so used the 
Convention ‘as an aid to clear up the ambiguity and uncertainty’.67  Likewise, 
complaints could be taken to the ECtHR.  Indeed, it required both the ECtHR68 and 
Parliament69 to ensure the UK judiciary’s approach to contempt of court did not 
violate Article 10.70  It was later stated in the Spycatcher case71 and repeated in the 
Derbyshire case72 that there was ‘no inconsistency’ between English law and Article 
10 on freedom of speech.  In Spycatcher, Lord Goff said further that the lack of 
inconsistency was ‘scarcely surprising, since we may pride ourselves on the fact that 
freedom of speech has existed in this country perhaps as long as, if not longer than, it 
has existed in any other country in the world’.73  His Lordship noted that: 
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 ex parte Crook, fn. 57, where the first instance judge was ‘persuaded that the likely harm to the 
children outweighed the restriction of freedom to publish’; a decision which appellant court agreed 
with (145). 
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 Per Lord Denning, R. v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, ex parte Salamat Bibi (1976) 
1 WLR 979, 984. 
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 Ibid. 
68
 Sunday Times v. UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245. 
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 AG v. Sunday Times Newspapers Ltd. (1974) AC 273. 
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 Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), fn. 46, per Sir John Donaldson MR, 181, and per Lord Goff, 283. 
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 Derbyshire County Council, fn. 54, 551. 
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 Guardian Newspapers, fn. 46, 283. 
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‘the only difference is that, whereas Article 10 of the Convention, in accordance with its 
avowed purpose, proceeds to state a fundamental right and then to qualify it, we in this 
country (where everybody is free to do anything, subject only to the provisions of the law) 
proceed rather upon an assumption of freedom of speech, and turn to our law to discover the 
established exceptions to it’.74 
 
Lord Goff’s analysis strongly echoes Winston Churchill’s assessment that ‘in 
England there is absolute freedom of speech as long as the speech does not violate the 
law’;75 an assessment that Schauer tersely dismissed as a ‘profoundly silly 
statement’.76 
The principal difficulty with this approach to freedom of speech – aside from 
the scant regard it shows for established theory77 – is that it seemingly provided 
opportunity for either bold, principled – almost irascible – defences of freedom of 
speech or timid surrender of it to occur (on the basis that ‘the law’ provided for the 
interference), and the pre-HRA case law attests to this assessment.  The decision in 
Re X is certainly an example of the former.  The case concerned the publication of 
revelations about a well known figure that, it was feared, might cause harm to the 
daughter.  Lord Denning’s speech, in particular, is uncompromising in its defence of 
free speech.  In rejecting the notion that freedom of speech could be decided ‘simply 
[by employing] a balancing function’ (there seemed to be no public interest in 
publication), His Lordship stated: ‘but this is where freedom of speech comes in.  It 
means freedom, not only for statement of opinion of which we approve, but also for 
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 See discussion in Chapter Two. 
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those of which we most heartily disapprove’.78  He protected publication ‘because of 
the importance [attached] to freedom of the press: or, better put, the importance in a 
free society of the circulation of true information’.79  Echoing this sentiment, Lord 
Justice Hoffmann (as he then was) acknowledged in Central Television,80 that: 
 
‘Publication may cause needless pain, distress and damage to individuals or harm to other 
aspects of the public interest.  But a freedom which is restricted to what judges think to be 
responsible or in the public interest is no freedom.  Freedom means the right to publish things 
which government and judges, however well motivated, think should not be published.  It 
means the right to say things which ‘right-minded people’ regard as dangerous or 
irresponsible.  This freedom is subject only to clearly defined exceptions laid down by 
common law or statute.  The principle that the press is free from both government and judicial 
control is more important than the particular case’.81 
 
Indeed Lord Bingham went as far as to say that the risk of harm may be avoided by 
those affected ignoring media coverage.82 
 Yet, particularly in cases that did not involve the press, protection for free 
speech could appear much more precarious.83  Certainly, the same principled 
approach to protection was not always entirely evident.84  This may be explained by a 
number of factors, including the existence of statutory measures regulating the 
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contested behaviour (thus illustrating the weakness of a liberty-based approach to 
freedom of expression) – a particular issue in public protest cases.85  Consequently, it 
was argued ‘the law in this area has developed in an incoherent fashion; the lack of a 
consistent pattern is probably due to the lack of a free speech clause against which the 
other interests have to be measured’86 and ‘the judges’ readiness to allow freedom of 
expression to be restricted on uncertain or flimsy grounds’.87  Writing in 1985, 
Barendt summarised the approach to free speech in similar terms: whilst freedom of 
speech is respected, ‘the courts in the absence of a constitutional text are unable to 
give adequate weight to the freedom when it conflicts with other public values and 
interests.’88 
 Thus, the introduction of the HRA raised great expectations for the protection 
of human rights, including freedom of expression.  However, before turning to 
consider those expectations, it is important to acknowledge two cases, both decided at 
the cusp of the post-HRA era, which can be seen to have heightened those 
expectations given the strong statements of free speech principle contained within 
them: the House of Lords decisions in Reynolds89 and ex parte Simms.90  In both 
cases, having outlined the values underpinning freedom of expression in general, their 
Lordships made strong pronouncements on the right to freedom of expression in light 
of the forthcoming HRA.  The facts of these cases are discussed in greater detail in 
                                                 
85
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Chapter Six.91  In Reynolds, Lord Steyn stated that in the post-HRA era, ‘freedom of 
expression is the rule and regulation of speech is the exception requiring 
justification’.92  Furthermore – of particular relevance to the point made above – his 
Lordship stated ‘it is true that in our system the media have no specially privileged 
position not shared by individual citizens’.93  Moreover, of relevance to the 
discussion to be had in later chapters,94 the strong statements of free speech principle 
(evident in established theory95 and the Strasbourg jurisprudence)96 provided a 
significant basis for their Lordships’ decision.97  As set out above, it will be argued in 
this thesis that the UK judiciary has tended to overlook these strong statements of 
principle in favour of the outcomes in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.   
In ex parte Simms, Lord Steyn set out the values underpinning freedom of 
expression in these terms: 
 
 ‘Freedom of expression is, of course, intrinsically important: it is valued for its own sake.  But 
it is well recognised that it is also instrumentally important.  It serves a number of broad 
objectives.  First, it promotes the self-fulfilment of individuals in society.  Secondly, in the 
famous words of Holmes J. (echoing John Stuart Mill), ‘the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market’…Thirdly, freedom of 
speech is the lifeblood of democracy.  The free flow of information and ideas informs 
political debate.  It is a safety valve: people are more ready to accept decisions that go against 
them if they can in principle seek to influence them.  It acts as a brake on the abuse of power 
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by public officials.  It facilitates the exposure of errors in the governance and administration 
of justice of the country’.98  
 
It will be argued in this thesis that, despite Lord Steyn’s assessment, freedom of 
expression is not valued for its intrinsic worth by the UK judiciary99 (it is doubtful 
whether the ECtHR does either)100 and, moreover, it will be argued that the UK 
courts’ approach does not embody the broad instrumentalist approaches Lord Steyn 
sets out.101  Instead, it is a narrow form of his Lordship’s third point that prevails.102  
Fenwick and Phillipson provide an alternative interpretation of this late surge of 
judicial activism at the cusp of the HRA’s inception: in light of an imminent 
‘unwelcome foreign impact’ into UK law ‘it appears to be no coincidence that there 
was a brief burst of strong free speech judgements in 1999-2000…: it might appear 
that the judiciary were determined that the common law should not be found to 
uphold lesser standards than the Convention at the moment of incorporation’.103  
Whatever the explanation, however, such strong judicial pronouncements matched 
the high expectations for the HRA evident in the academic literature.  The general 
themes of these expectations are explored in the following section. 
 
b) Expectations for the HRA 
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The HRA was hailed as a ‘fundamental constitutional measure’104 intended to 
give rise to a culture of human rights awareness:105 it was said that the HRA would 
have a ‘profound and beneficial effect on our system of law and government and will 
develop over the years a strong culture of human rights’106 in which ‘citizen’s rights 
will gain greater recognition as an integral part of the courts’ work’.107  The Lord 
Chancellor’s Department commented that achievement of this would ‘involve a 
whole new way of thinking’ for the judiciary since they ‘will be in the front line in 
deciding whether Convention rights have been breached’.108  It was argued that the 
HRA should be applied ‘boldly and in the spirit of liberal interpretation’109 in order to 
protect rights.  Furthermore, that the success of the Act depended upon the judiciary 
not being ‘so timid that the legislation loses its effectiveness as a guarantee of the 
citizen’s fundamental entitlements’.110  Indeed, Lord Cooke went further, arguing that 
a restrained approach to the HRA risked the Act becoming a ‘dead letter’: the 
judiciary ‘must not consign the Act to the realm of lip-service and window-
dressing’.111  He added, ‘it is not enough to go through the mechanics of embracing 
human rights.  There must be a commitment of the head – and of the heart as well’.112  
Leigh and Lustgarten felt that the HRA would provide ‘latitude to UK judges to give 
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a distinctive domestic interpretation to the Convention, provided it is more generous 
to the complainant than that adopted at Strasbourg.’113  Yet the HRA was not 
universally anticipated in such positive terms114 and, indeed, it had been speculated 
before the HRA was proposed that the principles within the Convention could be 
developed through the common law without the need for statutory implementation.115  
Furthermore not all judges agreed that the HRA would have the anticipated effect on 
the law.  Lord Hoffmann, for example, demonstrated resistance to the euphoria shown 
elsewhere: ‘its potential impact has been greatly exaggerated’.116   
Thus, regardless of the previous position, the inception of the HRA meant, in 
free speech terms, that the judiciary could no longer treat free speech as simply the 
void in between legislative and common law measures: as Lord Steyn put it in 
Reynolds, as noted above, ‘freedom of expression is the rule and regulation of speech 
is the exception requiring justification’.117  To achieve this arguably required a more 
positive approach that marked out a ‘zone of action’118 in order to determine which of 
those statutory and/or common law measures violated this area.  As mentioned above, 
Fenwick and Phillipson have coined the phrase ‘the Article 10 endeavour’ to describe 
the shift in attitude required for the judiciary to grapple with the right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 being directly available to citizens in the UK.  Thus, this 
phrase encompasses ‘the multiplicity of issues thrown up by the attempt to 
                                                 
113
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interweave into a mass of existing statutory and common law provisions and 
restrictions governing [free speech], the uneven and often flawed jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR and in doing so to adopt a more theorized approach’.119  Given its obvious 
significance, the UK judiciary’s approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence is critical to 
the discussion in this thesis.  The ECtHR’s approach to Article 10, in general terms, is 
outlined in the following section. 
 
c) The Strasbourg approach to Article 10 
 
Freedom of expression is consistently described by the ECtHR as one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society.120  The Court has found that Article 10 
applies not only to information or ideas that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference but also to those that shock, offend or 
disturb such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no democratic society.121  It is, likewise, applicable to both the 
substance and form of the speech,122 including photographs accompanying news 
stories.123  Generally, there is no requirement that the State should take positive 
action in order to assist the Speaker to exercise her right,124 although in exceptional 
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circumstances this requirement may be imposed.125  The right can be claimed by all 
legal and natural persons (including companies).126  Applicants must demonstrate that 
they have been the ‘victim’ of an unlawful interference with the right – a breach must 
have occurred and not be theoretical or prospective.127  It may also be used where 
relations are governed by private law.128  Applicants must exhaust all domestic 
remedies before the application is admissible to the ECtHR;129 since Contracting 
States have the primary obligation to secure these rights they must be given the 
opportunity to redress any individual violation before it is brought to an international 
tribunal.  It is important to note that the ECtHR is not an appellate court but a court of 
review; ‘it is in no way [its] task to take the place of the competent national courts but 
rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered in the exercise of their 
power of appreciation’.130  The significance of this point will be developed more fully 
in Chapter Three.  Broadly speaking, the ECtHR asks two questions when 
determining Article 10 claims: was the right under Article 10(1) interfered with and 
was that interference justified by the exceptions listed in Article 10(2)?  Given the 
extensive broadness of Article 10(1), it is rare (though not impossible) that the 
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responding state would deny that the right has been interfered with131 and so, 
typically, the main issue is whether this interference was justified under Article 10(2). 
 Article 10(2) states that since freedom of expression carries with it duties and 
responsibilities it may be restricted where a legitimate aim is identified which is 
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society.  The legitimate aims listed 
in Article 10(2) are national security,132 territorial integrity or public safety,133 
prevention of disorder or crime,134 protection of health or morals,135 protection of 
reputation or rights of others,136 prevention of confidential information being 
disclosed137 and maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.138 
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As for ‘prescribed by law’, in Sunday Times v. UK139 the ECtHR found this to 
have two requirements: the law140 must be ‘adequately accessible’141 and the 
consequences of it foreseeable.142  Certainty in the law benefits the citizen in two 
ways: so that one may act within the law and so that the State may not act 
arbitrarily.143  However, ‘those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute 
certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable’.144  For example, certainty may 
diminish with time as, say, the interest in maintaining confidentiality becomes less 
pressing.145  Likewise, too much certainty may be undesirable since ‘it might well 
unduly reduce the effectiveness of the protection’146 and, as Sales and Hooper note, is 
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undesirable for, particularly, obscenity laws where flexibility is required for the law 
to keep pace with current attitudes.147 
In many cases, the question of whether the interference was ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ will be the pivotal test.  In Sunday Times v. UK148 the ECtHR set 
out a three stage test for this: does the interference correspond with a ‘pressing social 
need’; is the interference ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’; and, were the 
reasons given by the national authority to justify the interference ‘relevant and 
sufficient’.149  In Handyside v. UK,150 the ECtHR found that the term ‘necessary’ ‘is 
not synonymous with ‘indispensable’ neither has it the flexibility of such expressions 
as ‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’ and 
[instead]…implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’’.  Satisfaction of the test 
requires the court, at whatever level, to apply the proportionality principle,151 and 
(potentially) the margin of appreciation principle, in order to reach a decision.   
In outline, the ‘proportionality’ requirement is that the interference must be 
proportionate to the legitimate objective sought by the State:152 i.e. that a 
sledgehammer is not required to crack open a nut or, more accurately perhaps, that 
‘sledgehammers are only used when nutcrackers prove impotent’.153  The Court must 
determine whether ‘the disadvantage suffered by the applicant is excessive in relation 
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to the legitimate aim pursued by the Government’.154  Thus the State must strike a 
‘fair balance’ between protecting individual rights and upholding competing general 
community interests or specific, counter rights.  The concept of proportionality and 
specific test applied is keenly contested.155  It has been noted that the principle may, 
in any event, present national authorities with difficulties since ‘it may often be 
difficult to formulate simple and clear (and, hence, necessarily, rigid) laws that are 
capable of satisfying the doctrine of proportionality’.156  In an Article 10 context, 
therefore, the State may be restricted, for example, from applying blanket bans on 
speech unless it can demonstrate such a draconian measure is proportionate.157   
The margin of appreciation doctrine, meanwhile, explicitly recognises the 
ECtHR’s ‘subsidiary’ role158 and so provides some latitude to Member States in order 
to secure the Convention rights.159  Arai-Takahashi describes the doctrine as the 
‘measure of discretion allowed the Member States in the manner in which they 
implement the Convention’s standards, taking into account their own particular 
national circumstances and conditions’.160  Thus, it serves to ‘draw a line between 
what is properly a matter for each community to decide at local level and what is so 
fundamental that it entails the same requirement for all countries whatever the 
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variations in traditions and cultures’.161  For this reason, it has been described as the 
flip-side of proportionality.162  Letsas argues that there are two broad categories 
where the discretion is applied:163 either because there is no consensus among 
Member States on what human rights individuals have, i.e., matters involving 
morality,164 religion165 or commercial speech,166 or because national authorities are 
better placed to decide on politically sensitive issues.167  Arai-Takahashi notes that 
‘the strictness of scrutiny involved covers a spectrum ranging from a very lax 
position…to a very vigorous appraisal of the merits’.168  The existence of a wide 
margin, though, ‘does not necessitate a finding in favour of the State…but it does 
make a cautious interpretation of the Convention more likely’169 and so the intensity 
of scrutiny may be affected:170 in these circumstances, the ECtHR is likely to be 
satisfied where the State acts ‘reasonably and in good faith’171 in its interference with 
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the right.  The existence of a narrow margin means the ECtHR will scrutinise the 
decision more closely.172  In an Article 10 context this occurs, in particular, where 
political speech or matters of public interest are at stake.173  The margin of 
appreciation doctrine is variously described as both pragmatic174 and threatening175 to 
the objectives of the Convention in seemingly equal measure.  It responds to a 
judicial understanding that the continuing existence and strength of the Convention 
rights depends upon Member States desiring to further protect and develop those 
rights and so accepting the ECtHR’s jurisdiction.176  Thus the ECtHR appears to 
accept that the Convention rights lose force if those Member States terminate their 
association.177  Likewise, the ECtHR respects its subsidiary role and is keen not to 
undermine or ignore national sovereignty.178  Thus the margin of appreciation ‘is 
inherent in, and naturally derived from, the original understanding that the 
Convention should serve as a system complementary but subsidiary to national 
systems’.179  For these reasons the doctrine has been described as ‘necessary form of 
judicial restraint’.180  Yet these aims may conflict with the ECtHR’s primary role as 
guardian of Convention rights.  As Jones notes, ‘critics…maintain that the doctrine 
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represents an abdication by the Court of its enforcement responsibility’.181  
Furthermore, ‘the elastic and elusive nature of the [Doctrine] is applied by the 
[ECtHR] on the basis of ad hoc pragmatic judgments, sometimes lacking in clear and 
consistent principles’182 and so ‘the principal objection…is that it introduces an 
unwarranted subjective element into the interpretation of various provisions of the 
[Convention]’.183  This conflict is not assisted by the often obscured reasoning in 
application.  The doctrine is sometimes applied abruptly such that the limit and nature 
of review184 is not expanded or clarified and is thus a matter of some debate, in185 and 
outside186 of the ECtHR.  Thus, ‘the principal objection…is that it introduces an 
unwarranted subjective element into the interpretation of various provisions of the 
[Convention]’.187  The issue of the margin of the appreciation is discussed further in 
Chapters Three and Four. 
 
d) Conclusion 
 
Without the benefit of a constitutional measure to ensure protection, the 
ability of the common law to protect free speech was uncertain pre-HRA.  Likewise, 
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the Strasbourg courts capacity to protect free speech was (and, arguably, remains) 
limited due to the margin of appreciation doctrine.  In this regard, Barendt has 
previously argued that the ECtHR were ‘less willing to uphold the bolder free speech 
claims’.188  The reason for this is relevant to this enquiry: there are ‘good reasons to 
expect supra-national tribunals to exercise a degree of restraint: they are not enforcing 
a…Bill of Rights or exercising an appellate jurisdiction over the national courts, but 
rather ensuring for the most part that certain minimum standards are met’.189  These 
points signpost the two issues that the judiciary ought to have addressed (but, it is 
submitted, have not) when the main provisions of the HRA became operative.  First, 
that due to these identified weaknesses both the common law and the ECtHR was 
unable to fully maximise the protection afforded to freedom of speech even if minded 
to.  Secondly, as a consequence, the jurisprudence of both the pre-HRA common law 
approach to free speech and the Strasbourg Article 10 jurisprudence generally contain 
this minimalist approach to protection.  Yet this limitation has not been fully 
recognised or addressed.190  For this reason, courts could have seen introduction of 
HRA as representing a ‘fresh start’ to address these points, recognising that reference 
to existing case law might be the start not end point in order to achieve maximum 
protection.  Yet the position of the common law remains unresolved: it has been said 
that ‘the Human Rights Act 1998 now provides a domestic underpinning to the 
common law’s acceptance of constitutional rights, and important new procedural 
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measures for their protection.’191  Meanwhile, the House of Lords has decided that the 
UK Convention rights jurisprudence should ‘mirror’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence.192  
Thus, it will be argued in this thesis that the opportunity to achieve maximum 
protection for free speech has not yet been taken.  The following section sets out the 
structure of the thesis in more detail. 
 
4. The domestic judicial response to Article 10 
 
 Given the uncertain status that free speech had prior to the inception of the 
HRA, it is understandable that the greatest expectation for the HRA from a free 
speech perspective was that the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 in the 
UK would provide free speech with a clearer status and so allow it to become a more 
clearly established right.193  Yet, as has also been recognised, despite the strong 
statements of free speech principle within the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the outcomes 
of ECtHR decisions largely fail to answer those expectations for the HRA due to the 
problematic effect of the margin of appreciation, which gives member states 
discretion (of varying levels) to both secure and limit the right in certain 
circumstances.194  This point will be further explored in Chapter Three in order to 
establish the argument that close adherence to the outcomes of the Strasbourg 
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jurisprudence does not enhance the protection of free speech in the UK in this desired 
way (i.e., in a way that achieves maximum protection for free speech in the UK).195 
It has been argued that since the margin of appreciation cannot be applied 
domestically, the presence of this doctrine in the Strasbourg jurisprudence is no 
barrier to realising greater protection for free speech in the UK.196  Indeed, reference 
to established free speech theory would allow the courts to both strip away the 
limiting effect of the margin of appreciation and develop Article 10 so as to 
determine the ‘ceiling’ of the right.197  For example, Barendt has long argued that the 
meaning and scope of freedom of speech can only be properly understood against the 
background of the moral and political arguments for its protection and incorporation 
in constitutions.198  The reasons why freedom of speech ought to be protected against 
undue state interference are firmly established in the academic literature.199  Although 
there are several more established theories, there are, in broad terms, four main 
justifications for protecting expression in this way, which are based on the connection 
between speech and truth, participation in a democracy, self-fulfilment and 
autonomy.  As Chapter Two will clarify, whilst theories drawn from the first three 
justifications are generally consequentialist, theories relating to the latter are firmly 
premised on the intrinsic value of expression.  This is particularly significant in the 
context of the Strasbourg jurisprudence since, as Chapter Three will demonstrate, the 
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ECtHR’s approach to freedom of expression is firmly consequentialist.200  
Furthermore, it will be demonstrated in that chapter that the statements of free speech 
principle within the Strasbourg jurisprudence closely match the argument from 
participation in a democracy, in particular, and have similarities with the arguments 
from self-fulfilment and truth.201  Therefore, for the UK judiciary to have greater 
regard to established theory would not conflict with the courts’ obligations under 
section 2 of the HRA but rather would be in keeping with it since it would allow the 
courts to achieve greater protection for freedom of expression.  In other words, the 
core values underpinning the Article 10 Strasbourg jurisprudence can only be 
unlocked by removing the problematic effect of margin of appreciation.  Since those 
values echo established theoretical approaches to freedom of speech, greater 
adherence to those theories provides a means of achieving this end.  This argument is 
set out more fully in Chapter Four. 
Yet, it will be argued in Chapters Five to Seven that the UK judiciary has had 
scant regard to established theory.  Aside from the recognition in ex parte Simms of 
the four main justifications for freedom of speech, there has been minimal reference 
since.202  Certainly the breadth of justificatory reasons for protecting expression, 
evident in the established theory, is not overwhelmingly apparent in the post-HRA 
case law: the judiciary has hardly plumbed the depths of these justificatory theories 
when evaluating free speech claims.  Of course, this is not to say that the UK 
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judiciary’s approach to freedom of expression is not comparable to free speech 
theory.  As will become apparent from the discussion in Chapters Five to Seven, 
since the UK courts have interpreted section 2 of the HRA as an obligation not to 
advance beyond or lag behind the Strasbourg jurisprudence,203 the UK Article 10 
jurisprudence, like that at Strasbourg, is comparable to the argument from 
participation in democracy.204  Yet, in general terms, and specifically in relation to 
political expression, it will be argued that the UK courts have adopted a particularly 
narrow approach to Article 10.205  Rather than simply enquire whether the expression 
engages with the democratic process, there is a discernible trend in the UK Article 10 
jurisprudence for the judiciary to go one step further by attempting to measure that 
engagement as a means of determining whether the expression should be protected.206  
Thus, the greater the impact of the speech on the democratic process, the more likely 
the speech will be protected.  Consequently, the strongest protection seems reserved 
for expression that actually influences or affects democracy, which gives the news 
media the upper hand on regular citizens who have a political message to 
disseminate.  It will be argued in Chapter Six that this approach translates to the level 
of protection being determinable by reference not just to the category of speech 
involved but also the identity of the speaker and speech target (i.e., a measurement of 
the influence of the speaker/speech target upon the democratic process).  
Furthermore, on the basis that popular ideas have more noticeable influence on the 
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democratic process than unpopular ones, it will be argued in Chapter Five that the 
risk of a heckler’s veto being created is real as a consequence. 
It will be argued that this narrow approach to freedom of expression is 
reminiscent of the unpopular theory advanced by American Robert Bork in the 
1970s.207  This theory, which is set out in more detail in the following chapter,208 
insists that a free speech guarantee, such as the First Amendment, must be reserved 
for political expression – narrowly defined – or else the judiciary risked acting in an 
unprincipled manner.  Likewise, the UK approach echoes Vincent Blasi’s theory209 
that the main purpose of free speech is its function as a check on government 
behaviour.  This theory also takes a particularly limited view on the range of 
expression that falls within the free speech clause.  Yet the approach to Article 10 in 
UK is somewhat enigmatic since the UK judiciary has also found, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven, that comparative advertising involves ‘important issues 
of free speech’210 and, furthermore, that pornography might be protected by it.211  The 
Strasbourg jurisprudence contains liberal statements about the inclusion of such 
expression within the ambit of Article 10.212  Thus, it might be said that the UK 
courts approach to such speech is simply a product of its obligations under s. 2, HRA.  
Yet, as will be shown in Chapters Three and Seven, in relation to such speech the 
ECtHR affords member states a wide margin of appreciation.  Therefore, in 
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recognition of this, the UK judiciary could also treat such speech in the same narrow 
way that political expression is treated, finding that interferences with such speech are 
easily justifiable.  Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter Seven, the House of Lords 
recently adopted such an approach in a case involving a failed licence application for 
a sex shop in Belfast.213  These issues are set out more fully out in Chapters Five to 
Seven.   
The purpose of this brief overview is to establish the argument to be made in 
this thesis that the UK judiciary’s approach to Article 10 seems haphazard: in relation 
to political expression, it often seems particularly conservative and yet, elsewhere, 
there are moments of liberalism.  It will be argued that this can be accounted for by 
what another commentator has described as a ‘heavily under-theorised’214 approach 
to freedom of expression.  The introduction of Article 10 into the UK represented an 
opportunity to give greater constitutional protection to freedom of expression and that 
due to the weighty issues associated with the ‘Article 10 endeavour’,215 greater 
adherence to established theory provided the means to realise this opportunity.  As a 
result of the continued failure to consult theory more meaningfully, this opportunity 
has not yet been taken, although the opportunity is not lost yet. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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In setting out the parameters of the enquiry, this chapter has introduced the 
key issues that will be explored in this thesis.  The purpose of this enquiry is to 
critique the UK judiciary’s approach to Article 10 post-HRA.  In particular, this 
thesis seeks to understand how the courts’ approach compares to established theory.  
In this regard, it will explore the extent to which the UK judiciary has heeded the 
advice of commentators, such as Barendt, who have long argued that the meaning and 
scope of freedom of speech can only be properly understood in light of the moral and 
political arguments for its protection found in established theory.  Adherence to such 
would provide for a richer and more certain free speech right in the UK.  As set out 
above, by exploring the Article 10 case law in the UK post-HRA, it will be shown 
that the UK judiciary has not yet taken the opportunity that the HRA represented to 
realise a more fully formed free speech right in the UK.  It will be argued that the 
strong statements of principle evident in the Strasbourg jurisprudence are not fully 
reflected in the UK Article 10 case law: the limitations of the Strasbourg court do not 
yet seem to be fully recognised by the UK courts.  Moreover, the UK courts have had 
scant regard to established theory as a means of deciphering the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.  It will be argued that this misses the opportunity for a richer free 
speech right in the UK based on the arguments from self-fulfilment, truth and 
autonomy.  Yet the key argument of this thesis will be that the UK judiciary have 
applied Article 10 in an unnecessarily narrow manner that goes beyond the 
consequentialist rationale of both the Strasbourg jurisprudence and popular 
conceptions of the argument from participation in a democracy found put forward by, 
for example, Alexander Meiklejohn.216  Before setting out the key themes of the 
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Strasbourg jurisprudence in Chapter Three, the following chapter sets out the 
established free speech theories in more detailed, including Meiklejohn’s, and 
introduces the key features of the UK judiciary’s approach to them. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
1948); ‘The First Amendment is an Absolute’ (1961) Supreme Court Review 245.  This theory is 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Established free speech theories and 
Article 10 
______________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Four main justificatory arguments have been put forward to explain why 
freedom of expression deserves special protection against state interference.  These 
are the arguments from: participation in a democracy; truth; self-realisation (or self-
fulfilment); and autonomy.  As set out in Chapter One, it will be argued in this thesis 
that, when determining Article 10 claims, the domestic judiciary has tended to neglect 
the latter three rationales in favour of a particularly narrow conception of the 
argument from participation in a democracy.  This key argument will be sketched out 
further in this chapter.  Of course, it is fully recognised that these justificatory 
arguments have been discussed extensively in the academic literature1 and so there is 
no intention to provide new insights into them.  Instead, this chapter will identify, and 
so establish, the significant features of these justificatory rationales that will be relied 
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upon in the remainder of this thesis.  In order to contextualise this discussion, this 
chapter will refer to certain key Article 10 cases in domestic and Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.  Rather than substantively engaging with these decisions, the purpose 
of these references is to highlight the four main justificatory arguments in action in 
order to both demonstrate that these theories are judicially recognised and to frame 
the key argument of this thesis, outlined above. 
 
2. The interplay between theory and practice  
 
 As set out in Chapter One,2 Barendt makes a compelling argument as to why 
the courts ought to engage with the moral and political arguments that underpin the 
commitment to freedom of expression.3  In short, he argues that the concept of free 
speech cannot be properly understood without such engagement.  In the UK and at 
Strasbourg level, there has been judicial recognition of the theoretical arguments 
which inform the protection provided by Article 10.  In the UK, Lord Steyn has so far 
given the fullest explanation in ex parte Simms: 
 
 ‘Freedom of expression is, of course, intrinsically important: it is valued for its own sake.  But 
it is well recognised that it is also instrumentally important.  It serves a number of broad 
objectives.  First, it promotes the self-fulfilment of individuals in society.  Secondly, in the 
famous words of Holmes J. (echoing John Stuart Mill), “the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market:”…Thirdly, freedom of 
speech is the lifeblood of democracy.  The free flow of information and ideas informs 
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political debate.  It is a safety value: people are more ready to accept decisions that go against 
them if they can in principle seek to influence them’.4 
 
In doing so, Lord Steyn explicitly recognises the role of the argument from self-
fulfilment, the argument from truth and the argument from participation in a 
democracy.  It could be argued that the reference to protecting speech for its intrinsic 
value also implicates the argument from autonomy.  These four arguments are 
commonly referred to as the main justificatory theories5 that explain why speech 
phenomena should be afforded special protection from state interference.  Lord 
Steyn’s judgment echoes the approach of the ECtHR to justificatory theory: as it said 
in Handyside, ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations 
of…a [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the 
development of every man.’6 
Fenwick and Phillipson have argued that ‘the reference to ‘progress’ of such a 
society by the Strasbourg court in Handyside can plausibly be taken to refer to the 
‘discovery of truth’ rationale, in one of its variants…The ‘truth’ and ‘democracy’ 
rationales are thus linked and the Court does not here sharply differentiate between 
the two’.7  Lord Bingham has recently reached the same conclusion: ‘the fundamental 
rationale of the democratic process is that if competing views, opinions and policies 
are publicly debated and exposed to public scrutiny the good will over time drive out 
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the bad and the true prevail over the false’.8  Schauer also notes the similarity 
between the two arguments but on a different basis: of the argument from democracy, 
he argues that ‘the special concern for freedom to discuss public issues and freedom 
to criticize governmental officials is a form of the argument from truth, because the 
necessity for rational thinking and the possibility of error in governmental policy are 
both large and serious’.9  Indeed, it is Schauer’s view that these similarities extend 
further into the arguments from autonomy and self-realisation so that all four share 
the same significant doubt that government is competent to properly regulate speech 
and, therefore, he argues that the idea of protecting speech due to a deep-rooted 
distrust of government unifies these theories.10  Barendt describes this argument as a 
powerful one.11 
Yet Schauer’s negative argument for protecting speech is not one that the UK 
courts appear to readily recognise: the judiciary does not seem to doubt its 
competency to know what speech is best for progressing democratic society.  For 
example, in ProLife12 (which is discussed in more detail in Chapters Five and Six),13 
a significant element of the decision that no violation of Article 10 had occurred 
turned on the finding that the speech in question did not sufficiently contribute to the 
democratic process.14  By recognising the justificatory theories that apply, the courts 
have demonstrated some engagement with the philosophical arguments that underpin 
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freedom of expression.  Yet the extent to which the courts have so engaged is 
debatable.15  Whilst the statements in Handyside and ex parte Simms have become 
touchstones for both domestic and Strasbourg courts and whilst these statements 
provide a wide variety of reasons to protect speech, it has been forcefully argued that 
both nationally and supranationally, the courts are most concerned with protecting 
speech for its beneficial effects in progressing democratic society.16  Yet such 
concentration on the instrumental value inherent in the argument from participation in 
democracy neglects the other broader rationales as well as the intrinsic value of free 
speech.  Moreover, it will be shown that this approach denotes a superficial 
engagement with these other justificatory theories thus causing the fuller statements 
in ex parte Simms and Handyside to resemble platitudes.  Thus, as set out in Chapter 
One, the UK courts will be criticised in this thesis for neglecting the valuation of 
speech for its intrinsic value in favour of near total reliance on protection for its 
instrumental value (and a limited conception at that).  The purpose of this chapter is 
not to synthesise the four main justificatory theories in full since that task has already 
been extensively undertaken by other commentators, particularly Schauer17 and 
Barendt.18  Instead, the following discussion aims to highlight why more than a 
superficial understanding of these theories is required in order for fuller protection of 
free speech to be realised.  This task includes recognition of the weaknesses that other 
commentators have found in these theories, particularly in the argument from 
democracy, which is discussed next. 
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3 The argument from democracy 
 
Theories based on the argument from participation in a democracy tend to 
emphasise that speech ought to be protected because of its benefit to society.  Perhaps 
the chief proponent is Meiklejohn, whose theory focuses on the value of free speech 
to the democratic process.19  Without this protection, he argues, citizens would be 
unable to perform essential tasks in the political process.  Therefore, to be self-
governing, citizens must be free to hear information and ideas that are necessary for 
decision-making.  As Brennan notes of the Meiklejohnian position, ‘he argued that 
the people created a form of government under which they granted only some powers 
to the federal and state instruments they established; they reserved very significant 
powers of government to themselves.  This was because their basic decision was to 
govern themselves rather than to be governed by others’.20  This is a Lockean 
conception of state/citizen interaction.21  Meiklejohn argues that speech ‘must have a 
freedom unabridged by our agents.  Though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense, 
govern them.  Over our governing, they have no power.  Over their governing, we 
have sovereign power’.22  Bork notes, further, the notion of democratic government 
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‘would be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies’.23  
Such justifications for freedom of speech, therefore, stem from the existence of 
democratic government, not just the constitutional document which protects it.24 
Themes from Meiklejohn’s theory can be found in a number of other 
important works: in particular, those of Blasi25 and Bork.26  This is not to say those 
commentators have analysed protection for freedom of expression in the same terms.  
Like Meiklejohn, Blasi argues that the First Amendment protects freedom of speech 
due to its significance as a necessary check on State power.  He finds this ‘checking 
value’ to be a central influence on the drafters of the First Amendment due to ‘the 
central premise of the checking value [being] that the abuse of official power is an 
especially serious evil’.27  Yet Blasi’s argument covers a much narrower range of 
communication than Meiklejohn’s does.  Meiklejohn’s theory explicitly protects: 
public discussions of public issues together with the spreading of information and 
opinion bearing on those issues; education in all its phases; philosophy and science; 
literature and the arts.28  These types of speech are afforded equal and absolute 
protection from interference.29  Blasi’s theory, meanwhile, ‘focuses on the particular 
problem of misconduct by public officials’.30  Furthermore, Meiklejohn’s argument is 
not confined to freedom of expression: it is a political vision that citizens express 
themselves in order to achieve the common goal of a better society.  Thus Meiklejohn 
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rejected Holmes’ ‘marketplace of ideas’ conception for its emphasis on the self-
interested nature of mankind: that people do not seek to collaborate with their ideas 
but, instead, only ‘believe whatever will serve his own private interest’.31  
Meiklejohn’s vision clearly goes further than the usual free speech model in 
determining whether the State ought to be prohibited from interfering (for 
Meiklejohn, the prohibition is absolute) with speech: it contains a positive obligation 
on government to provide citizens with the tools to be better informed politically, 
including better education to that end.32  Blasi criticises Meiklejohn’s theory for a 
number of reasons but makes an important point about what might be called the 
sinister undertone that individuals in this constructed reality must commit to political 
participation: ‘I question whether the highly politicized society extolled by 
Meiklejohn is, or ever was, a shared ideal of the American people’.33 
In common with both Meiklejohn and Blasi, Bork has argued for a free speech 
principle centred on political speech.  Yet Bork’s conception is certainly narrower 
than Meiklejohn’s and possibly narrower than Blasi’s.  Bork argues that: 
 
‘[C]onstitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political.  
There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it 
scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic.  Moreover, 
within that category of speech we ordinarily call political, there should be no constitutional 
obstruction to laws making criminal any speech that advocates forcible overthrow of the 
government or the violation of the law’.34   
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Protected speech is limited, therefore, to ‘criticisms of public officials and policies, 
proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions and 
speech addressed to the conduct of any government unit in the country.’35  Bork 
argues that to interpret the First Amendment any more broadly than this would 
require judges to act in an unprincipled manner;36 that to include literature and the 
arts or anything else in the vein of developing the individual is unprincipled because:  
 
‘These functions or benefits of speech are...to the principled judge, indistinguishable from the 
functions or benefits of all other human activity.  He cannot, on neutral grounds, choose to 
protect speech that has only these functions more than he protects any other claimed 
freedom.’37 
 
According to Bork, political speech, however, stands apart because it is implicit in the 
representative democracy formed by the Constitution.38  As might be expected, this 
view has been widely criticised.39  It is a common theme in such criticism to question 
the workability of the narrow approach taken to definition.  Whereas Blasi’s theory 
has been criticised on the basis its operative definitional terms40 are ‘by no means 
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self-evident’,41 Bork’s theory has been because the notion of ‘democracy’ it entails is 
‘too shallow’.42  Likewise, Barendt argues that Bork’s theory takes an overly narrow 
view of interpreting the US Constitution: since they ‘must be read as a whole…the 
scope of freedom of speech can only be understood in the light of the other rights 
guaranteed in the text’, for example, that the media’s right to report on criminal trials 
stems from freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial.43  Finally, Redish has 
argued that Bork’s theory creates ‘an untenable situation’: 
 
 ‘[W]hen an individual only has an indirect say in governing his life [by voting], he has a right 
to information that will enable him to exercise his power more effectively; but when the 
individual has full and total authority to make the very same decisions [affecting only 
himself], his right to the information mysteriously vanishes’.44 
 
Redish finds this situation untenable because the individual requires such information 
as allows her to self-rule, which may well include speech beyond that deemed 
‘political’.45   
Thus the question of what counts as ‘political’ is in sharp focus.46  Yet the 
reservation of the highest form of protection for speech that is ‘political’ has been 
extensively criticised by US commentators, in particular, primarily due to the obvious 
difficulty of defining ‘political’ with any sort of precision.  As Baker has argued, ‘any 
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focus on political speech is likely to be abused’.47  This can be seen, for example, in 
Bork’s theory by the particularly narrow approaches it takes to the definition of 
‘political’.  In this regard, Kalven has questioned the competency of the judiciary to 
accurately determine what is ‘political’ and what is not: ‘it must be recognised…that 
a reason implicit in the breadth of protection afforded speech is due to the judicial 
recognition of its own incapacity to make nice distinctions’.48  He adds, that this 
‘reflects a strategy that requires that speech be overprotected in order to assure that it 
is not underprotected’.49  This observation is in keeping with Greenawalt’s 
assessment: ‘politics is not hermetically sealed offered from other human concerns’.  
He adds, ‘speech that is not explicitly political often has political implications’.50  
Baker agrees: ‘once the insight that the personal is political is fully accepted, the 
category of politically relevant speech could be virtually unlimited’.51  Furthermore, 
Baker argues that ‘like the difference between lyric and vulgarity, the identification of 
politically relevant speech depends on the eye of the beholder’.52  Bollinger expands 
on the point to explain that ‘[w]hen we turn to open-ended, ambiguous words…we 
create the opportunity for distinctions to be drawn later that we did not originally 
intend’.53  It will be argued in Chapter Five that several recent Divisional Court 
decisions demonstrate that judicial competency to determine what is ‘political’ is a 
live issue.54  It will be further argued that Meiklejohn’s approach to definition is more 
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alluring than, say Bork’s or Blasi’s, because it better reflects the broader approach to 
definition that these criticisms call for than those narrow theories do. 
As suggested in Chapter One, and as other commentators have said,55 the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence heavily favours the argument from participation in a 
democracy as the principal rationale underpinning Article 10.56  Indeed, it has been 
said that this preference is also apparent in the domestic Article 10 jurisprudence,57 as 
will be shown in this thesis.  Yet, it will be argued, that rather than following the 
Meiklejohnian model, the Article 10 jurisprudence in the UK seems more akin to the 
narrow approaches evident in Bork’s or Blasi’s theory.  For example, whilst 
Meiklejohn would protect literature and the arts on an apparently equal footing with 
public discussion of public issues, the status of the same under Article 10 appears 
more precarious.58  It has been argued that the ECtHR adopts a hierarchical approach 
to protecting expression with artistic expression below political expression in the 
pecking order.59  Fenwick and Phillipson,60 however, argue that because the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence evidences a strong consequentialist approach to protecting 
speech, artistic expression is particularly disadvantaged since demonstrating that the 
expression has some beneficial effect on democracy may be difficult to prove, 
especially where it offends morals61 or religious sensibilities.62  This point will be 
discussed more fully in Chapter Seven.  Furthermore, in keeping with Bork’s thesis 
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especially, the ECtHR operates a strict principle that speech which is intended to 
undermine the principle of democracy will not be protected by Article 10 even though 
that speech may express a political idea, e.g., fascism.63  Likewise, the prohibition on 
Holocaust denial speech has been found to be consistent with Article 10 because such 
speech makes no contribution to the democratic process.64  These points concerning 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence will be established more fully in the following chapter.  
Having outlined the argument that a comparison can be made between the narrow 
theses advanced by Bork and Blasi, it will be argued that the criticisms made of those 
theses are also applicable to the domestic approach to Article 10 in particular.65  In 
particular, it will be argued that the requirement to establish what benefit the 
expression makes to the democratic progress is a test for which no independent 
calculus exists to determine the answer and thus requires the judiciary to resort to ad 
hoc balancing.  As noted above, Kalven has previously made similar comments about 
approaches to the First Amendment.66  It will be argued in Chapter Five that this 
criticism is particularly apt where offensive political expression is involved.67  
Furthermore, it will be argued, as Fenwick and Phillipson do,68 that the heavy 
reliance upon the consequentialist rationale has the effect of favouring traditional 
sources of ideas and information, particularly the media, when the court is 
determining Article 10 claims.69  Consequently, it will be argued that the principle of 
free speech is impoverished in the UK due to the onus that this consequentialist 
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approach places on expression to demonstrate its worth70 and so weakens the 
assumption evident in established theory that free speech of itself is worth protecting.  
As Weinstein, for example, notes: 
 
‘instrumentally based rights tend to be more fragile than morally based ones; they are 
vulnerable to being overridden … if the utilitarian calculus suggests that society would be 
better off without them.  In contrast, rights that are justified in terms of moral rights of 
individuals as well as benefiting society as a whole tend to be sturdier.’71   
 
These criticisms of consequentialist approaches to freedom of speech do not yet seem 
consistently recognised by the UK judiciary.72  Thus, despite having elements in 
common, it will be argued that the differential approach to types of expression (i.e., 
political, artistic and commercial) is a major departure from Meiklejohn’s thesis since 
the latter makes no such distinction because the rationale for protecting speech is read 
into such forms of expression (i.e., education in all its phases, literature and the arts, 
philosophy and science): 
 
‘[T]here are many forms of thought and expression within the range of human 
communications from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to 
human values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot 
should express.’73 
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It will be argued that the domestic jurisprudence does not adopt such a liberal 
approach to determining which expression may attain the highest levels of 
protection.74 
Of course, it is recognised that Meiklejohn’s approach is not without 
difficulties and thus, even if the judiciary were to recognise the issues with narrow 
approaches to freedom of expression, such as Bork’s or Blasi’s, close adherence to 
Meiklejohn’s theory might not provide a total solution.  For example, whilst Bork’s 
theory clearly would not protect speech which attacks the foundation of democracy, 
Meiklejohn’s theory, meanwhile, has been criticised because it would appear to 
protect such: Bollinger, for example, doubts that Meiklejohn’s theory has ‘anything 
to say about speech restrictions that are the product of the democratic system’ and 
‘why in particular we should protect speech that seeks to undermine the system 
itself’.75  Furthermore, it is unlikely that the domestic judiciary could protect such 
speech even if minded to do so: regardless of the conflict it would present with 
Strasbourg jurisprudence,76 there are a number of legislative measures that might 
prohibit anti-democratic speech, such as the Race and Religious Hatred Act 2006, for 
example. 
Moreover, as Barendt observes, concerns about consequentialism are 
applicable to Meiklejohn’s theory as well77 and so there are ‘awkward repercussions’ 
because a state might consider the values of democracy are best achieved by 
suppressing speech or, worse still, as Schauer observes, since the people are 
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sovereign, the majority might demand the minority is silenced.78  However Barendt 
argues that this concern can be remedied if the conception of democracy used is 
refined to a Dworkinian view embodying equal respect and concern.79  In this way, 
Barendt argues, the fundamental principle that everyone is entitled to participate in 
public debate – including those with unpopular views – is preserved and so is not 
‘surrendered to the powers of the elected majority’.80  This is a crucial principle.  Yet 
it will be argued that the domestic jurisprudence does not sufficiently guard against 
this and in Chapter Five it will be argued that the UK courts’ approach to offensive 
political expression, in particular, creates the risk of a Heckler’s Veto being 
established.  
However, whilst the argument from participation in a democracy is the 
dominant rationale applied in Article 10 cases, it is not the only rationale applied, as 
will be shown.  Chapter Three will demonstrate in more detail how the other broader 
established rationales for protecting speech have been applied in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, albeit with varying success.  The following section explores the 
argument from truth and outlines how this established theory has recently been 
applied by the House of Lords in ADI.81 
 
4. The argument from truth 
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ADI concerned the blanket ban on political advertising using the broadcast 
media.  More detailed facts, unnecessary for this chapter, are set out in Chapter 
Four.82  Lord Bingham found the ban was not incompatible with the claimant’s 
Article 10 rights on the following grounds: the fundamental rationale of the 
democratic process is that ideas, etc, are debated and scrutinised in public so that, 
over time, ‘the good will...drive out the bad and the true prevail over the false’ and 
that ‘it must be assumed that, given time, the public will make a sound choice’.83  
However, this is not achieved where the ‘playing field of debate’ is uneven: where 
wealthy organisations buy advertising/broadcast time to swamp the market with their 
own political ideas (true or false) so that these ideas ‘may come to be accepted by the 
public not because they are shown in public debate to be right but because, by dint of 
constant repetition, the public has been conditioned to accept them’;84 the public must 
be ‘protected against the potential mischief of partial political advertising’.85 Thus 
His Lordship finds the case is not really about serious debate but about the ‘more 
pervasive and potent’ effect of ‘the broadcast media’: essentially, that it seriously 
distorts perceptions of truth/falsehood within the mind of the citizen so that they are 
conditioned to accept them without applying any form of rational thought or 
reasoning.86  Baroness Hale, in agreeing with Lord Bingham, adds that ‘[the 
Claimant] can seek to put their case across in any other way, but not the one which so 
greatly risks distorting the public debate in favour of the rich’.87  
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Thus, Lord Bingham placed reliance on the central issue not being about 
serious debate because the effect of the broadcast media prevented such debate 
occurring.  This finding is not particularly persuasive: the broadcast media cannot 
prevent serious debate ‘by dint of constant repetition’.  Instead, the decision seems to 
be founded on the concern that voters may reach the ‘wrong’ decision when forming 
political opinion or voting for candidates; yet the reason why this should be so is 
unarticulated, which is particularly troubling given that Baroness Hale88 notes the 
position is opposite in the USA where such an argument has been rejected in the 
context of limits on election expenditure on the basis such restrictions would breach 
the First Amendment.89  Having acknowledged the elephant in the room, Baroness 
Hale does nothing much about it, commenting only that we do not want that sort of 
thing in the UK.90  The difficulty with the reasoning in ADI is that it looks like 
control shrouded in paternalism: it is a big claim that political advertising can be so 
alluringly persuasive as to rob the citizen of all cognitive reasoning so that they 
become automatons at the polling station.  Of course, this type of reasoning can be 
also found in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  In the seminal case of Jersild v. 
Denmark,91 the ECtHR stated that ‘it is commonly acknowledged that the audio-
visual media have often a much more immediate and powerful effect than the print 
media’92 but provided no further evidence of this claim, aside from passing reference 
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to a similar finding in an earlier Commission decision.93  Neither is the claim 
established by the ipso facto statement that ‘plainly, this application is made [by the 
Claimant] precisely because television and radio are judged to be the most effective 
advertising media’.94  Instead, it strongly resembles an argument that citizens should 
be protected from making bad political decisions and, as such, it invokes an objection 
raised by Redish:  
 
‘[Suppose] an individual wishes to …vote for a candidate because the candidate looks good 
with his tie loosened and his jacket slung over his shoulder, who are we to tell him that these 
are improper acts?  We may prefer that he make his judgments…on more traditionally 
‘rational’ grounds…[b]ut in these areas society has left the ultimate right to decide to the 
individual, and this would not be much of a right if we prescribed how it was to be used’.95 
 
Lord Bingham’s judgment implicates the argument from truth: that the power 
of broadcast media interferes with the usual process in which, eventually, goods 
defeats bad and truth overcomes falsehood.  Yet, this application of it is different 
from the theory expounded by J. S. Mill: it is much narrower, as will be shown; 
Mill’s does not deny protection to speech because it is false or risks the audience 
reaching bad decisions.  The inference in Lord Bingham’s dicta that the broadcast 
media conditions the viewer into accepting that view as fact parallels Mill’s argument 
that knowledge of ‘the truth’ results from an understanding of it (why it is true) not 
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from being told that it is true;96 however this argument is most powerful where the 
truth cannot be tested by virtue of competing evidence, testimony or opinion.  Lord 
Bingham’s judgment does not say that the competing views are prevented by virtue 
of the political advertising alone: indeed, His Lordship acknowledges that there 
would be good grounds to find Article 10 had been breached if the advert was ‘to 
counter the effect of commercial advertising bearing on an issue of public 
controversy’.97   
Yet it is positive that the argument from truth was employed to determine the 
case, albeit in a less than fully reasoned manner.  It is submitted that Mill’s argument 
provides a broader basis for protecting speech and, also, since it shares common 
features with the argument from self-fulfilment and autonomy, provides the basis for 
more meaningfully applications of those theories.  These arguments will be set out in 
the remainder of this chapter, commencing with an exploration of Mill’s argument in 
more detail. 
The argument from truth has long antecedents stretching back to the 
seventeenth century and beyond98 yet the justification is predominantly associated 
with J. S. Mill.  His classic work On Liberty contains his theory of free speech, 
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which, in outline, is that speech ought to be protected because unimpeded debate 
leads to the discovery of truth.99  The argument is not premised on truth always 
defeating falsehood in the short term but that truth will eventually surface in the long 
term.100  Yet Mill strongly argues against suppression of opinion because it is held to 
be false.  To do so would be an assumption of infallibility:101 ‘We can never be sure 
that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, 
stifling it would be an evil still’102 because the suppressed opinion may turn out to be 
true103 or it may be false but falsehood has value in providing a ‘livelier impression’ 
of the truth.104  Furthermore, rational discourse requires a proper understanding of the 
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arguments for and against the ‘truth’.  Holding a true opinion is not equivalent to 
understanding it.105 
 Mill’s theory has been criticised for a number of reasons, particularly where it 
has been interpreted as an argument that truth will succeed falsehood in the 
‘marketplace of ideas’.106  As Baker says, ‘why bet that truth will be the consistent or 
even the usual winner?’.107  If the focus of enquiry is on Mill’s apparent conditional 
assumption that truth will always be victor in ‘a grapple with falsehood’108 then 
Mill’s theory has little value as an explanation of why speech ought to be protected.  
Certainly such causality seems dubious at best.  Bollinger memorably dismisses the 
notion that truth will always ‘win out’ as ‘Pollyannaish’.109  He says it deserves ‘the 
brushing aside that Alexander Bickel gave it when he said “We have lived through 
too much to believe it”’.110  Nazi power in 1930s Germany, McCarthy’s America, and 
the general resistance to the American civil rights movement all illustrate the point.  
Yet this dismissal neglects Mill’s point.  Mill acknowledges that it is a ‘pleasant 
falsehood’ to believe that ‘truth will always triumph over persecution’ but that ‘over 
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the course of ages’ it will ‘escape persecution’.111  Bollinger dismisses this argument 
as an ‘empty plea’ on the more cynical basis that ‘to nearly all of us…the long run 
will always come too late’.112  Yet this does not fully address Mill’s argument.  The 
illustrations above are snapshot evidence.  Across a century, or even a decade, the 
choice of the collective was to put ‘right’ these ‘wrongs’, so perhaps Mill is right.  
Bollinger more firmly resists the argument from truth on the basis that it ignores the 
impact of ‘propaganda and manipulative political rhetoric on political behaviour’.113  
Yet this dismissal by reference to propaganda114 overlooks ‘the importance that Mill 
attaches to trying to know the truth instead of merely having true opinions’.115 
 It has been said that Mill’s theory has no longevity for the protection of free 
speech and, therefore, is of little value as a justification.  Redish argues that ‘any 
theory positing that the value of free speech is the search for truth creates a great 
danger that someone will…finally [attain] knowledge of the truth.  At that point, that 
individual (or society) may feel fully justified, as a matter of both morality and logic, 
in shutting off expression of any views that are contrary to this “truth”.’116  As noted 
above,117 Holocaust denial prohibition, which exists in many Eastern European 
countries, has been found compatible with Article 10118 and so represents a practical 
example.  Yet Redish’s point may be challenged for a number of reasons.  According 
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to Redish, over time the number of debatable topics will diminish as each 
discoverable truth is found and so the argument from truth will have diminishing 
application.  Yet, as Redish recognises, Mill’s theory protects falsehood because its 
‘expression makes the truth appear even stronger by contrast’.119  Redish anticipates 
this point: ‘acceptance of Mill’s initial premise that the goal of free speech is the 
ultimate attainment of truth does not necessitate acceptance of this…premise’.120  Yet 
this does not entirely displace Mill’s point that falsehood is an indirect reinforcement 
of the truth once the ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ signifiers have been assigned.  By way of 
illustration, Redish says that ‘the view that the Earth is the center of the Universe 
does not deserve … protection, because we know the truth to be different’.121  Yet, 
equally, because the truth is known and demonstrable, this falsehood reinforces that 
truth since a request for proof cannot be satisfied.  Furthermore, there are other two 
significant ways in which Mill’s theory might be used to counter Redish’s argument.  
First, through the ‘Assumption of Infallibility’122 argument: it is an assumption of 
infallibility to declare a statement false.123  As Ten clarifies, ‘the opinion we desire to 
suppress may very well be false, as we claim it to be, but, as fallible beings, we can 
have no rational assurance that it is false unless there is freedom to discuss it’.124  
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Second, through Mill’s ‘Necessity of Error’125 argument, denial of discussion 
prevents understanding (in a meaningful sense) of the grounds of the opinion:126 
‘Men will hold on to a belief quite independently of the balance of arguments and 
evidence for and against it.’127  Therefore, ‘as far as Mill himself is concerned, the 
ultimate defence of freedom of discussion lies …in his Assumption of Infallibility 
and Necessity of Error Arguments.’128  C. L. Ten expands on this view:  
  
 ‘Though Mill thinks that in the end there would be a consensus of opinion on many currently 
contentious matters,129 he believes that this state of affairs is desirable only if it results from 
freedom of discussion.  He does not regard peace and tranquillity, to which the absence of 
conflicting and contentious views gives rise, as intrinsically desirable, irrespective of how 
they were attained.  In this he differs from so many of his critics who share the views of 
Fitzjames Stephen that if all men could be made, without too great cost, to have true opinions, 
this would be “the greatest of all intellectual blessings”.  Whereas Stephen merely wanted 
men to have true beliefs, Mill wishes them to know the truth’.130 
 
Thus, because of both these arguments true opinions cannot be foisted upon 
individuals as the only option: individuals ought to reach this conclusion 
independently.  Admittedly, Mill’s argument cannot account for any inequality of 
access to the ‘marketplace’ or that Mill’s notional ‘discussion’, in practice, may not 
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be ‘open to everyone who wants to communicate his ideas’.131  What Mill’s theory 
offers in response is minimal: it is the assertion that even ideas that ‘hardly figure in 
public discussion’132 will emerge eventually if they are true.133 
Furthermore, Redish’s argument concerning the diminishing number of 
‘truths’ to be discovered appears to be posited on truth being a static concept.  
However, it is debatable whether the ‘truth’ is a static concept or whether, instead, 
‘truths’ change or vary as society changes.  For example, a fact may become 
unreliable as time progresses (the quantity of fossil fuels in the 1800s compared to 
today) or the discovery of a ‘truth’ in one context may alter a ‘truth’ in another (the 
discovery of the scientific effect of fossil fuels has affected political attitudes toward 
environmental issues).  In a sense, Mill’s argument assumes that truth is a 
discoverable quality.  It is not self-evident that such discoverability will always exist.  
The terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ are equal and opposite.134  There is, therefore, an 
assumption that issues of a political and moral nature can be similarly segregated and 
this must be a weakness in Mill’s argument.  Even on a collective level, across a 
broad timeframe, several courses of action for a political or moral issue may have 
equal appeal because each depends on a balance of desirable and undesirable 
outcomes (or potential outcomes).  On this basis, the utility of Mill’s argument may 
be challenged since determination of which option is ‘truth’ and which is ‘falsehood’ 
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will hold little scope for reliable classification on this binary basis.  To say, when 
presented with these difficult choices, that one is truth and the others are not is an 
inaccurate reflection of reality.  The outcome of the decision may be subject to 
unforeseen or random influences.  For example, consider the dilemma of determining 
policy for purchasing expensive medicine that benefits a small group of individuals.  
To purchase them might save several lives but, minus that money, others might 
suffer.  Equally, the medicine might be purchased but those patients die anyway.  It 
seems implausible to suggest truth is a verifiable fact prior to the decision since the 
‘correctness’ may be something that cannot be evaluated until afterwards.  This 
highlights what Redish describes as an ‘internal contradiction’: ‘the theory’s goal is 
the attainment of truth, yet it posits that we can never really know the truth, so we 
must keep looking.  But if we can never attain the truth, why bother to continue the 
fruitless search?’.135  Yet arguably, it is the process of discovering truth that is most 
significant: that Mill’s theory illustrates the significance of ensuring the truth is not 
accepted as such until the reasons for it are understood.  As Ten suggests,  
 
‘[Mill] wants people to hold their opinions in a rational manner, with a knowledge of the 
significance of these opinions and the grounds for them, and with a willingness to change or 
modify them in the light of new arguments and evidence’.136   
 
This is not naivety137 or elitism138 by Mill but an accurate depiction of what the 
process of debate ought to do.  In other words, we might interpret Mill’s argument 
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not as saying truth will be revealed if free debate prevails but rather that truth can 
only be revealed if free debate prevails.  As Ten observes: Mill defends free speech as 
‘an indispensable condition for the holding of rational beliefs’.139  The emphasis, 
therefore, is on the value of the process in its connection to the outcome.140   
 These aspects of Mill’s argument do not seem apparent from the Strasbourg 
approach to Article 10 outlined earlier in this chapter.  There does not seem to be a 
discernible judicial recognition that the Court lacks the competence to determine what 
ideas, etc, are important or beneficial for society at large.  As Schauer argues, ‘just as 
we are properly sceptical about our own power always to distinguish truth from 
falsity, so should we be even more sceptical of the power of any government 
authority to do it for us’.141  Applying this principle ought to broaden the protection 
afforded by Article 10: it ought to restrict lesser protection being afforded to speech 
because it is to a limited audience or affects a limited number of individuals.  
Furthermore, since this principle is evident in other justificatory theories based on the 
intrinsic value of speech, greater recognition might cause these theories to be taken 
more seriously.  These theories are discussed in the following section. 
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5. The arguments from self-fulfilment and autonomy 
 
 Despite Lord Steyn’s finding in ex parte Simms that freedom of speech serves 
the objective of promoting self-fulfilment,142 the apparent judicial approach of 
protecting speech for its perceived beneficial effect on society at large seems 
fundamentally at odds with the argument from self-fulfilment (or self-realisation) as 
conceived by Redish: 
 
‘if the centrality of the self-realization value were recognized, the Court would necessarily 
acknowledge that it is not for external forces…to determine what communications or forms of 
expression are of value to the individual; how the individual is to develop his faculties is a 
choice for the individual to make’.143 
 
In other words, awarding protection for speech based on judicial perceptions of its 
significance or contribution conflicts with the argument from self-realisation, which 
places such decision-making solely within the remit of the audience.  This feature 
appears to conflict with ADI since in that case the House of Lords does appear to 
make such a decision for the audience.  That the judiciary does not seem to recognise 
this point suggests that either the judiciary does not have a deep understanding of the 
theory or else, despite contrary statements, does not place much reliance upon the 
argument from self-fulfilment when determining Article 10 cases. 
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The argument from self-fulfilment implicates a number of distinctive theories 
which regard freedom of speech as critical to the development of the individual and 
which values freedom of speech not only for its instrumental value but also for its 
intrinsic value.  As Barendt notes, such theories argue that restrictions on speech 
‘inhibit our personality and its growth’.144  The inherent value achieved by protection 
has been described as ‘liberty’145 and ‘self-realisation’146 amongst other things147 and 
is closely related to the argument from autonomy popularised by Scanlon.148  These 
theories, though, are not just restatements of each other: there are significant 
differences between them.149  The major difference between the argument from self-
fulfilment and the argument from autonomy is that whilst theories based on self-
fulfilment may be explicated in terms that value expression for its instrumental and 
intrinsic worth, theories based on autonomy value expression solely for its intrinsic 
worth. 
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Redish’s argument posits that self-realization is the ‘ultimate value’150 that the 
guarantee of free speech serves.  This ‘one true value’151 is, in fact, two values: ‘self-
development’ and ‘self-rule’.  Self-development allows an individual to realise their 
full potential in life by developing their ‘powers and abilities’.152  Self-rule permits 
‘control of [one’s] own destiny through making life-affecting decisions’.153  Baker 
meanwhile argues that ‘the liberty theory justifies protection of expression because of 
the way the protected conduct fosters individuals’ self-realization and self-
determination’.154  Baker notes that Redish’s distinctions ‘correspond closely to my 
presentation [of] self-realization (compare Redish’s self-development component) 
and self-determination (compare Redish’s self-rule component).’155  The liberty 
model ‘repeatedly emphasizes people’s self-fulfilment and participation in societal 
change’.156  Scanlon’s justification based upon autonomy derives from the principle 
that ‘a legitimate government is one whose authority citizens can recognize while still 
regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.’157  Scanlon explains that 
‘to regard himself as autonomous…a person must see himself as sovereign in 
deciding what to believe and in weighing competing reasons for action.’  Therefore, 
‘an autonomous person cannot accept without independent consideration the 
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judgment of others as to what he should believe or what he should do’.158  Scanlon’s 
thesis thus contains the decision-making functions and self-development function that 
Redish and Baker identify.  Each of these variations also claims that there is value in 
speaking of itself regardless of content and, therefore, speech ought to be protected on 
that basis. 
The difference between these theories appears sharp in application as 
definitional tools but oblique in justification terms.  Baker dismisses Scanlon’s theory 
because of the protected acts of expression it includes,159 which is a definitional issue, 
yet, as a justification, notes, ‘respect for people’s autonomy is roughly the liberty 
theory’.160  Redish asserts, unconvincingly, that ‘autonomy’ is too narrow because it 
includes only the ‘decision-making value’,161 not individual development.  Scanlon’s 
thesis does focus on the limitation of state power,162 which is perhaps more 
appropriate to decision-making issues, yet the accuracy of Redish’s assertion appears 
challengeable.  Scanlon’s emphasis on the relationship between free speech as a 
means of rational deliberation163 necessarily affects individual development in a 
positive way.  Perhaps this does not extend as far as Redish’s notion of individual 
development but his argument appears more applicable to definition than 
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justification.  Maybe Redish’s best riposte would be that his self-fulfilment thesis 
removes any doubt as to whether self-development is included. 
The arguments from self-realisation have been criticised on the basis that the 
values they promote may be achieved by methods besides debate.  As Schauer argues 
‘even if communication is a sufficient condition for intellectual self-fulfilment, it 
does not follow that it is a necessary condition’164 since experiences may produce the 
same result.  Barendt argues likewise: ‘[u]nless some reasons can be given for 
treating expression as particularly significant, the case for a free speech principle 
made on this basis becomes hard to distinguish from general libertarian claims to do 
anything which an individual may consider integral to his personality’.165  Self-
realisation is unlikely to only stem from free debate.  Experiences will also develop 
the self: escape from near-death leads, surely, to appreciation of life.  Whilst this 
criticism is important in philosophical terms it need not interfere with the application 
in practice: a judge might easily limit the application to recognised expression.166 
A further difficulty raised about these arguments is the causality they seem to 
assume between ‘self-realisation’ and free debate.  As Barendt notes, ‘it is far from 
clear that unlimited free speech is necessarily conducive to personal happiness’.167  
Schauer similarly argues that speech is not sufficient for this purpose: ‘the value of 
communication in the process of intellectual development is of necessity limited by 
the range of experiences that are the subjects of the communication’.168  Neither is it 
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clear that unlimited speech will necessarily promote or permit the individual to make 
autonomous decisions or lead to self-rule/self-determination.  As Barendt also 
comments, some restrictions ‘on saturation advertising by a candidate for office, 
could be justified in order to foster a climate for rational thought by the public’.169  
These difficulties are not easily overcome.  The argument from self-realisation values 
speech for its intrinsic worth.  This might manifest in several ways, for example, as 
an emotional pressure valve or through an increased sense of dignity, respect or self-
worth.  Yet recognition of this intrinsic worth would suggest that any suppression of 
speech unduly restricts these benefits.  This argument would seem to consider free 
speech as predominantly a speaker’s, rather than audience, right.  The difficulty with 
this aspect of the argument is that it cannot explain when speech ought to be restricted 
without damaging its internal cogency.  Any nontrivial theory must allow speech to 
be restricted in certain circumstances.  As Greenawalt argues, ‘the government must 
protect citizens from social harms’.170  Financial, emotional and physical harms might 
also be added to this list.  Yet theories based on the benefit to individuals seem to be 
premised on it being the individual, not the State, deciding whether to access the 
information or not, which leaves little or no room for government interference.  
Government reasons for wishing to interfere, whether well-intended or not, would 
appear irrelevant.  Greenawalt dismisses this aspect as ‘implausible’.171  This 
criticism is particularly pertinent to Scanlon’s argument from autonomy since, as 
Blasi notes, ‘[it] rests on the proposition that unless individuals retain a basic 
minimum of choice-making capability, they cease to be ‘individuals’ at all’ yet ‘the 
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concept of human autonomy is largely irreducible’,172 which therefore significantly 
reduces scope for state interference.  Neither, as Barendt notes, is the State ‘entitled to 
suppress speech on the grounds …that its audience will form harmful beliefs or that it 
may commit harmful acts as a result of these beliefs’.173   
In a later article, Scanlon conceded that the benefit of such a broad principle 
was probably not as strong as he originally believed.174  This is not to say that 
Scanlon does not make a good point, that the individual should have a strong voice in 
deciding what to say, think or hear but that the diminished scope for government to 
interfere is a significant weakness and, as Scanlon admits, such broadness is most 
likely unnecessary.  Yet Scanlon’s theory remains valuable because it focuses on the 
principle of the right rather than its consequential effect.  The arguments from self-
fulfilment do similarly.  The importance of this is that it recognises that individuals 
ought to be able to hear all sides of the debate in order to decide for themselves.  In 
this sense, the argument from self-fulfilment and autonomy need not be applied so 
broadly as Scanlon, Baker and Redish suggest in order to have a broader effect on 
Article 10 than is evident in, say, ADI.   
Furthermore, in this sense, there is a clear connection with Mill’s argument 
from truth in the value he places on rational discourse being achievable only where 
individuals understand the truth having heard all sides.  Comparisons with the 
argument from truth have been recognised by a number of commentators.  Redish, for 
example, says that the argument from truth175 ‘if viewed as merely a means by which 
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the ultimate value of self-realization is facilitated, the concept may prove quite 
valuable in determining what speech is deserving of constitutional protection’ since 
‘the individual needs an uninhibited flow of information and opinion to aid him or her 
in making life-affecting decisions’.176  Indeed, Baker self-promotes the ‘liberty’ 
model as a means of ‘cur[ing] major inadequacies of the ‘truth’ argument.’177  
Likewise Scanlon explicitly states his ‘autonomy’ justification is an extension of 
Mill’s thesis.178  He describes it as the Millian Principle.179  Perry similarly notes that 
‘the self-fulfilment value seems to me to reduce to the truth value’180 on the basis 
both reflect ‘an essential characteristic of human beings [which] is their need for, and 
their capacity to pursue and achieve, an even better understanding of reality’.181  It is 
this essential element which is present in general terms in both the arguments from 
self-realisation and truth and, furthermore, it is this element which is not reflected 
either specifically in ADI or generally in the courts central positioning of the 
democratic-process value in Article 10 jurisprudence.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 The discussion set out above is not an argument for the prioritisation of self-
fulfilment, autonomy or truth arguments but for a better footing for each within the 
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domestic Article 10 jurisprudence.  In addition to the contribution to the democratic 
process, the Strasbourg jurisprudence states that freedom of expression under Article 
10 ‘constitutes one of the essential foundations...for each individual’s self-
fulfilment’.182  Yet this does not seem fully recognised in decision outcomes.  This 
could be achieved more readily if the judiciary adopted a broader approach to the 
values inherent in freedom of speech so that its intrinsic value is not lost.  In practical 
terms, this means greater prominence to the arguments from autonomy and self-
fulfilment in particular.  Furthermore, the judiciary should, in any event, recognise 
the limits of their competence to determine what speech is beneficial.  As the UK 
Article 10 jurisprudence is surveyed in this thesis, it will be argued that the judiciary 
has not fully mapped out its approach to Article 10 and, indeed, Hare has recently 
argued that the UK approach to freedom of expression ‘remains heavily under-
theorised’.183  Before exploring, in greater detail, what the UK domestic case law 
reveals about the judiciary’s approach to Article 10 and established theory, the 
following chapter outlines, by reference to recent decisions, the evident approach in 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence to these issues. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Strasbourg approach to freedom of 
expression compared to theory: 
Examining recent Article 10 decisions in 
the European Court of Human Rights 
______________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The discussion within this chapter considers the Article 10 jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”).  The following chapter goes on 
to consider how this rich and well-established jurisprudence is treated by the UK 
courts under the Human Rights Act 1998.  The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is 
not to consider how the UK judiciary treats or ought to treat the Strasbourg case law 
but rather to map out both the nature and limitations of the ECtHR’s evident approach 
to Article 10 as a reference point to that later discussion.1  Drawing upon extensive 
academic literature in this area and recent case law, the nature of the pre-eminent 
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consequentialist rationale (outlined in Chapter One)2 will be set out and comparisons 
made with the established body of free speech theory discussed in the previous 
chapter.  It will be argued that the consequentialist approach of the ECtHR bears 
close comparison with the argument from participation in a democratic society (albeit 
it is not exclusively premised on this rationale) although more closely resembles 
Meiklejohn’s theory3 than the more conservative theories of Bork and Blasi.4  This 
argument informs the main theme of this thesis that the dominant UK approach to 
Article 10 is discernibly narrower in scope than both the Strasbourg approach and the 
argument from democracy as formulated by Meiklejohn in particular. 
 
2. The Strasbourg approach in outline: mechanics and rationale 
 
a) Mechanics 
 
 The mechanics of the ECtHR’s approach to the right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 are well-documented in the academic literature5 and are briefly set 
                                                 
2
 At pages 35 to 44. 
3
 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government, (New York: Harper, 1948); 
“The First Amendment is an absolute,” [1961] Supreme Court Review 245 
4
 Robert Bork, ‘Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,’ [1971] 47 Indiana Law 
Journal 1; Vincent Blasi, ‘The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory’ (1977) American Bar 
Foundation Research Journal 521.  See discussion in previous chapter. 
5
 See, e.g., Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act, (Oxford University 
Press, 2006); Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 2005, 2nd ed.); Y. Arai-
Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR, (Intersentia, 2002); A. Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European 
Convention on Human Rights, (Butterworths, 2001); Janis, Kay and Bradley, European Human Rights 
Law, (Oxford University Press, 2000, 2nd ed.); Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, (Butterworths, 1995). 
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out6 in this section in order to frame the following discussion of recent decisions.  As, 
for example, Fenwick and Phillipson point out,7 analysis of the Strasbourg approach 
to freedom of expression must be viewed in the context of its limitations as a court.  
In particular, the ECtHR cannot be equated with a constitutional court like those in 
the United States of America or Canada.  As the ECtHR has reiterated many times, it 
is an international court of review and, consequently, ‘it is in no way [its] task to take 
the place of the competent national courts but rather to review under Article 10 the 
decisions they delivered in the exercise of their power of appreciation’.8  As is well-
established in the academic literature,9 this limitation is significant for a number of 
reasons but two in particular: first, in positive terms, the purpose of the ECtHR is to 
establish the minimum level of human rights protection that member states should 
achieve rather than establish its limits (i.e., it establishes a ‘floor’ not a ‘ceiling’ of 
rights),10 which means that members states have scope to maximise protection 
beyond the Strasbourg jurisprudence; secondly, in more negative terms, this 
limitation recognises two distinct aspects of the ECtHR’s position: first, the 
Convention applies ‘across a vast and disparate area, an area with hugely differing 
cultural sensitivities’11 (and so achieving minimum harmonisation is arguably more 
pragmatic than maximum harmonisation); secondly, the Convention system has an 
obvious dependency upon the continuing support of its signatories for its authority 
                                                 
6
 For a fuller discussion of the mechanics of the ECtHR’s approach to Article 10 albeit in a media law 
context see Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5, 37-107. 
7
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5, 6-7. 
8
 Handyside v. UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737, [50]. 
9
 See fn. 5. 
10
 See Jonathan Lewis, ‘The European ceiling on human rights’ [2007] Public Law 720. 
11
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5, 7. 
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and, therefore, must ‘retain the loyalty of governments, rather than of the peoples of 
Europe’.12 
 The ECtHR has developed general principles to govern the operation of the 
Convention rights and specific principles relevant to Article 10.  Of its general 
principles, the most significant are the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
proportionality principle, both of which were outlined in Chapter One.13  These 
principles have been discussed extensively in the academic literature14 and are 
mentioned briefly in order to contextualise later discussion in this chapter and the 
thesis generally.  As set out in Chapter One, the ECtHR has adopted a three stage test 
to determining whether the Article 10 right has been violated: first, did the 
interference have a legitimate aim (as listed in Article 10(2));15 secondly, was the 
interference prescribed by law;16 and, finally, was the interference necessary in a 
democratic society?  As set out in Sunday Times v. UK,17 this latter test involves three 
questions: does the interference correspond with a ‘pressing social need’; is the 
interference ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’; and, were the reasons 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 See pages 35 to 44. 
14
 See Lester, ‘Universality versus Subsidiarity: a reply’ (1998) 1 EHRLR 73; Laws, ‘The Limitations 
of Human Rights’ (1998) PL 254; Lavender, ‘the problem of the margin of appreciation’ (1997) 
EHRLR 380; Singh, Hunt and Demetriou, ‘Is there a role for the Margin of Appreciation in national 
law after the Human Rights Act?’ (1999) EHRLR 15; K. A. Kavanagh, ‘Policing the margins: rights 
protection and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) EHRLR 422; George Letsas, ‘Two 
concepts of the margin of appreciation’ (2006) OJLS 705; Paul Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of 
Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’ (1998) 19 HRLJ 1; T. H. Jones, ‘The devaluation of 
human rights under the European Convention’ (1995) PL 430; Fenwick, ‘The Right to Protest, the 
Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation’, (1999) 62(4) MLR 491; J. A. Sweeney, ‘Margin 
of appreciation: cultural relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the post-Cold War era’ 
(2005) ICLQ 459; Arai-Takahashi, fn. 5. 
15
 The legitimate aims listed in Article 10(2) are national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, protection of reputation or rights of 
others, prevention of confidential information being disclosed and maintenance of the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
16
 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245; Hashman and Harrup v. UK (2000) EHRR 
24. 
17
 Fn. 16, [62]. 
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given by the national authority to justify the interference ‘relevant and sufficient’.18  
Thus the test implicates both the necessity of the state interference (in order to protect 
another right or interest) and the means adopted to achieve that protection.19  Since it 
is the task of each member state to secure the rights and freedoms that the Convention 
enshrines,20 the ECtHR allows each state a margin of appreciation in relation to both 
securing the right and in determining the reality of the ‘pressing social need’ to 
interfere.21  The width of this margin depends on two factors: first, the correlation 
between the expression in question and the democratic principles underpinning the 
Convention;22 secondly, in recognition of the cultural diversity between the member 
states, on whether the needs of the legitimate aim invoked can be assessed objectively 
or else entirely depend upon local conditions.23  Consequently, in relation to the first 
element, it is commonly accepted that although the ‘rhetorical attachment to free 
speech is always strong’,24 a much narrower margin exists for interfering with 
political expression than commercial expression since the former connects with the 
democratic process more keenly than the latter.  This point will be discussed in more 
detail shortly.  In relation to the second element, the ECtHR recognises that the extent 
to which the legitimate aims concern objective notions varies, thus the ECtHR is 
better able to assess the requirements of some of these aims compared to others.  
Letsas argues25 that wider margins apply in these circumstances either because there 
                                                 
18
 See, for example, Lavender, fn. 14, where Lavender analyses the varying (and, he suggests, 
conflicting) approaches taken by the court to this question, 387-389. 
19
 Handyside v. UK, fn. 8, [48]. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid., [49] 
23
 Ibid., [48]. 
24
 Fenwick and Phillipson, fn. 5, 50. 
25
 Letsas, fn. 14, 722-723. 
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is no consensus among member states on what human rights individuals have (i.e., on 
matters involving morality,26 religion27 or commercial speech28) or because politically 
sensitive issues are involved (i.e., national security or public safety29). 
Yet, although the ECtHR affords these margins, in order to ensure its 
supervision is not ‘illusory’30 it scrutinises the interference to ensure it is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  Thus, regardless of the margin applied, 
the Court must be satisfied that ‘the disadvantage suffered by the applicant is [not] 
excessive in relation to the legitimate aim pursued by the Government’.31  In 
recognition of their symbiotic relationship, the proportionality test is said to be the 
‘flip-side’ of the margin of appreciation doctrine.32  However, as has been observed 
by several commentators,33 the intensity of this proportionality analysis covers a 
spectrum, according to the width of the margin involved, ranging ‘from a very lax 
position…to a very vigorous appraisal of the merits’.34  Thus where the expression or 
legitimate aim involved permits only a narrow margin of interference, a stricter 
approach to the issue of proportionality is evident.  For example, in Sunday Times v. 
                                                 
26
 Handyside, fn. 8.  It has been held that a lack of public outcry does not necessarily mean restrictive 
judgments are not responding to a genuine public need, Muller v. Switzerland (1991) 13 EHRR 212. 
27
 E.g., Wingrove v. UK (1997) 24 EHRR 1; Otto-Preminger v. Austria [1995] 19 EHRR 34; Murphy v. 
Ireland (2004) 38 EHRR 13; IA v. Turkey (2007) 45 EHRR 30. 
28
 E.g., Markt Intern Verlag Gmbh v. Germany (1990) 12 EHRR 161; Casado Coca v. Spain (1994) 18 
EHRR 1; Jacubowski v. Germany (1995) 19 EHRR 64; Krone Verlag Gmbh & Co. KG v. Austria 
(2006) 42 EHRR 28 though where a public interest is involved that margin is diminished Hertel v. 
Switzerland (1999) 28 EHRR 534. 
29
 Brind v. UK, (1994) 18 EHRR 76; McLaughlin v. UK, (1994) EHRR 84; Zana v. Turkey (1999) 27 
EHRR 667, . 
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 Handyside v. UK, fn. 8, [50]. 
31
 National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (1979-1980) 1 EHRR 578, 595. 
32
 Y. Arai-Takahashi describes the margin of appreciation as the ‘flip-side’ of proportionality: The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, fn. 5, 14. 
33
 See Letsas, fn. 163; J. Rivers, ‘Proportionality and variable intensity of review’ (2006) CLJ 174.  
See also Bosma, Freedom of Expression in England and under the ECHR: In Search of a Common 
Ground (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) and Van Dijk and Van Hoof, The European Convention on 
Human Rights: Theory and Practice, (Kluwer, 1998, 2nd edn.) as discussed in Fenwick and Phillipson, 
fn. 5, 79-81. 
34
 Arai-Takahashi, fn. 5, 189. 
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UK,35 the expression in question involved a matter of utmost public interest (the 
effects of the drug thalidomide) and the legitimate aim involved (the authority of the 
judiciary) was one for which there was ‘a fairly substantial measure of common 
ground’36 amongst the Member States.  Consequently, the ECtHR adopted a strict 
approach to whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society.37  
Alternatively, where the margin is wider in respect of both the expression and the 
legitimate aim, the proportionality test appears limited to the issue of whether the 
State’s approach was not unreasonable.38  As Fenwick and Phillipson argue, this 
lesser standard is ‘a world away’ from limiting inference to that which is least 
intrusive39 and, furthermore, would seem to conflict with the principle that exceptions 
to Article 10 must be narrowly construed.40  This does not, however, mean that the 
finding of a wide margin necessarily leads to no violation being found: the ECtHR 
may decide the reasons put forward by the Member State to show the interference 
was proportionate simply do not stack up.41 
 
b) Rationale 
 
This section outlines the pre-eminent rationale that underpins the ECtHR’s 
approach to Article 10 in order to make initial assessments on how this approach 
                                                 
35
 Fn. 16. 
36
 Ibid., [59]. 
37
 Ibid., [59] in which the ECtHR said that the margin of appreciation ‘does not mean that the Court’s 
supervision is limited to ascertaining whether a respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, 
carefully and in good faith’. 
38
 See, e.g., Casado Coca v. Spain (1994) 18 EHRR 1 or Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1995) 19 
EHRR 34. 
39
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5, 81. 
40
 Handyside v. UK, fn. 8, [49]. 
41
 See Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland (1993) 15 EHRR 244. 
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compares with the established free speech theories (outlined in the previous chapter) 
for the purposes of analysing recent decisions.42  Moreover, having set out the 
mechanics of the ECtHR’s approach to Article 10 claims in the previous section, and 
in particular, having established that the width of the margin of appreciation is 
dependent upon both the type of expression and the legitimate aim of the interference 
and, furthermore, that this width directly affects the intensity of the proportionality 
test applied, the argument, outlined in Chapter One,43 that the Strasbourg approach is 
heavily reliant upon a consequentialist rationale will be developed in this section in 
order to be tested in the following sections by reference to recent decisions. 
The ECtHR’s approach to Article 10 is fairly settled: in each Article 10 
decision, the Court tends to reiterate the principles enunciated in earlier case law, 
particularly those set out in Handyside.44  Thus, the ECtHR tends to begin its 
judgments by reminding itself that freedom of expression constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment and that Article 10 applies to 
information and ideas, whether favourably received or not (including that which 
offends, shocks or disturbs) such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’.45 
As outlined in Chapter One, it has been argued that the ECtHR adopts a 
hierarchical approach to protecting expression so that categorisation of the speech 
determines the strength of protection afforded, with political expression sat atop 
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 See Sections 3 and 4 below. 
43
 See pages 35 to 44. 
44
 Fn. 8. 
45
 Ibid., [49]. 
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followed by artistic then commercial.46  For example, in VgT47 the ECtHR stated that 
the exceptions to Article 10(2) must be narrowly construed and convincingly 
established ‘particularly where the nature of the speech is political rather than 
commercial’.48  Fenwick and Phillipson have developed this analysis by arguing that 
the categorisation of the speech is not the determinative factor: instead, it is the 
connection between the expression and the democratic principles underpinning the 
Convention that is the key to determining the level of protection to be afforded.49  
Consequently, certain types of political expression may be no better protected than, 
say, artistic or commercial expression, particularly where a wider margin of 
appreciation is implicated due to the competing right or interest which the speech 
conflicts with.  Fenwick and Phillipson’s analysis relates to the observation outlined 
above that the margin of appreciation is based on both the type of expression 
involved and the nature of the state’s legitimate aim in interfering with the speech.  
The decision in Handyside v. UK attests to this analysis: despite the strong pro-free 
speech sentiment Handyside ultimately lost his claim because of the wide margin 
afforded to the UK on public morality.50  The connection between freedom of 
expression and democratic principles was made explicit in Refah Partisi v. Turkey:51 
expression that conflicts with democratic principles (i.e., that which attacks or seeks 
to undermine democracy) ‘cannot lay claim to protection of the Convention’.52  Thus, 
in determining Article 10 claims, it has been argued that the ECtHR is examining the 
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 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention of Human Rights, (Butterworths, 
1995, 1st edn.), 397. 
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 VgT v. Switzerland (2002) 34 EHRR 4. 
48
 Ibid., [66]. 
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 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5, 50-72. 
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 Fn. 8. 
51
 (2002) 35 EHRR 3. 
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 Ibid., [43]. 
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expression for signs that it advances democratic participation or accountability.53  
Applying this analysis, Fenwick and Phillipson conclude that ‘Strasbourg’s reasoning 
is firmly consequentialist, practical and concerned above all with ensuring the free 
flow of widely disseminated information relevant to legitimate public debate’.54   
The similarity between this approach and the argument from participation in 
democracy outlined in the previous chapter is manifest (a more critical comparison is 
set out in section four below) but Fenwick and Phillipson are sceptical that the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence also upholds the self-fulfilment, truth and autonomy 
rationales, despite judicial statements (evident in Handyside) that suggest these 
rationales also inform the Article 10 right: ‘freedom of expression is valued [by the 
ECtHR] not really as an aspect of individual autonomy or for the contribution it 
makes to the flourishing of individuals but for the part it plays in maintaining a 
democratic society’.55  It will be argued, below,56 that the consequentialist rationale 
applied by the ECtHR is akin to Meiklejohn’s conception of the argument from 
participation in democracy in as much as it focuses attention on whether the speech 
attempts to contribute to the democratic process rather than whether that expression 
actually contributes and that this is particularly evident from the recent decisions to 
be discussed in the following section.  This next section is subdivided so as to 
consider, first, the treatment of political expression and then, secondly, the treatment 
of non-political expression in order to demonstrate the ECtHR’s approach to each. 
 
                                                 
53
 David Feldman, ‘Content Neutrality’ in Ian Loveland, ed., Importing the First Amendment, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 1998, 2nd edn.), 157 
54
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5, 71. 
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 Ibid., 71. 
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 See Section Four. 
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3. Recent decisions 
 
a) Political expression 
 
 In keeping with the argument from participation in a democracy, it is a clear 
and constant principle in the Strasbourg jurisprudence that political expression may 
only be interfered with in the narrowest of circumstances and thus any interference 
with it is subjected to the closest scrutiny.57  The ECtHR has stated that ‘freedom of 
political debate’ lies ‘at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which 
prevails throughout the Convention’.58  This principle has manifested itself in a 
number of specific ways.  In particular, it is clear that the limits of acceptable 
criticism are wider for politicians than private individuals (because the former 
‘inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and 
deed’59 unlike the latter).  Similarly, attempts to interfere with the speech of 
politicians calls for ‘the closest scrutiny’ because politicians are spokesmen ‘for the 
opinions and anxieties of [their] electorate’.60  The ECtHR acknowledges that the 
press has an ‘important role’ to play not just in terms of reporting matters of this 
nature (i.e., on matters of accountability) but also on broader issues of public interest 
as seen, for example, in the case of Jersild which concerned the reporting of violent 
racist attitudes amongst groups of young people.61  As a consequence, it has been 
                                                 
57
 Sunday Times v. UK, fn. 16. 
58
 Lingens v. Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407, [42]. 
59
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60
 Castells v. Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, [40]-[42]. 
61
 Jersild v. Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1. 
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noted by several commentators that the audience interests in receiving speech 
relevant to the democratic process (in a broad sense) is a guiding principle in the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence62 given the clear principle that the public has a right to 
receive information and ideas of public interest.63  This has clear similarities with 
Meiklejohn’s conception of argument from participation in democracy, which, as set 
out in the previous chapter, argued that in order to self-rule effectively, citizens 
require all information relevant to the voting process, including information of public 
interest.64  However, the significance of audience interests within the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence provides the possibility that those who are able to communicate 
directly or more effectively to the public (i.e., the press and politicians) than others 
(i.e., individuals) may have an enhanced free speech right under Article 10 as a 
consequence.  Thus, Fenwick and Phillipson argue that:  
 
‘the ‘democracy’ rationale, in which the importance of informing and educating the voters has 
such prominence, therefore inherently gives particular weight to the role of the media, as 
opposed to individual expression, since it is only ‘the fourth estate’ which has the ability to 
disseminate information and political discussion on a large scale’65 
 
Certainly statements made about the press by the ECtHR would seem to resonant 
with this argument: the Court consistently describes the press as holding a ‘vital role 
of “public watchdog”’66 in which it has the task of imparting information of public 
                                                 
62
 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 2005, 2nd edn.), 26, 64-67; Fenwick and 
Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5. 
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interest67 and since the press ‘affords the public one of the best means of discovering 
and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders’.68  Prima facie, 
the press would seem to enjoy an advantage when claiming an infringement of Article 
10. 
 It will be argued in later chapters69 that the discernible approach of the UK 
courts toward the Article 10 claims of the press suggests a greater receptivity to free 
speech claims made by journalists than non-journalists, even though the same type of 
speech may be at stake.  As a consequence it will be argued that the UK courts have 
also interpreted Article 10 in such a way as to value the beneficial effects of speech 
upon society as a whole rather than value it for its symbolic worth, as Fenwick and 
Phillipson argue the Strasbourg courts have done.70  Thus it is agreed that the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence bears little comparison with the broader rationales for 
protecting speech, i.e., the arguments from autonomy and self-fulfilment,71 and it will 
be argued that this is also true of the UK judiciary’s approach.  However, it is 
submitted that there are discernible and important differences between the ECtHR’s 
and UK judiciary’s approach to the question of ‘beneficial effect’.  Whereas, as 
outlined in Chapter One,72 it will be argued in this thesis that the UK courts seem to 
determine protection by reference to the actual contribution made by the speech, the 
Strasbourg court does not tend to look beyond the question of whether the speech 
intended to contribute to a debate of public interest.  In other words, the Strasbourg 
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court seems more concerned with the issue of whether a genuine public interest 
existed – one that clearly connects with the democratic foundations of the Convention 
– as in Jersild, for example, rather than assessing the extent to which the speech made 
a worthwhile contribution to the democratic process.  As is evident from the recent 
cases to be discussed, once the ECtHR is satisfied that a debate of public interest is 
identifiable and that the expression sought to engage with that debate, the critical 
question for determining whether Article 10 has been violated is whether the reasons 
for interfering with that expression are necessary in a democratic society (and this 
involves consideration of the right or interest at stake). 
 As a consequence of the ECtHR’s approach to Article 10, which, as 
identified, must be understood not only in terms of its comparison with the argument 
from participation in democracy but also by reference to the ECtHR’s limitations as a 
court, the press may appear to have an advantage over non-journalists.  However this 
is not to suggest that the ECtHR overtly prefers the claims of journalists over non-
journalists.  If anything, the advantage arises due to the type of competing right or 
interest engaged since individual expression tends to involve questions of morality or 
public order that press freedom does not and thus a wider margin of appreciation 
doctrine is applied.73  Furthermore, the ECtHR clearly draws a distinction between 
reporting information or ideas and advocating them with the result that controversial 
political ideas may or may not be protected under Article 10 depending on whether 
the speaker seeks to convince the public of these ideas74 or rather alert the public to 
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the fact that others hold these ideals.75  Clearly, this also impacts on the 
press/individual expression distinction.  The argument that the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence does not overtly prefer the press is, to some extent, borne out by two 
recent decisions, the first of which confirms the longstanding principle that press 
freedom has limits even where discussing matters of public interest whilst in the 
second decision the ECtHR explicitly states that the Article 10 claims of individuals 
should not be treated less seriously than those of the press. 
As to the first case, it is well-established that there are limits which the press 
must not ‘overstep’,76 including that the press must act in good faith in order to 
provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism.77  Thus the press receives no special treatment in this respect.  The recent 
decision in Lindon v. France78 demonstrates the ECtHR upholding this principle.  In 
this case, the ECtHR held that the French courts had not violated Article 10 where it 
found a novelist and journalist had defamed a politician by comments made in a book 
which were then later repeated in a newspaper.  Prima facie, the decision is perhaps 
unexpected given the principles outlined above that politicians must tolerate greater 
criticism than private individuals and the importance attached to the press.  Moreover, 
the politician concerned, Jean Marie Le Pen, is a controversial figure in France due to 
his involvement with the ‘Front National’ and, as the ECtHR reported ‘is known for 
his virulence of his speech and his extremist views’79 which have led to previous 
convictions for ‘incitement to racial hatred, trivialising crimes against humanity, 
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making allowances for atrocities, apologia for war crimes, proffering insults against 
public figures and making offensive remarks’.80  Although the ECtHR recognised 
that, as set out in previous decisions, freedom of expression allows for a degree of 
exaggeration or even provocation81 and, furthermore, that outspoken politicians with 
extreme views expose themselves to harsh criticism as a consequence and, therefore, 
must display a particularly high degree of tolerance82 nevertheless it agreed with the 
French courts that the mark had been overstepped by accusations that Le Pen was the 
‘chief of a gang of killers’; that he had ‘advocated’ a murder (albeit in the context of a 
fictional novel); and that he was a ‘vampire who thrives on the bitterness of his 
electorate but sometimes also on their blood’.83  These comments were made first by 
a novelist and then repeated by a journalist who, after Le Pen had successfully 
pursued a defamation claim against the novelist, was so apparently outraged by the 
victory that he invited Le Pen to sue him as well, which he duly did.  This case 
confirms that the media are not over-privileged in as much as it emphasises the 
requirement of responsible journalism. 
 Moreover, secondly, in the recent decision of Steel & Morris v. UK84 the 
ECtHR expressly rejected the argument that the free speech claims of non-journalists 
should be treated less seriously than journalists.  The case concerned members of a 
campaign group who had distributed leaflets attacking alleged practices of 
McDonald’s restaurants and who were successfully sued for defamation as a 
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consequence.  The campaigners claimed in the ECtHR that the denial of legal aid and 
inequality of arms amounted to a violation of Article 6 and a disproportionate 
interference with Article 10 and, further, that the size of the defamation award 
(£60,000 reduced to £40,000 on appeal) given the applicant’s means and the fact that 
McDonald’s had not proved any loss amounted to a violation of Article 10.  In 
response, the UK government had argued that since the campaigners were not 
journalists they should not be afforded the high level of protection that the press 
received when discussing matters of public interest.85  In finding that there had been a 
violation of both Article 6 and 10, the ECtHR rejected the government’s argument, 
pointing out that ‘in a democratic society…there exists a strong public interest in 
enabling [small and informal campaign groups] and individuals outside the 
mainstream to contribute to the public debate by disseminating information and ideas 
on matters of general public interest such as health and the environment’.86  
Elsewhere in the decision, the ECtHR referred to the ‘legitimate and important role 
that campaign groups can play in stimulating public discussion’.87  If the ECtHR did 
differentiate between the free speech claims of the press and non-journalists, seeing 
one as more valuable than the other, then this seemed to be an opportunity for the 
Court to confirm as much if not expand upon how this difference manifested itself in 
Article 10 terms.  The fact that the ECtHR did not do so, emphasising instead the 
significance of speech ‘outside the mainstream’, would seem to confirm that the press 
does not qualify for preferential treatment under Article 10. 
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 It was argued, above, that, as part of its evaluation of the ‘beneficial effect’ of 
the expression, the ECtHR examines both the nature of the expression and the reasons 
put forward for the interference.  Moreover, it was argued that, in terms of the 
expression, the ECtHR’s approach to the question of ‘beneficial effect’ is limited to 
identifying whether the speech concerns a matter of genuine public interest or not.  
This point is also illustrated by recent decisions.  In Von Hannover v. Germany,88 
Princess Caroline of Monaco succeeded in her Article 8 claim that her right to respect 
for privacy had been violated by published photographs of her that revealed nothing 
more than aspects of her everyday life.  As Fenwick and Phillipson note, ‘it was not 
possible to mount even a colourable argument that [the expression] contributed to any 
discussion of legitimate public concern’.89  Thus the Article 10 claim failed because 
the speech did not demonstrate any genuine connection with the democratic process.  
This point is further apparent from consideration of the ECtHR’s recent findings in 
Nikowitz v. Austria,90 Tonsbergs Blad as and Haukom v. Norway,91 Verlagsgruppe 
News GmbH v. Austria (No. 2)92 and Vereinigung Bildender Kunstler (“VBK”) v. 
Austria93 where, in each case, the Article 10 claims succeeded despite the counter-
claims made that the expression did not actually contribute to the democratic process.  
The findings in these decisions suggest that the intention to contribute to a discussion 
of public interest is more significant than the extent to which an actual contribution to 
that debate was made. 
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 Nikowitz concerned a satirical cartoon published in the aftermath of a national 
skiing champion accidentally breaking his leg.  The cartoon depicted a competitor, 
Mr. Eberharter, revelling because the accident improved his own chances of future 
success.  Eberharter sued in defamation, successfully arguing that the image depicted 
him as disdainful of his colleague’s injury and, in that sense, damaged his reputation.  
The Court found that this constituted a violation of Article 10.  In particular, it stated 
that whilst obviously written in a satirical style, the cartoon ‘sought to make a critical 
contribution to an issue of general interest, namely society’s attitude towards a sports 
star’.94  Arguably this evidences a generous approach to the question of both ‘public 
interest’ and ‘contribution’.  It is well-established in the Strasbourg jurisprudence that 
the notion of public interest extends beyond narrow issues of, say, political 
accountability95 however the relevance of publicly recognisable figures to that 
context is a matter of debate.96  In any event, however, it was not as if the expression 
sought to expose hypocritical or morally repugnant behaviour by that individual:97 
indeed, it was a central tenant of the ECtHR’s decision that the cartoon could not be 
understood as depicting any sort of reality about Eberharter’s attitudes toward his 
competitor.  Thus, the decision confirms that it is the intention to contribute that is 
significant not the measurement of its actual contribution. 
 In Tonsberg Blad as and Haukom v. Norway, a newspaper reported on 
permanent residence requirements drawn up to control the high demand for holiday 
homes.  In particular, it reported that two individuals, a well-known singer and Mr 
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Rygh, an Executive Vice President of a large Norwegian company, had ‘escaped’ this 
residence requirement due to a ‘major loophole’.  In a later article, the newspaper 
reported that the properties of these individuals did not, in fact, qualify for the 
permanent residence requirement.  Nevertheless Mr Rygh successfully sued in 
defamation.  Whilst it was not disputed that the expression was defamatory, the 
ECtHR found that the amount awarded to Rygh represented an excessive and 
disproportionate interference with Article 10 ‘capable of having a chilling effect on 
press freedom’.98  The Norwegian government had argued that the expression ‘hardly 
corresponded’ to a matter of public interest.  In response, the ECtHR stressed that 
‘whether or not a publication concerns an issue of public concern should depend on a 
broader assessment of the subject matter and the context of the publication’.99  
Furthermore, the ‘possible failure of a public figure to observe laws and regulations 
aimed at protecting serious public interests, even in the private sphere, may in certain 
circumstances constitute a matter of legitimate public interest’.100  Thus whilst the 
Court accepted that the article did not ‘directly address’ Mr Rygh’s role as an 
industrial leader, neither was it entirely about his private life. 
 Similarly, in Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria (No. 2), a newspaper 
reported on pending investigations against ‘Mr G.’, the managing director of a well-
known enterprise producing pistols for use by the Police, on suspicion of large-scale 
tax evasion.  This article was accompanied by a photograph of Mr G.  At first 
instance, the Austrian courts granted Mr G.’s application for an injunction to restrain 
publication of the photograph but only in so far as the accompanying text described 
                                                 
98
 Fn. 91, [101]. 
99
 Ibid., [87]. 
100
 Ibid. 
110/385 
him as more than a suspect in the enquiry.  However, the Supreme Court later 
widened the injunction so that the photograph could not be published in any context 
linking Mr G. to reports of tax evasion charges on the basis that tax evasion 
investigations were not public enquiries and that tax officials were bound by secrecy.  
Focusing on the restriction to accompany the report with a picture of Mr G., the 
ECtHR found that ‘articles of this kind are capable of contributing to a public debate 
on the integrity of business leaders, on illegal business practices and the functioning 
of the justice system in respect of economic offences’.101   
 As noted above, when determining the margin of appreciation involved in any 
particular claim, the ECtHR looks at the nature of both the expression and the 
competing interest involved.  What these cases show – the latter two, in particular – is 
that in determining the level of protection to be afforded to the expression it is the 
intention to contribute to the democratic process that is significant; there is no 
measurement of the actual contribution made.  If it were otherwise, then it might be 
expected that a lesser degree of protection would be evident in these cases given the 
qualified descriptions of the contribution made by the expression: in Verlagsgruppe 
News GmbH, the ECtHR referred to articles ‘of this kind’ rather than the actual article 
and, similarly, in Tonsberg Blad as and Haukom the Court said the article ‘may’ 
contribute to the debate.  If the measure of the actual contribution to the democratic 
process was significant then the ECtHR might have attached less importance to the 
speech, particularly in Tonsberg Blad as and Haukom given that the speech was 
factually inaccurate.  In other words, what the ECtHR did not say, as it might 
otherwise have done, was that since the speech in Tonsberg Blad as and Haukom was 
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factually inaccurate it could not make any real contribution to the public interest 
debate and in Verlagsgruppe News GmbH it could have decided that the injunction on 
the photograph made no difference to the actual contribution that the accompanying 
text made to the debate. 
 Of course, it is recognised that these cases concern the press and therefore it is 
necessary to return, briefly, to the question of whether these decisions are also 
explainable by reference to the argument that the ECtHR adopts a preferential 
approach to media freedom over individual expression.  It has already been argued 
above that the decision in Steel & Morris v. UK deals with that view.  Moreover, it is 
submitted that the recent decision in VBK v. Austria is significant in this debate 
because not only does it graphically illustrate the principle that it is the intention to 
contribute not the actual contribution made that is critical but also it concerns a non-
journalist speaker.  This case concerned a painting by an infamous artist – Otto Muhl 
– depicting naked bodies involved in various sexually explicit acts with superimposed 
blown-up images of the faces of various public figures on the heads of these bodies.  
The painting was displayed in a public exhibition.  The public figures involved were 
significant religious and political figures such as Mother Teresa, an Austrian Cardinal 
and several prominent politicians from the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) such as Mr 
Meischberger, a former general secretary, who was depicted ‘gripping the ejaculating 
penis of Mr Haider [former head of the FPO] while at the same time being touched by 
two other FPO politicians and ejaculating on Mother Teresa’.102  The painting, which 
had attracted press attention in any event, became more notorious after an outraged 
visitor to the exhibition threw red paint at it, covering the part that showed, amongst 
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others, Mr Meischberger.  Meishberger eventually obtained an injunction prohibiting 
exhibition of the painting on the basis that it debased his reputation and political 
activities. 
The ECtHR, however, found that the injunction amounted to a violation of 
Article 10.  The decision is interesting for a number of reasons, some of which are 
discussed below in the context of artistic expression,103 but, in the context of this 
discussion, for the assessment that the ECtHR made about the contribution to the 
democratic process.  In particular, the Court noted that ‘the painting could hardly be 
understood to address details of Mr Meishberger’s private life, but rather related to 
Mr Meishberger’s public standing as a politician from the FPO’104 and, furthermore, 
stated ‘the court does not find unreasonable the view taken by the court of first 
instance that the scene in which Mr Meischberger was portrayed could be understood 
to constitute some sort of counter-attack against the Austrian Freedom Party, whose 
members had strongly criticised the painter’s work’.105  Clearly, this is a rather 
guarded assessment of the connection between the painting and debate on a matter of 
public interest and, as such, is contrary to a requirement of an actual contribution to a 
debate of public interest.  This point is further drawn out by reference to the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides who tersely rejected the majority opinion as 
flawed.  The finding that the painting was ‘a form of criticism by the artist of Mr 
Meischberger’106 was impossible because there was no such discernible message to 
be derived from the expression: ‘it is my firm belief that the images depicted in this 
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product of what is, to say the least, a strange imagination, convey no message; the 
“painting” is just a senseless, disgusting combination of lewd images whose only 
effect is to debase, insult and ridicule…’107 
 Yet Judge Loucaides’ reasoning is unsound, it is submitted, precisely because 
judges are not qualified to criticise art or discern its actual meaning or contribution to 
society at large.  The majority opinion is therefore on a sounder footing because it 
limited its evaluation to the question of whether some public interest debate was 
identifiable but asked no questions about what precisely that public interest debate 
was and the extent to which the painting contributed to that debate.  This point is 
significant to the discussion in Chapters Five and Six because it will be argued there 
that the UK judiciary has made ad hoc calculations of the actual contribution made 
by the expression as a reason to uphold an interference with it.108  It is unconvincing 
that the Strasbourg jurisprudence requires it to do such and, indeed, the decision in 
VBK v. Austria firmly points away from such a requirement.  Furthermore, it is also 
relevant to note that the ECtHR operates a practice whereby it distinguishes between 
‘value judgments’ and facts.  For example, to accuse a politician of behaving ‘like a 
clown’ is to make a value judgment about that politician rather than a factual 
statement.109  Such a finding is significant since value judgments – unlike facts – are 
not susceptible to standards of proof.  Of course, determining whether the expression 
is a value judgment or statement of fact may be difficult110 yet, it is submitted, this 
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approach reinforces the point that the ECtHR is more concerned with the intention to 
contribute rather than the actual contribution made by the speech. 
These recent decisions clarify the ECtHR’s approach toward political 
expression, particularly in relation to the treatment of the speaker involved and the 
question of the contribution made by the speech to the democratic process.  
Furthermore, these cases support Fenwick and Phillipson’s analysis that ‘Strasbourg’s 
reasoning is firmly consequentialist, practical and concerned above all with ensuring 
the free flow of widely disseminated information relevant to legitimate public 
debate’.111  Yet, Fenwick and Phillipson also argue that, consequently, the place of 
expression which does not serve this value but serves other important values such as 
self-fulfilment and individual autonomy is threatened: ‘the right of the individual 
artist to cry aloud from her soul….is, under this perspective, inevitably afforded 
much less protection because, in terms of consequences, it doesn’t matter as much’.112  
Thus they argue that the protection of non-political expression is threatened by this 
approach.  In order to reach overall conclusions about the place of established free 
speech theory within the Strasbourg jurisprudence,113 the following section considers 
what recent decisions reveal about the protection afforded such speech. 
 
b) Non-political expression 
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As a result of the ECtHR’s consequentialist approach to Article 10, it is 
broadly accepted that the Court adopts a hierarchical approach to freedom of 
expression in which political speech sits atop followed by artistic and then 
commercial speech.114  The fit of this hierarchical approach with established theory is 
discussed in the following section.  As Fenwick and Phillipson argue, the protection 
afforded to artistic expression compared to political speech in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is largely disappointing.115  The findings against Article 10 in the well-
known cases of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria,116 Muller v. Switzerland117 and 
Wingrove v. UK118 (which Fenwick and Phillipson discuss extensively)119 suggest a 
low valuation is placed on the connection between artistic expression and the 
democratic process, particularly in circumstances where morality or religious 
sensibilities are implicated.  However, it may be that the recent decisions in VBK v. 
Austria and IA v. Turkey120 provide scope for optimism that a more liberal approach 
to artistic expression might emerge.  The facts of VBK v. Austria have already been 
discussed and the implications for artistic expression are obvious.  Whether the 
decision represents a radical departure from previous decisions such as Muller v. 
Switzerland is debatable.  This case also concerned paintings of sexually explicit acts 
in a public exhibition albeit in this case acts between men, women and animals.  In 
this case, however, the domestic authority cited the protection of morals as the reason 
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for the interference and the ECtHR accepted these reasons as being relevant and 
sufficient121 whereas in VBK the reasons for interfering with the speech solely related 
to the protection of Mr Meischberger’s reputation and therefore the Member State’s 
later attempt to justify the interference based on the protection of morals were found 
to be unsustainable by the ECtHR.122  Yet the decision in VBK is significant for the 
comparative ease with which the ECtHR accepted that the expression made a political 
comment and was prepared to do so despite the vulgarity of the expression. 
The case of IA v. Turkey concerned a novel which was critical of religious, 
particularly Islamic, beliefs.  The decision itself is unremarkable: the ECtHR 
confirmed the well-established principle that although freedom of expression extends 
to that which shocks, offends or disturbs a wide margin of appreciation is afforded to 
Member States for the rights of others under Article 9 to have their religious 
sensibilities protected.123  The ECtHR was thus satisfied that since the expression 
amounted to an abusive attack on Islam, the margin afforded to domestic courts had 
not been exceeded.  The decision is remarkable, however, for the dissenting 
judgments within it.  The decision was split by four votes to three and, as part of their 
dissent, Judges Costa, Cabral Barreto and Jungwiert called on the ECtHR to ‘revisit’ 
the case law on the protection of religious sensibilities (i.e., Otto-Preminger-Institut 
and Wingrove v. UK) ‘which in our view seems to place too much emphasis on 
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conformism or uniformity of thought and to reflect an overcautious and timid 
conception of freedom of the press’.124   
The implications of these two decisions for comparisons between the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and established free speech theory are considered in the 
following section.  Before doing so, the position of commercial expression is briefly 
considered.  As noted above, commercial expression is said to be at the base of the 
protection hierarchy employed by the ECtHR.  In the context of the Court’s firm 
consequentialist approach, the reason for this may seem obvious: as Barendt notes, 
‘while political speech lies at the heart of a free speech guarantee, commercial 
speech…may be regarded as peripheral’.125  There is, of course, an established body 
of academic literature which contests this positioning of commercial speech, 
emphasising instead that the connection between political and commercial speech 
may be greater than realised.126  These arguments are discussed in Chapter Seven in 
the context of domestic approaches to commercial expression.  The ECtHR has stated 
on several occasions that commercial expression is afforded the lowest weight by the 
Court whilst at the same time the domestic authorities are provided with the widest 
margin to decide how to regulate it.127   
However, the decision in Krone Verlag GmbH v. Austria (No. 3)128 
demonstrates that the ECtHR is prepared to find a violation of Article 10 even in 
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these circumstances.  In that case, a daily newspaper had published an advertisement 
comparing its own cost and quality with a competitor’s newspaper.  The competitor 
obtained an injunction, which required the newspaper to indicate differences in their 
coverage of foreign or domestic affairs, economy, culture, science, health, 
environmental issues and the law within that advertisement.  Since this was a 
particularly onerous obligation, the ECtHR held that Article 10 had been violated.  
The decision may be explained on a number of grounds.  Certainly, it fits with the 
ECtHR’s overarching concern to protect freedom of information relevant to society at 
large (albeit in a commercial context in this example).  This theme emerges from the 
finding that ‘advertising is a means of discovering the characteristics of services and 
goods offered to [citizens]’.129  In this way, commercial expression may have greater 
significance to the Article 10 jurisprudence than artistic expression, especially that 
which holds no value beyond its aesthetic qualities.  Alternatively, the decision may 
be explainable simply by reference to the inferiority of the member state’s argument 
on the necessity of interference in which case the significance of the case may be 
minimal. 
 
4. Analysis: comparisons between the Strasbourg jurisprudence and 
established theory 
 
As noted above, Fenwick and Phillipson have recently conducted a thorough 
exploration of the dominant rationale that underpins the ECtHR’s approach to Article 
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10.130  They argue that the emphasis by the ECtHR on information and ideas that the 
‘public has a right to receive’ suggests that the Court values freedom of expression 
from an audience-based rather than speaker-based perspective: ‘it would follow 
naturally that the Court would be principally concerned with media freedom not 
individual freedom of expression.  This follows logically from the pragmatic stance 
of the Court – expression is valued for its contribution to the democratic process, both 
in watchdog and education terms’.131  They argue that, as a result, ‘freedom of 
expression is valued not really as an aspect of individual autonomy or for the 
contribution it makes to the flourishing of individuals but for the part it plays in 
maintaining a democratic society’.132  Thus, their conclusion is that ‘where expression 
does not engage the functionalist virtues of directly contributing to general debate on 
public-political matters, the Court employs a style and method of review that largely 
fails to insist upon any proper justification for the interference in question’.133  Thus, 
they conclude, that whilst media freedom is generously protected by this approach, 
freedom of individual expression is impoverished and that this is ironic since rather 
than promoting diversity of opinion (the ECtHR cites pluralism as an important 
Article 10 goal),134 the approach actually confines opinion because the greatest 
protection is afforded to a narrow range of speakers (i.e., traditional sources of the 
media).135 
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From this analysis, comparisons with established free speech theory are 
difficult.  At an earlier stage in their discussion, Fenwick and Phillipson136 – like 
Feldman137 and Barendt138 – compare the Strasbourg approach to Meiklejohn’s theory 
of free speech.139  As set out in the last chapter, Meiklejohn’s conception of 
participation in a democracy centres on the argument that citizens require access to all 
information and ideas essential to such participation in order to realise the goal of 
self-rule.  Yet whilst the strong rhetorical statements in favour of freedom of 
expression resonant with this rationale, the outcomes of the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
as a whole do not always match up with this approach.  In some cases, information 
and ideas which the Court admits are of a genuine public interest are not protected.  
As noted, Fenwick and Phillipson attribute this to a differential approach based on 
speaker identity.  They do not directly address the ECtHR’s findings in Steel & 
Morris v. UK in their argument.140  Instead, in support of this argument, they refer to 
three cases concerning public protest type issues141 and, elsewhere, two artistic 
expression cases142 in which the ECtHR adopted particularly lacklustre approaches to 
the defence of individual expression.  However, each of these cases concerned 
competing social interests where the ECtHR has conceded a wide margin of 
appreciation to member states: public order in the first set of cases and the protection 
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of morals in the second.  It may be, as Fenwick and Phillipson argue, that the Court 
can be criticised about the extent to which it scrutinised the member state’s evidence 
on the severity of these interests.143  However that criticism is a separate point (and 
not one that will be addressed here).  As a consequence, two points might be made 
about the ECtHR’s approaches in these cases: first, the same outcome ought to be 
apparent even if the speaker was the media, as is evident from the decision in 
Lindon;144 secondly, the ECtHR had the opportunity to confirm that individual 
expression is of lesser value than media expression in Steel & Morris.145  An 
alternative explanation for the Strasbourg reasoning is that in the final analysis, the 
Strasbourg court – whatever rationale it applies – is hamstrung by the limits it has set 
for the margin of appreciation on competing interests and, in circumstances where the 
margin is wide, it is forced to apply a lesser proportionality test.  In other words, the 
operation of the margin of appreciation doctrine prevents true comparison between 
the Strasbourg approach to freedom of expression and established theories of free 
speech.  Since the margin of appreciation cannot be applied domestically it is 
incumbent upon Member States to strip away the effect of the doctrine on the 
decision146 in order to distil the underlying rationale for Article 10.147  Of course, the 
danger is that decisions with unfavourable outcomes for freedom of expression – if 
not recognised as explainable by the margin of appreciation at work – can serve to 
legitimise both the interferences and the differential approach based on speaker status 
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as compatible with Article 10.148  Indeed, it will be argued in Chapters Five and Six 
that this effect is discernible in the UK Article 10 jurisprudence.   
Yet by concentrating on the strong rhetorical statements in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence for the protection of free speech, the comparison with Meiklejohn’s 
theory of free speech becomes sharper.  As set out in the previous chapter, in 
referring to all speech that would be relevant to self-rule, Meiklejohn specifically 
includes: public discussion of public issues together with the spreading of 
information and opinion bearing on those issues; education in all its phases; 
philosophy and science; literature and the arts.149  In general terms this accords with 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence however, as noted, it has been said that the Strasbourg 
courts adopt a hierarchical approach to types of expression in which literature and the 
arts occupies a lesser position to political speech.150  This appears to conflict with 
Meiklejohn’s theory, which admits of no such approach.  Established theory in 
general does not tend to categorise speech in this way although since coverage is 
based on how readily the speech in question engages with the justificatory theory in 
play151 certain forms of speech might be said to be of ‘high’ or ‘low’ value.152   
As Fenwick and Phillipson argue,153 it is on the question of interferences with 
expression, not the significance of the expression itself, in which the lesser status of 
artistic expression becomes apparent.  Indeed, the ECtHR has stated that ‘those who 
                                                 
148
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5, 8. 
149
 Meiklejohn, ‘The First Amendment is an Absolute’, fn. 3, 257. 
150
 Fn. 46. 
151
 See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
152
 E.g., see the discussion between Larry Alexander and Cass Sunstein on the question of placing 
values on speech: Larry Alexander, ‘Low value speech’ (1989) 83 Northwestern University Law 
Review 547 and Cass Sunstein, ‘Low value speech revisited’ (1989) 83 Northwestern University Law 
Review 555. 
153
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 5, 57. 
123/385 
create, perform, distribute or exhibit works of art contribute to the exchange of ideas 
and opinions which is essential for a democratic society.  Hence the obligation on the 
State not to encroach unduly on their freedom of expression’.154  Also, it might be 
noted that artistic expression not intended to express ideas and opinions relevant to 
the democratic process would seem to be on uncertain grounds.  In more general 
terms, however, the ECtHR’s rhetorical statements about artistic expression seem to 
be in keeping with Meiklejohn’s theory.  Furthermore, at this point, it might be noted 
that the Strasbourg approach is broader than, say, Bork or Blasi’s conception of the 
argument from participation in a democratic society.  It will be recalled from the 
previous chapter that Bork explicitly demarcates artistic expression as outside his 
conception of the First Amendment.155  Likewise, since Blasi centres his theory on 
the ‘checking value’ of free speech, expression unrelated to the abuse of official 
power has little connection with this theory.156  It will be argued in later chapters that 
the UK judiciary’s approach to Article 10 bears stronger comparison with Bork and 
Blasi’s conceptions than Meiklejohn’s. 
Since Meiklejohn’s list of specially included types of expression does not 
refer to commercial expression, this represents a potential point of departure by the 
ECtHR.  The fit between the democratic process and the inclusion of commercial 
speech is questionable.  Indeed, the academic literature contains a fierce debate on the 
question of the inclusion of commercial speech within a free speech guarantee.  
Barendt, for example, is particularly sceptical about its place on the basis that the 
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 Muller v. Switzerland, fn. 27, [33]. 
155
 Bork, fn. 4, 20. 
156
 Blasi, fn. 4, 538. 
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claim is particularly weak.157  This debate is explored more fully in Chapter Seven.  
Yet the Strasbourg jurisprudence on commercial expression suggests that such speech 
significantly engages with Article 10 protection where it provides information and 
ideas relevant to decision-making.  For example, this is apparent from the decision in 
Krone Verlag GmbH158 although it remains questionable how comparative 
information on newspaper prices and quality connects with the maintenance of 
democratic society. 
However, the ECtHR also states that freedom of expression constitutes one of 
the basic conditions ‘for the development of every man’.159  By reference to 
established free speech theory, this aspect of the underlying rationale would seem to 
provide a better basis for defending the inclusion of artistic expression that does not 
seek to engage with the democratic process and also the inclusion of commercial 
speech.  For example, Redish has argued strongly that self-fulfilment includes 
information and ideas that relate to the choices made by an individual in their private 
life.160  Likewise, the argument from self-fulfilment as formulated by Redish would 
also account for the inclusion of pornography under Article 10 (albeit the ultimate 
protection of pornography depends upon the competing interest at stake161).  As 
Redish argues the regulation of pornography ‘can be seen as a means of rejecting 
                                                 
157
 Barendt, fn. 62, 416. 
158
 Fn. 128. 
159
 See, e.g., Handyside v. UK, fn. 8, [49]. 
160
 Martin Redish, ‘The Value of Free Speech’, (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
591, 630-635; ‘Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment’ (1996) 81 Iowa Law Review 589; ‘First 
Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking 
Controversy’ (1997) 24 Northern Kentucky Law Review 553. 
161
 Hoare v. UK, (1997) EHRLR 678.  See discussion of pornography in Chapter Five. 
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whatever life style such expression may implicitly urge’.162  Furthermore, ‘how the 
individual is to develop his faculties is a choice for the individual to make’.163  This 
latter argument resonates with the argument from autonomy, as conceived by 
Dworkin164 and Scanlon,165 which was also discussed in the previous chapter.166  As a 
rationale for protecting expression, the argument from autonomy hardly features in 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence.167  This is largely unsurprising: whilst the argument 
from self-fulfilment is predominantly consequentialist,168 the argument from 
autonomy values freedom of speech entirely for its intrinsic value.  Thus, as set out in 
the previous chapter, Scanlon describes the aim of his argument from autonomy as 
‘[establishing] that the authority of governments to restrict the liberty of citizens in 
order to prevent certain harms does not include authority to prevent these harms by 
controlling people’s sources of information to insure that they will maintain certain 
beliefs’.169  This principle, however, conflicts with the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
which explicitly states that expression threatening or undermining democratic 
principles cannot be protected.170  For this reason, calls for content neutrality in 
judicial decision-making largely fail.171   
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 Redish, fn. 160, 637; see similarly Joseph Raz, ‘Free Expression and Personal Identification,’ in 
Free Expression: Essays in Law and Philosophy, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994). 
163
 Ibid. 
164
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is there a right to pornography?’ (1981) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 177. 
165
 Thomas Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’, (1972) Philosophy and Public Affairs 204. 
166
 See pages 81 to 88. 
167
 Fenwick and Phillipson argue that the autonomy rationale explains the protection afforded 
pornographic material in the Commission decision of Scherer v. Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR 276. 
168
 See debate between Redish and Baker: C. Edwin Baker, ‘Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate 
Political Expenditures and Redish’s The Value of Free Speech’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 646; Martin Redish, ‘Self-Realization, Democracy and Freedom of Expression: A Reply 
to Professor Baker’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 678. 
169
 Scanlon, fn. 165, 222. 
170
 E.g., see Refah Partisi, fn. 51; Norwood v. UK, fn. 74. 
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The argument from truth is also particularly evident within the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.  This is hardly surprising given the self-rule elements evident in both 
the argument from truth and the argument from participation in democracy, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.172  It will be recalled from that discussion that in 
his classic statement,173 J. S. Mill’s argues that suppression of falsehood is both an 
assumption of infallibility174 and prevents a proper understanding of the reasons that 
establish the ‘truth’ as true.175  These elements of Mill’s argument were echoed by the 
ECtHR in the recent case of Salov v. Ukraine176 in which the Court stated that Article 
10:  
 
‘as such does not prohibit discussion or dissemination of information received even if it is 
strongly suspected that this information might not be truthful.  To suggest otherwise would 
deprive persons of the right to express their views and opinions about statements made in the 
mass media and would thus place an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of expression set 
forth in Article 10’.177 
 
In the context of Mill’s argument from truth, it is interesting that there appears to be a 
schism in the treatment of political speech compared to religious speech.  Mill’s 
argument refers equally to freedom to discuss religious issues as it does political: 
indeed, many of the examples Mill provides are religious.178  The Strasbourg 
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 The argument from participation in a democracy is discussed at pages 58 to 69 whereas the 
argument from truth is discussed at pages 69 to 81. 
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 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (London: Routledge, 1991), (1st edn., 1859). 
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 Ibid., 29. 
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 Ibid., 56. 
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 (2007) 45 EHRR 51. 
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 Ibid., [113]. 
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 See fn. 173. 
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jurisprudence, however, seems to adopt a stricter position on religious expression, 
even prior to evaluating the competing interest at stake.  For example, in Refah 
Partisi, the Court stated that the expression of religious views contradicting the 
principles of tolerance, pluralism and broadmindedness are not protected by Article 
9.179  Likewise, the margin of appreciation afforded to the competing interest at stake 
is broader when limiting religious expression compared to political expression as a 
consequence of Article 9.180 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
From the analysis above, it seems fairly clear that the Strasbourg approach to 
Article 10 is consequentialist and tends towards audience-based perspectives.  When 
examining interferences with freedom of expression, the ECtHR considers the nature 
of expression and the nature of the interference.  In respect of both, the Court allows 
Member States a certain margin of appreciation, which is wider in some cases than in 
others.  It is submitted that comparisons between Strasbourg’s reasoning and 
established free speech theory is most clear in respect of the statements of free speech 
principle evident in the case law rather than the outcome of those cases.  It is further 
submitted that this is a consequence of the ECtHR’s limitations as a court.  In other 
words, because the ECtHR has conceded that certain societal interests admit no 
common European-wide standard, such as morality or the protection of religious 
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 Fn. 51, [49]-[52]. 
180
 E.g., Otto-Preminger-Institut, fn. 27.  See further, Ian Leigh, ‘Homophobic Speech, Equality Denial 
and Religious Expression’ in Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
128/385 
sensibilities, and that other societal interests, such as public order and national 
security, involve issues that are beyond the Court’s competency, the full force of its 
rhetoric on freedom of expression cannot be realised.  Thus, when taking the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence into account under s. 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 it is 
imperative that the UK judiciary recognise the impact of these limitations181 
otherwise the arguments from truth, participation in democracy and self-fulfilment 
that the Strasbourg jurisprudence echoes may be overlooked or otherwise 
underestimated.  The following chapter examines how the UK judiciary have 
interpreted their obligations to take the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account under s. 
2. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Key issues under the Human Rights 
Act: 
Is there scope to diverge from 
Strasbourg? 
______________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (the “HRA”) contains a number of provisions 
that have attracted comment in the academic literature.  Amongst these, s. 3 relating 
to statutory interpretation and s. 4 relating to declarations of incompatibly have, 
arguably, received the greatest academic commentary.1  However, so far, these 
provisions have not been significant in the development of Article 10 in the UK: the 
                                                 
1
 C Gearty ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights’ (2002) 118 Law Quarterly 
Review 248; R Clayton ‘Judicial Deference and “Democratic Dialogue”: the legitimacy of judicial 
intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2004] Public Law 33; G Phillipson ‘(Mis)-Reading 
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 183; C Gearty ‘Revisiting 
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act’, (2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 551; D Nicol ‘Statutory 
Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson’  [2004] Public Law 274. 
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principles relating to these provisions are fairly clear from the case law2 and, 
moreover, in an Article 10 context, no specific issues relating to the interpretation of 
these sections have yet arisen.  The focus of this chapter is, therefore, on s. 2 of the 
HRA, which, it will be argued, is a provision that is particularly relevant to the 
development of Article 10 in the UK.  When deciding cases involving Convention 
rights,3 s. 2 of the HRA states that the judiciary ‘must take into account’,4 amongst 
other things, any relevant decision delivered by the European Court of Human Rights 
(the “ECtHR”) and/or European Commission of Human Rights (the “ECommHR”).  
So far, the dominant judicial approach5 has been to interpret this section as an 
obligation not to depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence without good reason.6  As will 
be shown, the ‘inevitable uncertainty’7 created by the wording of s. 2 and its 
subsequent interpretation by the courts has given rise to significant academic debate 
about the manner in which the Strasbourg jurisprudence should be treated when 
determining Convention rights cases. 
It will be argued in this chapter that the UK courts’ approach to s. 2 is often 
inconsistent and generally hard to discern.  The aim of the next section of the 
discussion is to delineate the main arguments from the academic literature in order to 
show that the predominant view is that the courts’ approach has been disappointing.  
                                                 
2
 See Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007, 4th edn.), 169-214. 
3
 i.e., those Convention rights to which the Human Rights Act 1998 applies, as set out in s. 1(1). 
4
 S. 2(1), HRA. 
5
 Although it has been argued that it is not the only evident approach: E. Wicks, ‘Taking Account of 
Strasbourg?’ (2005) 11(3) European Public Law 405 (see discussion below). 
6
 R (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions (2001) 2 All ER 929; R (on the application of Anderson) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (2002) 4 All ER 1089; R (on the application of Amin) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (2003) 4 All ER 1264; Kay v. Lambeth LBC; Leeds City Council v. 
Price (2006) 2 AC 465; Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2007) 2 AC 167; R 
(Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (2008) 2 WLR 
781 (“ADI”). 
7
 S. Tierney, ‘Devolution Issues and s. 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2000) EHRLR 380, 392 
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In effect, the courts appear to have interpreted s. 2 very restrictively.  By adopting 
these academic views as a benchmark, it will be argued that, in an Article 10 context, 
the courts’ approach is particularly concerning.  As set out in Chapter Three, the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence contains both strong statements of free speech principle but, 
often, weak realisation of those principles in the outcomes of decisions due to its 
limitations as a court and, in particular, due to the operation of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, as shown, for example, in Handyside v. UK.8  From an Article 
10 perspective, the courts’ approach to s. 2 is particularly concerning to the extent 
that it seems to recommend the adoption of shallow approaches to the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, thus discouraging judges from delving deeper where strong free speech 
principle lurks behind a margin of appreciation led outcome.  This has the potential 
effect of leading judges to incorporate the margin of appreciation doctrine into the 
domestic jurisprudence by the back door.9  Moreover, this minimalist approach 
provides little scope for an activist development of free speech in the UK, leading to a 
narrower interpretation of Article 10 than is evident at Strasbourg level. 
By exploring the courts’ approach to s. 2 in relation to Article 10 cases and by 
considering the academic literature on the margin of appreciation, it will be argued 
that there is no reason why the UK courts’ cannot move away from timid Strasbourg 
decisions, where they arise, in order to fully realise the maximum protection of free 
speech in the UK.  As set out in Chapter One, this could be achieved by greater 
recognition of the broader consequentialist rationales for the protection of free 
speech, such as the arguments from self-fulfilment or from truth or by recognition of 
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 (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 
9
 As Fenwick and Phillipson argue in Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 146. 
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the intrinsic worth of free speech evident in the argument from autonomy.10  In this 
way, and by greater adherence to the amassed body of academic literature concerning 
these theories, the UK judiciary could create a richer free speech right.  Alternatively, 
the UK judiciary might develop a broader approach to the democratic process value, 
evident in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, by greater adherence to, for example, 
Meiklejohn’s conception of the argument from participation in a democracy.11  Such 
changes need not represent some radical departure from Convention orthodoxy.  
Instead, it will be argued that because of the flexibility within the procedural 
principles that exist (domestically and at Strasbourg level) and the inherent broadness 
within the core principles underpinning the Convention, Article 10 in the UK could 
be developed according to this broader approach should the UK judiciary be so 
inclined. 
 
2. Section 2, HRA: decisions and debate 
 
a) Introduction 
 
 In critiquing the development of Article 10 post-HRA, s. 2 clearly represents a 
significant issue.  As will be shown, the dominant approach emanating from the 
House of Lords is to treat it as an obligation not to depart from relevant Strasbourg 
case law in the absence of special circumstances.  This would seem to place some 
limits on the extent to which the judiciary may theoretically develop Article 10 in the 
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 These theories were discussed in Chapter Two. 
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 Alexander Meiklejohn, ‘The First Amendment is an Absolute’ (1961) Supreme Court Review 245. 
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UK beyond the Strasbourg jurisprudence: indeed, contrary to the anticipated 
liberating effect of the HRA on judicial thinking (i.e., British rights for British courts, 
etc.), as explored in Chapter One,12 this narrow interpretation of s. 2 may suggest that 
any ‘development’ of Article 10 is unlikely.  This narrowness in approach has 
attracted a number of persuasive criticisms from commentators, as will be shown.  
Yet, despite this interpretation, it will be argued in this section that whilst this 
interpretation is bound to impose some limits on judicial activism, it should not be 
overestimated: in the context of free speech, it does not prevent differences emerging 
between the UK and ECtHR jurisprudence so long as the underlying substantive and 
procedural Strasbourg principles are followed and, further those procedural principles 
themselves permit some differences to emerge.  Since it is also pertinent to the 
general discussion in this thesis, the view of leading commentators that this narrow 
approach to section 2 is an improper use of it and, further, that alternative approaches 
to it might pave the way to a more liberal realisation of HRA as a vehicle for a UK 
Bills of Rights will also be discussed.  This possibility is clearly relevant to the 
critique that follows in this thesis. 
 
b) No departing from Strasbourg without good reason 
 
The leading case law evidences a rather narrow interpretation of s. 2 of the 
HRA.  The dominant strand13 is that s. 2 requires the judiciary not to depart from 
                                                 
12
 At pages 33 to 35. 
13
 Wicks, fn. 5, has argued that other (what are called here) softer approaches to section 2 are evident.  
These are discussed below in section c). 
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relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence without ‘good reason’14 or ‘special 
circumstances’.15  Lewis terms this the mirror principle16 after Lord Nicholls’ 
observation that the ‘obligations of public authorities [including the courts]...mirror in 
domestic law the treaty obligations of the United Kingdom in respect of 
corresponding articles of the Convention and its protocols’.17  The leading proponent 
of this approach is undoubtedly Lord Bingham.  Having established the principle in 
the House of Lords decision in Anderson, he has subsequently reiterated it in the 
further House of Lords decisions in Ullah,18 Huang19 and ADI.20  Lord Bingham has 
also reminded the House, most notably in Ullah21 and ADI22 that whilst relevant 
Strasbourg case law ‘is not strictly binding’, any failure to follow ‘clear and constant’ 
Strasbourg jurisprudence would be unlawful under section 6(1) of the HRA:23  
 
This reflects the fact that the Convention is an international instrument, the correct 
interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg court.  From 
this it follows that a national court subject to a duty such as that imposed by section 2 should 
not without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case law...It is of 
course open to member states to provide for rights more generous than those guaranteed by 
the Convention, but such provision should not be the product of interpretation of the 
Convention by national courts, since the meaning of the Convention should be uniform 
                                                 
14
 Anderson, fn. 6, [18] per Lord Bingham. 
15
 Alconbury, fn. 6 [26] per Lord Slynn as endorsed by Lord Bingham in R. (on the application of 
Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator (2004) 2 AC 323, 350, [20]; Huang, fn. 6, [18] and ADI, fn. 6, [37]. 
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 Jonathan Lewis, ‘The European ceiling on human rights’ [2007] Public Law 720. 
17
 R. (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs (2006) 1 AC 529, [34]. 
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 Fn. 15. 
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 Fn. 6. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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Convention right. 
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throughout the states party to it.  The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less’24 
 
This passage will be referred to hereinafter as the Ullah principle. 
Lord Slynn has likewise stated that if the UK courts do not follow Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in this way in circumstances where there are no ‘special circumstances’ 
then ‘the dissatisfied litigant has a right to go to Strasbourg where existing 
jurisprudence is likely to be followed’.25  This apparently rigid approach has attracted 
much criticism from the academic community.  Wicks, for example, has criticised 
this approach as ‘com[ing] extremely close to abdicating judicial responsibility to 
Strasbourg’,26 while Masterman notes that ‘in the absence of guidance as to what 
might amount to ‘special circumstances’ the possibility of lower courts 
unquestioningly adopting the relevant reasoning of Strasbourg is quite real’.27  Lewis 
explains (without defending) the rationale for keeping pace with Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in the following terms:  
  
‘If a domestic court differs from Strasbourg in offering more generous rights protection, this 
mistake cannot be rectified as the Member State cannot question the decision at Strasbourg.  
However if a domestic court errs in providing less protection than Strasbourg this is easily 
remedied by the litigant taking his or her case there.  Hence, it is better to err on the side of 
caution.’28  
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 Ullah, fn. 15.   
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 Amin, fn. 6, [44]. 
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 Wicks, fn. 5, 414. 
27
 Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a “municipal law 
of human rights” under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) ICLQ 907, 918. 
28
 Lewis, fn. 16, 728 
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The House of Lords’ interpretation of section 2 is certainly disappointing: 
clearly, it dampens the jubilant rhetoric, which anticipated the introduction of the 
HRA,29 that the UK judiciary should be ‘allowed to make a distinctive British 
contribution to the development of human rights in Europe’; ‘not grudgingly driven 
to swallow the medicine prescribed for us by the court in Strasbourg when we are 
found in breach of the Convention’.30  Instead, as Wicks notes, ‘this self-denying 
ordinance by certain members of the House of Lords may prevent the development of 
uniquely British rights and freedoms’.31  Consequently, the position of the House of 
Lords would seem to anticipate that the efforts of this thesis to chart the Article 10 
case law in the UK post-HRA will reveal nothing more than a mirror image of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.  However, in the following sections, the argument will set 
out why this need not be the case and, further, specifically for the purposes of 
critiquing the UK judiciary’s approach to Article 10, the arguments demonstrating 
why the judiciary does have scope to develop Article 10 without, necessarily, 
breaching the Ullah principle will also be set out. 
 
c) Qualifications to this apparent rigidity? 
 
Despite its apparent rigidity, clearly the approach to s. 2 laid out in Ullah and 
afterwards admits of circumstances where the Strasbourg jurisprudence will not be 
followed.  Although there is no specific guidance on the meaning of ‘special 
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 As discussed in Chapter One at pages 33 to 35. 
30
 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘Constitutional reform and a Bill of Rights’ (1997) European Human Rights 
Law Review 483, 485. 
31
 Wicks, fn. 5, 415 
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circumstances’, as Lewis notes, the judiciary have been prepared to depart from the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence where it is found that the ECtHR in the relevant case 
misunderstood some aspect of English law.32  Further, Lewis33 notes the possibility 
outlined by Lord Irvine in Parliamentary debates that the UK courts could depart 
from the Strasbourg jurisprudence where there has been no precise ruling on the 
matter.  Likewise, Wicks34 notes that Lord Irvine stated it would be inappropriate to 
be ‘bound to apply to the letter a judgment given decades ago’ because the 
interpretation of Convention rights develops over the years and, instead, domestic 
courts should preferably use their commonsense.  On a similar theme, Masterman 
further notes Lord Irvine’s observations that the UK courts should not be bound by 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence because: 1) it is the Convention that is the ultimate 
source of relevant law not the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and as such the 
Convention system has no strict rule of precedent; 2) under the Convention, the UK is 
only bound to ‘abide by’ such ECtHR decisions that it is a party to; 3) the White 
Paper states that the UK courts ‘must be free to try to give a lead to Europe as well as 
be led’.35  As to Masterman’s second point, it should be noted that the two cases 
commonly referred to as a significant source of Article 10 principle are cases against 
the UK (Handyside36 and Sunday Times37).  Therefore, in an Article 10 context, at 
least, there is less scope to argue that the courts are not abiding by this point.38 
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 Lewis, fn. 16, 730, cites the cases of R v. Lyons (No. 3) (2003) 1 AC 976, [46] per Lord Hoffmann; 
R v. Spear (2003) 1 AC 734, [12] per Lord Bingham and Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza (2003) Ch. 380, 
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 Wicks, fn. 5, 406. 
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 Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg?’ (2004) Public Law 725, 728-730 
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Whilst Lewis doubts that the exceptions to the mirror principle recognised by 
the courts so far (the ‘manifestly wrong’ scenario and the ‘lack of a precise ruling’ 
possibility outlined above) meaningfully allow for departure from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence (‘the mirror principle is practically inescapable’39), Masterman and 
Wicks identify alternative judicial approaches to s. 2 which demonstrate a more 
relaxed approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  Wicks labels these as ‘paying 
insufficient regard to Strasbourg’;40 ‘assessing relevance by reference to [judge’s] 
own perception of merits’41 and ‘consciously departing from Strasbourg’.42  Of the 
first category (in which she identifies certain Court of Appeal judges as the chief 
culprits), whilst Wicks is critical that judges should not disregard the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence altogether in favour of ‘prioritis[ing] the development of a domestic 
law of human rights’43 on the basis it would lead ‘judges into the territory of 
illegality’44 (for the same reasons identified by Lord Bingham in Ullah and ADI), she 
endorses45 Lord Justice Laws’s warning in the Court of Appeal decision in Runa 
Begum46 that ‘the courts’ task under the [HRA]…is not simply to add on the 
Strasbourg learning to the corpus of English law, as if it were a compulsory 
adjunct’.47  Of the second category, Wicks observes that this is a more subtle 
approach to the application of s. 2 in which the judge ‘assesses the relevance of each 
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 Sunday Times v. UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245. 
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 Also, in terms of protecting religious sensibilities against religiously offensive speech, the leading 
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Strasbourg judgment by reference to its implications for the outcome of the case 
before him’.48  As an example, she cites Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in Alconbury 
where he said that he would have ‘considerable doubt’ in following Strasbourg 
jurisprudence where it ‘compelled a conclusion fundamentally at odds with the 
distribution of powers under the British constitution’.49  Wicks notes that ‘for Lord 
Hoffmann it appears that his statutory obligation to ‘take into account’ only entails 
following Strasbourg where Strasbourg is, in his view, correct’.50  Of the third 
category, Wicks cites the decision in Ghaidan51 as representing ‘an explicit rejection 
of a particular judgment’.52  She describes this possibility as an ‘inevitable 
consequence of a failure to oblige domestic courts to be bound by Strasbourg’.53  
Masterman, meanwhile, cites Lord Hoffmann’s finding in Re McKerr that:  
 
‘although people sometimes speak of the Convention having been incorporated into domestic 
law, that is a misleading metaphor.  What the Act has done is to create domestic rights 
expressed in the same terms as those contained in the Convention.  But they are domestic 
rights, not international rights.  Their source is the statute, not the Convention...their meaning 
and application [of Convention rights] is a matter for domestic courts, not the court in 
Strasbourg’54 
 
Masterman argues that this statement is ‘remarkable’: ‘in asserting that the ‘meaning 
and application’ of the rights under the HRA is a ‘matter for domestic courts’ – and 
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 Ibid., 421. 
51
 Fn. 32. 
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 Wicks, fn. 5, 423. 
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explicitly denying this function to Strasbourg – Lord Hoffmann could be seen as 
laying claim to a more creativist role for domestic courts in rights litigation’.55  
Further, both Masterman and Lewis56 cite with approval Sir Andrew Morritt V.C.’s 
finding in the Court of Appeal decision in Wallbank: ‘our task is not to cast around in 
the European Human Rights Reports like blackletter lawyers seeking clues.  In the 
light of section 2(1) of the [HRA] it is to draw out the broad principles which animate 
the Convention’.57  Masterman argues that this view is ‘closer’ to the intention behind 
section 2(1) (‘to allow domestic courts the scope to develop home-grown human 
rights principles’58) than the dominant approach in the House of Lords and that ‘to 
follow such an approach would avoid accusations of treating the relevant Strasbourg 
case law as tantamount to binding authority’.59  To these observations may now be 
added the view of Lord Scott in ADI.60  In a judgment that neither Lord Bingham61 
nor Baroness Hale62 were able to agree with, Lord Scott emphasised in a full and 
reasoned manner that Strasbourg jurisprudence is binding only in international law 
but that in the UK, the House of Lords ‘interpretation of the incorporated articles [is], 
subject only to legislative intervention,...binding in domestic law’.63  In clarifying the 
position, he stated: 
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‘The judgments of the European court are, therefore, not binding on domestic courts.  They 
constitute material, very important material, that must be taken into account, but domestic 
courts are nonetheless not bound by the [ECtHR]’s interpretation of an incorporated article.  It 
is, in my opinion, important that that should be so and that its importance is not lost sight 
of.’64 
 
Collectively, these observations of alternative judicial approaches to section 2 suggest 
some softening of the approach in Ullah is possible if not already evident. 
 Also, it is submitted, there is an evident slipperiness to the Ullah principle 
which affects its apparent rigidity.  This can be seen in its application in recent case 
law.  In Kay65 the House of Lords resolved the prospective tension a lower court 
judge faced when presented with relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence and a conflicting 
House of Lords decision: s. 2 does not cause the domestic rules of precedent to be 
abandoned.  Lord Bingham explained that: 
 
‘The mandatory duty imposed on domestic courts by section 2...is to take into account any 
judgment of the Strasbourg court...Thus they are not strictly required to follow Strasbourg 
rulings, as they are bound by section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 and as they 
are bound by the rulings of superior courts in the domestic curial hierarchy.’66 
 
The significance of this finding should not be exaggerated: it is a sensible if not 
obvious outcome.  Yet it does show that differences will exist between domestic and 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, temporarily at least, even though this difference may be 
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more or less generous than the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence.  How temporarily 
this may be is a different matter: it cannot be guaranteed that the disappointed will 
appeal and ultimately succeed in the House of Lords, particularly as a consequence of 
the decision in ADI,67 which also happens to be an Article 10 decision. 
This House of Lords case concerned a politically-motivated group against 
animal cruelty, ADI, who wished to advertise their latest campaign on television but 
were unable to by virtue of s. 321(2) of the Communications Act 2003 which 
prohibits such political advertising.  Their claim for a declaration of incompatibility 
was unsuccessful.  This was surprising given that their argument centred on the 
successful application of VgT in the ECtHR where it was held that a similar statutory 
prohibition on political advertising in Switzerland was in violation of Article 10.68  
Giving the leading judgment, Lord Bingham found it significant that the ‘full 
strength’69 of the argument that the rights of others exception under Article 10(2) 
includes ‘a right to be protected against the potential mischief of partial political 
advertising’70 had not been deployed in VgT.  It was further significant that in VgT 
‘the applicant was seeking to respond [emphasis added]... to commercials broadcast 
by the meat industry’.71  Furthermore it was a ‘factor of some weight’72 that ADI 
could campaign by other means such as ‘newspapers and magazines, direct mailshots, 
billboards, public meetings and marches.  The claimant may also contribute to 
broadcast programmes and radio phone-ins’.73  Thus the Court found the decision in 
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VgT to be sufficiently different to the present facts.  In agreeing with Lord Bingham, 
Baronness Hale said ‘[n]or do I think that the decision in [VgT] should lead us to any 
different conclusion.  All Strasbourg decisions are fact-specific.’74 
 Thus, the Ullah principle would seem to be weakened: ‘distinguishing VgT 
and ADI is logically impossible’.75  Yet the House of Lords felt able to do so, without 
breaching the principles set out so clearly in Ullah, on the basis that all Strasbourg 
cases are fact-sensitive but, as Knight notes,76 not so fact sensitive for the House of 
Lords to find that the relevant, applicable Strasbourg jurisprudence was Murphy v. 
Ireland77 – a case concerning a radio advertisement on a religious – not political – 
matter; a ‘noticeably less factually similar decision’.78  Thus, as Knight accurately 
observes, the House of Lords relied upon ‘a distinction without a difference’.79  In his 
judgment, Lord Bingham does not fully explain the difference: instead, his Lordship 
found it instructive that the rationale for a blanket prohibition of political advertising 
on television and radio was due to ‘the greater immediacy and impact of television 
and radio advertising’.80  Since this point was recognised by the ECtHR in Murphy v. 
Ireland, that case was applied as opposed to VgT where ‘the court appeared to 
discount the point somewhat’.81  Baroness Hale explained away the apparent factual 
discrepancy in one sentence: ‘if anything, the need to strike a fair balance between the 
competing interests is stronger in the political than in the religious context’.82  Yet 
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neither judge sufficiently addresses the point that the ECtHR in Murphy had 
distinguished VgT on the basis that Member States have a wider margin of 
appreciation in relation to matters of morals and religion as compared with political 
speech or debate on matters of public interest.83  Thus it was appropriate that in VgT 
the ECtHR had attached ‘little weight’ to the possibility of other avenues of 
promoting the campaign because the case concerned political expression for which a 
much narrower margin of appreciation exists.   
Thus the manner in which the House of Lords felt able to apply Murphy rather 
than VgT points to a greater flexibility when considering Strasbourg jurisprudence 
than Ullah may otherwise suggest.  However, this does not remove the issue that both 
Lord Bingham and Baroness Hale steadfastly defended: it is not for the UK courts to 
develop the Convention rights beyond their understanding in Strasbourg.  The 
decision in ADI, therefore, acts somewhat as a template to show how the apparent 
strictness of the Ullah principle may be avoided by means of ‘smoke and mirrors’ 
where the court wishes to achieve a different result.  The following section explores, 
in more general terms, the UK courts’ approach to s. 2 in Article 10 claims.   
 
d) The use of section 2 in the UK Article 10 case law 
 
In relation to Article 10 cases, at least, the Ullah principle would seem to 
require systematic consideration of the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence by the 
courts in order to ensure that the UK approach, evident in existing UK case law, is 
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neither ahead nor behind.  If it is determined that the UK approach is either ahead or 
behind then the next question is whether the court hearing the case is able to rectify 
this discrepancy; the court will not be able to remedy the situation if the discrepancy 
is due to a) a contrary Statutory provision that the court cannot make compatible or b) 
case law decided by a higher court.  Yet this systematic approach is not readily 
apparent in the UK Article 10 jurisprudence.  Instead, it is difficult to fully discern the 
UK courts’ approach to s. 2 in an Article 10 context because different approaches are 
apparent.   
Indeed, surveying the UK Article 10 case law, it seems that s. 2 is not always 
explicitly referred to by the courts when making their decisions.84  In this regard, 
there is no real guidance on how the Ullah principle is to be realised in an Article 10 
context so that it is left unspoken how the courts’ should approach the margin of 
appreciation issue.  This point is considered in more detail, below.85  It may be that 
the UK judiciary finds it unnecessary to refer to s. 2 in every case, particularly where 
a liberal approach to free speech is contemplated.  For example, in Jameel, there is 
limited reference to the Strasbourg jurisprudence: Lord Bingham and Lord Hope refer 
to those cases that enable them to determine the extent of the margin of appreciation 
that operates at Strasbourg level on the question of damages in a defamation context.  
The decision in Jameel itself, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six,86 
evidences a liberal approach to media freedom in a defamation claim that is 
comparable to the strong statements of free speech principle evident in similar 
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ECtHR decisions, such as Haukom87 discussed in the previous chapter.88  In that 
respect, the fact that there is no explicit consideration of s. 2 is not problematic from a 
free speech perspective.  Yet that is not to say that this approach might not be 
problematic in other circumstances where a less favourable approach to free speech is 
evident.   
 Furthermore, in keeping with Wicks’s analysis,89 there are instances in which 
the UK courts have not had regard to the Strasbourg jurisprudence when determining 
Article 10 claims.  For example, in the House of Lords’ decisions in Re S90 and Miss 
Behavin’ Ltd91 the Court determined the Article 10 claims in each by reference to UK 
authorities only.  Although such an approach may be criticised for its failure to 
uphold the Ullah principle – how is the court to determine if the law is ahead or 
behind the Strasbourg jurisprudence if it has no regard to it? – it is less problematic 
from a free speech perspective so long as the reasoning applied is pro-free speech.   
 In cases where the UK courts have considered the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
the intensity of review appears to vary.  For example, in R. v. Shayler,92 on the 
question of whether Article 10 protects disclosure of official secrets in the name of 
public interest, their Lordships’ consideration of the Strasbourg jurisprudence was 
fairly extensive whereas in other cases the review can appear much shallower, for 
example, in the Court of Appeal decision in Charman,93 in which a defence of 
qualified privilege (i.e. the Reynolds defence) was made in respect of a libel claim.  
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Since the Reynolds principles had recently been clarified in Jameel, Lord Justice 
Ward found it was ‘necessary only to cast an eye over the Strasbourg decisions since 
Jameel was argued’94 and in doing so cited passages from three Strasbourg 
decisions.95  A shallow approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence is not necessarily 
problematic although, by doing so, it is possible the UK courts might not fully 
recognise subtle developments to the ECtHR’s approach to specific aspects of Article 
10. 
 Given the courts’ approach to section 2 so far – and particularly given the 
analysis in ADI – it appears accurate to say that the courts may achieve whatever 
outcome is desired by either anticipating the operation of a wide margin of 
appreciation at Strasbourg level or by distinguishing comparable Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on the basis of ‘fact-sensitivity’.  As ADI illustrates, such distinctions 
are not always convincing.  From a free speech perspective, this approach is troubling 
since the desired outcome may not be favourable to freedom of expression.  For 
example, in Sanders v. Kingston, a case which is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapters Five and Six, the disputed expression related to a series of vitriolic outbursts 
in the public domain by the leader of Peterborough City Council concerning Northern 
Ireland.  In deciding whether or not this expression should enjoy the protection of 
Article 10, Wilkie J. cited passages from the ECtHR decisions in Lingens v. Austria96 
and Jersulam v. Austria,97 which confirm that Article 10 applies to information that is 
not favourably received, including that which shocks, offends or disturbs; that 
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freedom of political debate is at the core of the concept of democratic society and that 
whilst freedom of expression is important for everyone, it is particularly so for 
politicians.  However, Wilkie J. found that these strong free speech principles could 
not be applied because the disputed speech was not ‘political’ but instead was 
‘personal abuse’.98  It is unnecessary to consider the merits of the decision at this 
stage – the substance of the decision is considered in greater detail in Chapter Five99 – 
but it is relevant to note that Wilkie J. cited no Strasbourg case law to support this 
definitional finding. 
Yet what the courts’ approach to s. 2 in relation to Article 10 resoundingly 
confirms is that differences between the UK and Strasbourg approach are 
inevitable.100  Consequently, because these differences will emerge, it seems plausible 
to suggest that there is scope to develop Article 10 in the UK so as to maximise the 
protection afforded to freedom of speech.  Indeed, it has been argued, in general 
terms, that s. 2 ought to be used more liberally so as to better secure human rights.101  
In an Article 10 context, this could be achieved by greater application of the strong 
statements of free speech principle in the Article 10 jurisprudence and greater 
adherence to the established body of academic literature on free speech so that a more 
fully formed free speech right might be realised.  The following section explores this 
argument in more detail. 
 
                                                 
98
 See discussion in Chapter Two on the academic view that the definition of ‘political’ is likely to be 
abused (page 63). 
99
 See pages 183 to 187. 
100
 As Fenwick and Phillipson argue in Media Freedom, fn. 9. 
101
 See Masterman, fn. 27. 
149/385 
e) Section 2 is a Gateway to a UK Bill of Rights: Aspiration or 
Aberration? 
 
As noted above, given that this thesis seeks to critique the development of 
Article 10 in the UK post-HRA, it is important to be aware of the arguments which 
point toward divergence from Strasbourg jurisprudence being probable in an Article 
10 context.  This is particularly important given the judicial indication, explored 
above, that any ‘development’ of Convention rights is not a matter for UK courts.  It 
is fair to say that this interpretation has not been well-received by the academic 
community.  Masterman, for example, describes the approach to s. 2 as ‘curious’102 
whilst Lewis complains that ‘the HRA has been interpreted in such a way as to put a 
ceiling on human rights protection.’103  As Lewis notes (and as noted above), Lord 
Bingham has said that the Convention must be uniformly understood by all Member 
States and so there should be no divergence between domestic and ECHR 
jurisprudence.  Yet the reason for this remains unclear (apart from the vague threat 
that to do otherwise is to be in breach of section 6(1)): ‘most often such statements 
are made as assumptions or are simply stated as self-evident truths’.104  As the 
judgments in ADI, in particular, make clear, there is an evident tension between the 
view that there can be no domestic development of the Convention rights beyond 
their understanding in Strasbourg and the view (put forward by Lord Scott) that the 
relationship between international and domestic law is not properly understood by 
                                                 
102
 Masterman, fn. 27, 917.   
103
 Lewis, fn. 16, 726. 
104
 Ibid., 732.   
150/385 
such sentiments: ‘under the dualist constitution of the UK, international and domestic 
law are entirely separate fields.  Both are supreme within their own field because they 
are the only legal system operating there’.105 
Perhaps, though, there is scope to resolve this tension without contradicting 
Lord Bingham’s analysis that there must be uniformity (or comity) amongst Member 
States since, particularly in a free speech specific context, it is possible that 
divergence in the protection afforded freedom of expression in the UK compared to 
other signatories may exist, for a number of reasons, without interfering with the 
general principle evident in Ullah.  The possibility depends entirely on the meanings 
attached to ‘divergence’ and ‘development’: so long as such divergence applies to the 
interpretation and application of the underlying principles of free speech that 
Strasbourg recognises but does not alter those underlying principles themselves, then 
divergence in outcomes but not principles may be evident and so the UK Article 10 
jurisprudence may be developed in a way that is ‘distinctly British’ but does not 
destroy the dialogic function between Strasbourg and UK courts or offend against 
Strasbourg’s supervisory purpose.  In other words, so long as the UK courts do not 
seek to alter the foundation of Article 10 – that it is built on democratic principles – 
then it is submitted that the UK courts can interpret these principles in any way that is 
compliant with those foundations without being in breach of s. 2 or risking a violation 
of Article 10 being found by the ECtHR.  The reasons for this are outlined in the 
following paragraph and developed in later chapters. 
Lord Bingham’s analysis in Ullah is set out above.106  First, the observation 
that Convention rights cannot be more generous without Parliamentary intervention is 
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uncontroversial for Article 10: Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression, which as 
Chapter Two observes, is a broad and generous commitment in any event.  Second, 
the (connected) observation that the meaning of the Convention can be authoritatively 
expounded only by the Strasbourg court belies the fact that the principles on which 
the Convention right to freedom of expression is founded are extraordinary wide.107  
Consequently, whilst adherence to Lord Bingham’s analysis might preclude the 
development of freedom of speech on an entirely new and radical footing (for 
example, on the basis that it only applies to pornographic and commercial speech but 
has no relevance to political expression), it subtly masks the fact that to say, as 
(former ECtHR President) Wildhaber has, that the protection of freedom of speech is 
built on notions of democracy and individual self-development108 is to ensnare a 
broad range of moral and political philosophies about freedom of speech and the 
variance in protection for different types of speech that they involve.109  It is for the 
UK courts to determine which moral and political philosophical interpretation is to be 
applied.110  Given the criticism that the Strasbourg jurisprudence is essentially 
declaratory,111 and, furthermore, (as set out in the previous chapter) given the effect 
of the margin of appreciation on decisions, the Strasbourg jurisprudence is not 
capable of wholesale transplantation in any event. 
Thirdly, the obligation not to ‘weaken or dilute the effect of Strasbourg case 
law’ without ‘strong reason’ and to ‘keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence’ 
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does not adequately acknowledge the role of the margin of appreciation within that 
jurisprudence.  This significance of this will be spelt out more fully in the following 
section (exploring the scope of the doctrine) but, briefly (and as set out in previous 
chapters), it is established that where there is no European consensus on the correct 
treatment of certain speech, such as the protection of morals, and in areas which 
involve sensitive political issues (such as national security or public safety), Member 
States are afforded a wide discretion.  Thus Lord Bingham’s conclusion: ‘no more 
[generous], but certainly no less’ is problematic because although the principles 
employed may be no different, the outcome in cases may result in more generous 
protection for, say, pornographic speech in Member States that have strong liberal 
traditions as compared to those that do not.  Yet such divergence between Member 
States does not necessarily implicate any divergence from Strasbourg case law: 
Handyside v. UK112 is the classic example: whilst recognising the oft-cited principle 
that freedom of expression applies equally to speech that shocks or offends, the 
ECtHR accepted that the UK was better placed to decide on the protection of 
morals.113  Consequently, it is submitted, it is possible that the development of Article 
10 in the UK might take on a different appearance to Strasbourg jurisprudence 
without falling foul of Lord Bingham’s analysis. 
Whilst this argument leans towards the idea that divergence is inevitable, the 
popular view of academics tends to be that not only is the dominant position a 
betrayal of section 2’s original purpose but also that a divergent approach to 
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Strasbourg is desirable.  The foundation of Wicks’s argument, for example, is that the 
Parliamentary intention for the HRA demands divergence since otherwise: 
 
‘the Act designed to bring rights home will have done no such thing: it will merely have 
brought home the possibility of a domestic remedy for violations of international rights.  If on 
the other hand, there is reasoned and purposeful divergence, the HRA will have heralded a 
new, and long overdue, domestic law of human rights’.114   
 
Lewis, specifically taking Lord Bingham’s decision in Ullah to task, argues that ‘if 
domestic courts cannot fall behind Strasbourg jurisprudence and cannot overtake it, 
their only option is to stay in line with it.  English human rights law finds itself to be 
nothing more than Strasbourg’s shadow.’115  Lewis recommends the approaches to 
Strasbourg decisions proposed by Starmer and Masterman.116  Starmer suggests a 
weighted approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence which recognises: 1) the age (and so 
deteriorating quality/reliability) of a decision; 2) which Strasbourg institution made 
the decision: the ECtHR having more authority than the ECommHR; 3) the extent to 
which the margin of appreciation was relied upon in making the decision (the 
doctrine has no direct application in domestic law).117  As will be explored below this 
final element is not without its difficulties: it is not always clear how and to what 
extent the doctrine has affected the outcome.  However, it is submitted, that this is an 
important point.  Masterman’s position on s. 2 meanwhile is that the dominant 
position is tantamount to binding the UK courts to Strasbourg (which is not what was 
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intended) and is set out above.118  In a later article,119 Masterman argues that the 
interpretation of Convention rights in a domestic context is not something that the 
ECtHR is equipped to do and therefore some divergence from Strasbourg is vital so 
that the Convention rights can become fully formed.  Masterman therefore argues that 
– so long as the underlying principles of the Convention remain intact – the UK 
judiciary must be free to look to existing common law120 or comparative 
jurisprudence121 (as it did in Brown v. Stott122) to remedy any deficiencies and 
lacunae it finds in Strasbourg jurisprudence.  The significance of this, Masterman 
argues, is reflected in Clapham’s observation that: ‘it is important that national courts 
have the autonomy to interpret the relevant international human rights so as to make 
them appropriate to the national culture’.123  On a literal reading of Ullah such a view 
may appear to be more aberration than aspiration yet as has been shown, there are 
significant reasons why it is inadvisable for the UK courts to simply follow the 
outcomes of ECtHR decisions. 
 
f) Conclusion 
 
The concerns outlined in Chapter One that the HRA would cause judges to 
behave unconstitutionally and so overstep the mark appear unfounded in light of 
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treatment of s. 2 so far: indeed, the opposite approach is evident in which the 
judiciary may be criticised for not being active enough.  As noted, several 
commentators have warned that the HRA does not instruct the judiciary to be bound 
by Strasbourg precedent.  This is not simply the attitude of Parliament: the ECtHR 
consistently emphasises this point as well in so far as it accepts that whilst it has 
supervisory functions, it is for Member States to interpret and apply the Convention 
rights, as will be shown in the next section.  Although the approach to s. 2 in the UK 
has a rigid appearance, a case like ADI illustrates that this does not necessarily mean 
Strasbourg jurisprudence will automatically be followed: the finding that Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is entirely ‘fact sensitive’ presents opportunities for the judiciary to 
develop Article 10 differently in the UK provided that the underlying principles of 
the Convention are maintained.  Furthermore, the Ullah principle seems 
unsustainable in light of the influence of the margin of appreciation doctrine on 
decision-making at Strasbourg level, as will be shown in the following section. 
 
4. The Margin of Appreciation doctrine and the Ullah principle 
 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that as a consequence of the 
manner in which the margin of appreciation doctrine (the “Doctrine”) has been 
applied in Strasbourg jurisprudence and the criticisms which have been made of it, 
the Ullah principle is only sustainable in an Article 10 context, at least, to the extent 
that it requires the UK courts to keep pace with the underlying principles which 
govern the Convention rights (which, in the context of free speech, are very broad, as 
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was shown in Chapters Two and Three), yet the Ullah principle seems to go beyond 
this by its implication that the UK courts are required to reach the same decisions that 
Strasbourg have so that protection is no more and no less generous.  As noted in the 
previous section, leading commentators on s. 2, such as Masterman, doubt that the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence can be used, meaningfully and reliably, in this way because, 
for example, the decisions are essentially declaratory.  In this section, it will be shown 
that the criticisms of the Doctrine made by commentators lend strong support to that 
view in an Article 10 context and so cast further doubt on the overall sustainability of 
the Ullah principle in relation to Article 10. 
The nature of the Doctrine was discussed previously in Chapters One124 and 
Three.125  By way of brief reminder, in recognising its ‘subsidiary’ role to Member 
States, who have the initial responsibility for securing the rights enshrined in the 
Convention,126 the ECtHR allows some latitude to Member States in their 
interpretation and development of those rights.  As set out in Chapter One, a wide 
margin is applied where there is no European-wide consensus on what human rights 
individuals have or because the domestic authority is better placed to decide upon a 
sensitive issue.127  As also set out in Chapters One and Three, there is a wealth of 
academic literature about the Doctrine.  In broad terms, significant concerns have 
been raised that the Doctrine may engage too readily at Strasbourg level or else be 
applied too loosely.128  With that in mind, it is difficult to accept the UK courts’ 
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concern that a failure to adhere to the Strasbourg jurisprudence would lead to 
‘illegality’, especially in cases where a wide margin of appreciation was applied;129 
such concerns seem inconsistent with the fact that the ECtHR is a court of review 
rather than appeal.  Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile the concerns raised by 
commentators about the variable quality and intensity of review at Strasbourg level130 
with the deference to Strasbourg jurisprudence that the Ullah principle requires.  Of 
course, this is not to say that the UK courts should not respect Strasbourg 
jurisprudence or have regard to it.131  It is instead, to query what mechanism demands 
such devotion to Strasbourg jurisprudence.  Moreover, as Lewis notes, the Ullah 
principle seems strangely at odds with the Doctrine.132  Lord Bingham has recently 
said this about the Doctrine:  
 
‘in its decisions on particular cases the Strasbourg Court accords a margin of appreciation, 
often generous, to the decisions of national authorities and attaches much importance to the 
peculiar facts of the case.  Thus it is for national authorities, including national courts 
particularly, to decide in the first instance how the principles expounded in Strasbourg should 
be applied in the special context of national legislation, law, practice and social and other 
conditions.’133  
 
As Lewis notes, clearly this gives dominance to the Doctrine over the Ullah 
principle.134  On the face of it, there is a conflict.  However, Lord Bingham does not 
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seem to recognise the conflict or else, as Lewis further notes, it may be implied that 
his Lordship believes the tension is resolved by there being a clear difference between 
interpretation and application.135  In support of this latter explanation, Lewis cites 
Lord Hope in ex parte Kebilene: ‘by conceding a margin of appreciation to each 
national system, the court has recognised that the Convention, as a living system, 
does not need to be applied [emphasis added] uniformly by all states but may vary in 
its application according to local needs and conditions’.136  By way of reminder, Lord 
Bingham in Ullah said: ‘the Convention is an international instrument, the correct 
interpretation [emphasis added] of which can be authoritatively expounded only be 
the Strasbourg court’.137  As Lewis notes, this analysis relies on there being a ‘clear 
cut’ distinction between interpretation and application.  Yet, he argues ‘there is 
simply no intellectually honest and universally applicable method to distinguish the 
two exercises’: the distinction is ‘illusory’.138  Thus, Lewis argues that the House of 
Lords in Lambeth v. Kay acted contrary to the Ullah (or, as he calls it, mirror) 
principle by deciding that precedent conflicting with an ECtHR decision should be 
followed: ‘if the mirror principle had been applied in that case, the Lords would have 
held that their decision in Qazi, was ECHR per incuriam, or that Strasbourg 
jurisprudence had developed subsequent to that decision and domestic courts should 
seek to catch up with it even if that resulted in [domestic] uncertainty’.139 
It is submitted that the only ‘intellectually honest’ distinction which can be 
drawn from ‘interpret’ and ‘apply’ is the limited argument that it is for the Strasbourg 
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courts to determine (or ‘interpret’) what the underlying principles of the Convention 
rights are and the UK courts to apply those principles.  Theoretically, at least, this 
would allow the UK courts to ensure conformity with the standards set by Strasbourg 
whilst also ensuring the Convention rights in operation suit needs peculiar to the UK 
(whatever those needs might be).  As noted, in a free speech context, this translates to 
the Strasbourg court determining, as it has, that the foundation of Article 10 is 
democracy and development of the individual and, thus, that certain types of speech 
are particularly important to protect; when these types of speech appear, the UK has a 
very narrow margin of appreciation to avoid protection.  Therefore, applying these 
principles to domestic conditions is a matter for the UK courts.140  Yet even this 
limited analysis is not without its difficulties: as set out in Chapter Two, there are a 
number of free speech theories which are premised on notions of democracy and 
individual self-development and they do not all coincide as to the type of speech to be 
protected or the reasons for protection.  Thus, it is difficult to divorce application 
from interpretation without the argument appearing entirely artificial.  Arguably, the 
‘application’ of these principles requires at least some level of ‘interpretation’ to 
ensure that a fully formed Article 10 right is established in the UK.  As set out in 
Chapter One, it is submitted that, in order to do so, the UK judiciary might have 
greater regard to the established body of academic literature on free speech theory.141  
In this regard, it might be said that the UK judiciary is uniquely positioned to 
determine whichever theory or theories best suit domestic conditions: this is not a 
task that Strasbourg can do on the UK’s behalf.  As Sweeney puts it:  
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‘human rights protection needs more than the examination of compliance with simple 
imperatives.  It requires an understanding of the multitude of actors in society, each with their 
different interests and values, including recognition that it is the social and political 
institutions of particular societies that must deal with much of the actual protection of human 
rights’.142 
 
Sweeney adds that whilst ‘human rights are generally universal…in becoming 
embedded in society some local particularities affect the substantiation of human 
rights and result in specific qualifications’.143  This, he argues, is inherent in the 
operation of, and rationale behind, the Doctrine: international institutions must 
recognise ‘some realistic limitations to their own competence’.144 
Of course, as Sweeney argues, the issue is not simply limited to judicial 
institutions: other social and political institutions must play their part as well.145  
Naturally, this implicates the role of judicial deference when determining rights.  As 
Jones notes, the issue ‘connects with a much broader debate about the role of the 
judiciary in protecting fundamental rights and of the degree to which democratically 
elected legislatures should be constrained in their range of choices’.146  This debate 
pits the attractions of legislative sovereignty against the perils of executive 
manipulation/abuse and judicial impotence.  The issue of judicial deference was 
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outlined in Chapter One.  Of course, the presence of judicial deference to the other 
limbs of government might explain the persistence of the Ullah principle, although 
the sustainability of that principle cannot hang on this point since section 2 of the 
HRA does not impute such deference.  Nor does the spectre of deference, be that to 
the Government or Strasbourg, extinguish concerns about the competency of the 
ECtHR to determine distinctly national issues.  This is not to say that the ECtHR does 
not recognise the limits of its competency since it plainly does147 but rather that this 
recognition taints the Strasbourg decisions such that the outcome may demonstrate, 
not an interpretation of the underlying principles, but recognition of the ECtHR’s 
limits in competency to apply those principles.  Consequently, this may affect the 
suitability of applying that ECtHR decision at domestic level. 
 Moreover, there is a further concern that the operation of the Doctrine in 
Strasbourg jurisprudence may not simply affect the applicability of the decision 
wholesale into domestic law but may mask or otherwise mislead as to which element 
of the decision reflects a universal principle and which is arrived at entirely by means 
of the Doctrine operating.  This can result in decisions where the nature of review is 
not clear, causing concern inside148 and outside the ECtHR.149  As Singh, Hunt and 
Demetriou argue,  
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‘far from being a doctrine or principle capable of abstract definition and concrete application, 
[the Margin] is a conclusory label which only serves to obscure the true basis on which a 
reviewing court describes whether or not intervention in a particular case is justifiable.  As 
such it tends to preclude courts from articulating the justification for and limits of their role as 
guardians of human rights in a democracy’.150 
 
Fenwick argues that this may separate the activist from the restrained or deferential 
judge with the former recognising that the application of the Doctrine opens up the 
issue to (or else does not prevent) local judicial scrutiny whilst the latter may interpret 
it as confirmation of executive or legislative discretion151 thus requiring little or no 
judicial scrutiny.  Consequently, the principle – whilst not directly identified as the 
Doctrine operating – may be doubly applied: at national level, in recognition that the 
legitimate aim involves issues identified at supranational level as peculiar to the State, 
with this decision then endorsed supranationally.  Thus Singh et al express the 
concern that the Doctrine ‘prevents articulation of the reasons why deference might 
be appropriate and to what degree in a particular case’152 and so fails to ‘capture the 
subtlety of questions of appropriateness and intensity’153 of reviewing decisions.  In 
these circumstances, the Doctrine ‘obscures [the] important distinction between an 
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unreviewable decision and a justifiable one by preventing the articulation of the 
Court’s reasons for not intervening in the decision’.154  Furthermore, it is important to 
acknowledge that the Doctrine should not be applied domestically since it is 
‘distinctively international law’;155 domestic courts ‘will not be subject to an 
objective inhibition generated by any cultural distance between themselves and the 
State organs whose decisions are impleaded before them’.156.  In other words, the 
Doctrine is domestically inapplicable since whilst the Strasbourg court is not an 
appellate court, the domestic courts are.  The express use of the Doctrine in this way 
has been judicially recognised: ‘this technique is not available to the national courts 
when they are considering Convention issues arising within their own countries.’157   
Yet this is not to argue that the UK courts should not be able to anticipate the 
existence of a margin of appreciation at Strasbourg level when determining a 
particular case.  Indeed, such an approach would be welcomed as it might serve to 
remind the court that, in the case of a wide discretion, there is sufficient scope to 
‘apply’ the principles according to domestic needs or, in the case of a narrow 
discretion, to remind itself of the relevant Strasbourg principle.  Yet in both instances, 
the court ought to ensure that it adopts a strategic approach to the ‘application’ (or 
interpretation) of the relevant underlying principles so as to ensure uniformity within 
its own jurisdiction.  Recognition of a margin existing is not objectionable except in 
circumstances where the court concludes that such existence provides a discretion for 
the public authority in question akin to the standard of Wednesbury unreasonableness.  
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As Lord Irvine stated in anticipation of enactment, the Doctrine is not just a 
restatement of Wednesbury principles.158  Thus some concerns are raised by Lord 
Hoffmann’s approach to Article 10 in Miss Behavin’ Ltd.159  Having noted that, if it 
applied at all, Article 10 operated only ‘at a very low level’ in such circumstances, his 
Lordship noted that the ECtHR: 
 
‘has always accorded a wide [Margin]…which in terms of the domestic constitution translates 
into the broad power of judgment entrusted to local authorities by the legislature.  If the local 
authority exercises that power rationally and in accordance with the purposes of the statute, it 
would require very unusual facts for it to amount to a disproportionate restriction on 
Convention rights’.160   
 
The principal difficulty with this reference to the Doctrine is that it did not lead the 
Court to consider pornography in the connection of the Convention’s underlying 
principles and then apply those principles in light of domestic conditions.  Lord 
Hoffmann did state that he was ‘prepared to assume, without deciding’ that the 
Article 10 right includes the right to use premises to distribute pornographic 
material161 however offered no theoretical justification for this reasoning.  This is 
fairly unsatisfactory: as will be shown in Chapter Seven, Lord Hoffmann could have 
decided that pornography plays no role in democracy; that it is antithesis to 
democracy because it ‘strips and devastates women of credibility’162 and so leaves 
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them effectively voiceless in the democratic process.163  Instead, he concluded that if 
Article 10 did engage it was ‘at a very low level’ since ‘the right to vend pornography 
is not the most important right of free expression in a democratic society’.164  Thus, 
Lord Hoffmann’s finding is unclear: what level does pornography engage at in a 
democratic society?  For example, it has been suggested that pornography does seek 
to engage the democratic process in order to seek ‘a fair opportunity to influence the 
sexual mores of the society’.165  Likewise, Lord Hoffmann overlooks the argument 
that pornography engages the arguments from self-development or self-realisation, a 
popular view in the USA.166  Instead, Lord Hoffmann’s analysis is not just deferential 
to the executive but also reminiscent of Wednesbury principles. 
 Thus, it has been argued that the Ullah principle does not sit well with the 
Doctrine.  In particular, the distinction between ‘interpretation’ and ‘application’ 
appears fairly hollow except to the limited extent that it dictates that UK courts have 
no power to alter the underlying principles of the Convention rights.  Yet even this 
argument is not without its difficulties: those underlying principles ensnare so many 
theoretical arguments for free speech that the UK courts must make some 
interpretation to determine which variants of the theoretical justifications for free 
speech engage.  This requires a strategic approach, which will not be achieved if the 
Court is to simply follow Strasbourg jurisprudence without reference to established 
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theory, particularly where the Doctrine is recognised in a way that is reminiscent of 
Wednesbury unreasonableness. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The academic community’s view on the interpretation of section 2 in Ullah so 
far has been fairly damning.  As Lewis puts it, ‘there is neither a mandate for [it] nor 
any advantages flowing from its adoption’.167  Furthermore it is difficult to reconcile 
the view that UK case law must ‘keep pace’ with Strasbourg so as not to be more or 
less generous with the margin of appreciation doctrine since some divergence seems 
inevitable due to the discretions available to domestic authorities that this doctrine 
promotes.  The apparent reliance on some clear cut distinction between 
‘interpretation’ and ‘application’ of the Convention’s underlying principles seems 
unsustainable, yet it is the current state of the law after the House of Lords decisions 
in Kay168 and Ullah.169   
In an Article 10 context, it is difficult to discern a consistent approach to the 
application of s. 2.  The finding that all ECtHR decisions are ‘fact-sensitive’ 
compounds the issue since, as ADI illustrates, decisions that appear broadly 
comparable may be distinguished on the slightest factual discrepancy.  The 
instruction within the Ullah principle that UK courts should not interpret the 
underlying principles of the Convention is cogent enough; yet, it is submitted, those 
underlying principles are so broad in an Article 10 context that the UK courts ought 
                                                 
167
 Lewis, fn. 16, 747. 
168
 Fn. 6. 
169
 Fn. 15. 
167/385 
to adhere to established theory in order to realise the full potential of those principles 
when applying them and, inevitably, this process must involve some level of 
interpretation.  By exploring the UK post-HRA case law, the following three chapters 
explore how the UK judiciary has so far treated Article 10 by comparison to both 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and established theory.  In particular, the next chapter deals 
with the UK courts’ approach to offensive political expression. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Offensive political expression and the 
‘right not to be offended’: 
Toward a heckler’s veto? 
______________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is a common feature of established free speech theories that political 
expression is particularly significant and ought to enjoy preferential treatment in 
protection terms.1  This chapter and the next will consider the UK courts’ approach to 
political expression post-Human Rights Act 1998 (the “HRA”).  Whereas this chapter 
specifically examines the courts approach to offensive political expression in the 
context of its commitment to protect political expression, the following chapter 
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examines the domestic judicial approach to such expression in a broader context.  
Thus, this chapter lays some of the foundation for that discussion.  Meanwhile, 
Chapter Seven concentrates on the UK courts’ approach to non-political speech post-
HRA.  In keeping with established theory and the consequentialist rationale that 
underpins Article 10, it is a well-established feature of the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
that since ‘freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a 
democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention’,2 a narrow margin of 
appreciation is applied where such speech is at stake.  The UK judiciary clearly 
recognises this principle and, as will be shown, there is a clear commitment to protect 
political expression within the case law.  Indeed, although it is not central to the 
argument to be made, it might be said that the UK courts’ clearly recognised the 
importance of protecting political speech even before the HRA was implemented.3  
Furthermore, it is also a well-established Strasbourg principle that this high level of 
protection also applies to political expression that shocks, offends or disturbs.4  As 
will be shown, the UK courts have also recognised this principle.5  At face value, it 
might be thought that, as a consequence, ‘hate speech’ is included within the ambit of 
Article 10: it is clear from the established academic literature that such expression 
might be classified as political and, moreover, that such speech tends to shock, offend 
or disturb those that hear it.6  Yet, as the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) has confirmed, such an argument is a non-starter: Article 10 protection 
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will not be afforded to any speech that seeks to undermine the democratic principles 
that the Convention is built upon.7 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the UK courts’ approach to the 
protection of offensive political expression.  This will involve consideration of the 
type of expression that engages with the principle (so, for the reasons set out above, 
there will be no significant discussion of hate speech).  It will be recalled from 
Chapter One that the core argument of this thesis is that the UK judiciary has adopted 
a particularly narrow approach to protection under Article 10.  It will be argued in 
this chapter that this is particularly apparent in the context of offensive political 
expression: the UK courts do not appear to uphold the principle that the commitment 
to protect political expression includes that which shocks, offends or disturbs.  
Further, it will be argued that this narrow approach has manifested in the 
development of the counter-right ‘not to be offended’.  As will be shown, there is a 
paucity of judicial guidance on how this non-Convention right should be treated and 
it will be argued that, as a consequence, the UK courts have resolved the apparent 
conflict between a ‘right to offend’ and a ‘right not to be offended’ by divining in 
each case the expression’s value to the democratic process as a means of determining 
the level of protection it should be afforded.  Whilst it will be argued that the UK 
courts lack the competency to accurately measure the contribution that offensive 
expression makes to society at large, it will also be argued that such an approach 
nurtures a Heckler’s veto culture: the more people that reject an offensive idea, the 
less value it would appear to have to society at large. 
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2. The commitment to protect offensive political expression 
 
a) The terms of the commitment to protect political expression 
 
The commitment to protect freedom of political speech has a long history 
within the common law, pre-dating both the introduction of the HRA and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”).  As Crompton J. 
remarked in the nineteenth century, ‘it is the right of all the Queen’s subjects to 
discuss public matters’.8  Likewise, John Stuart Mill, writing in the seventeenth 
century, notes that ‘the time, it is to be hoped, is gone by when any defence [of 
freedom of political speech] would be necessary…there is little danger of it being 
[repressed], except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives 
ministers and judges from their propriety’.9  Indeed, it might be thought that the 
commitment to protect political expression was so well established prior to the HRA 
that its enactment has had no discernible effect in determining the claim to protect it, 
particularly since it had been found prior to the inception of the HRA that the 
common law was already in synch with Article 10.10  However, it will be argued that 
the development of Article 10 under the auspices of the HRA has altered the terms of 
the commitment to protect political speech: the accentuation of protection of free 
speech for its instrumental value has caused protection for its intrinsic value to 
whither away; the focus of this instrumentalist development has been limited to the 
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direct contribution made to the democratic process value (narrowly interpreted).  
Thus, the mantra evident in UK case law that: ‘freedom of political speech is a core 
value of our legal system’11 and ‘in a democracy it is the primary right’12 (which 
mirrors the position in Strasbourg13) has transformed from justification to definition: 
in order to gain full protection, the speech in question must demonstrate its 
contribution to the democratic process.  This approach risks narrowing down the 
ambit of what expression may qualify for the highest level of protection.14  Whilst it 
is not argued in this thesis that the judiciary do not treat unpopular speech as 
‘political’, it will be argued that the courts approach to offensive political expression 
excludes such speech from the highest level of protection afforded to less offensive or 
inoffensive political expression.  It will be argued that the development of the ‘rights 
of others’ exception under Article 10(2) threatens the commitment to protect political 
expression on the terms that the UK judiciary had previously set out.  Before 
considering this development, and how it might affect the commitment, it is worth 
reminding ourselves of what the terms of the commitment are. 
In recent years, the judiciary has said the following about this core value and 
its nature.  In Reynolds, a defamation case concerning a politician, Lord Nicholls 
made the general observation that: 
 
‘At a pragmatic level, freedom to disseminate and receive information on political matters is 
essential to the proper functioning of the system of parliamentary democracy cherished in this 
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country.  This freedom enables those who elect representatives to Parliament to make an 
informed choice, regarding individuals as well as policies, and those elected to make 
informed decisions.’15  
 
This reflects what Lord Bingham had previously said in the Court of Appeal: 
 
 ‘We do not for an instant doubt that the common convenience and welfare of a modern plural 
democracy such as ours are best served by an ample flow of information to the public 
concerning, and by vigorous public discussion of, matters of public interest to the 
community...Recognition that the common convenience and welfare of society are best served 
in this way is a modern democratic imperative which the law must accept...It would be 
strange if the law in this country -- the land of Milton, Paine and Mill -- were to deny this 
recognition...’16 
 
Likewise, it echoes Lord Denning’s position in another defamation claim, London 
Artists Ltd v. Littler:17 
 
 ‘whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately 
interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or others; then it 
is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment.’ 
 
Similarly, Lord Steyn remarked in the House of Lords decision in ex parte Simms 
that: ‘freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy.  The free flow of information 
and ideas informs political debate.  It is a safety valve: people are more ready to 
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accept decisions that go against them if they can in principle seek to influence 
them’.18  Given these strong statements of principle, it is unsurprising that Lord 
Justice Brown observed in the Court of Appeal decision in ProLife that ‘the 
importance of freedom of expression in the context of political speech is hard to 
exaggerate’.19  As Barendt notes, ‘although the House of Lords upheld the BBC’s 
appeal, its decision did not question the importance of political speech’.20  Lord 
Hoffmann, for example, in the House of Lords confirmed that he was ‘fully conscious 
of the importance of free political speech’.21 
The most recent statement on political speech is to be found in Animal 
Defenders International22 (and Lord Bingham’s speech in particular), which has been 
discussed in previous chapters.23  It is instructive to set out a pertinent passage from 
Lord Bingham’s judgment in full:  
 
‘Freedom of thought and expression is an essential condition of an intellectually healthy 
society.  The free communication of information, opinions and argument about the laws 
which a state should enact and the policies its government at all levels should pursue is an 
essential condition of truly democratic government.  These are the values which Article 10 
exists to protect, and their importance gives it a central role in the Convention regime, 
protecting free speech in general and free political speech in particular…The fundamental 
rationale of the democratic process is that if competing views, opinions and policies are 
publicly debated and exposed to public scrutiny the good will over time drive out the bad and 
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the true prevail over the false.  It must be assumed that, given time, the public will make a 
sound choice when, in the course of the democratic process, it has the right to choose.  But it 
is highly desirable that the playing field of debate should be so far as practicable level.  This 
is achieved where, in public discussion, differing views are expressed, contradicted, answered 
and debated.’24  
 
Thus, according to this judgment, the democratic process requires competing views to 
be heard so that they can be ‘exposed to public scrutiny’: for the public to ‘make a 
sound choice’ a ‘level playing field’ must exist where ‘differing views are expressed, 
contradicted, answered and debated’.  Clearly, the judiciary has an important role to 
play in providing for this level playing field, especially where the views expressed are 
unpopular.  Indeed, Lord Justice Laws, in the Court of Appeal decision of ProLife, 
was particularly emphatic about this point: ‘as a matter of domestic law the courts 
owe a special responsibility to the public as the constitutional guardian of the 
freedom of political debate’.25 
 
b) The inclusion of offensive political expression within the definition 
 
 Clearly, the definition of ‘political speech’ is significant in determining the 
range of speech that this ‘special responsibility’ extends to.  As the discussion in 
Chapter Two shows, the term ‘political speech’ can be understood broadly, as in 
Meiklejohn’s conception of the argument from participation in a democratic society26 
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or Redish’s argument from self-fulfilment27 or it can be understood narrowly as in 
Bork’s theory.28  Yet, whatever else might constitute political speech, it is well-
established at Strasbourg level that Article 10 applies equally to speech that is 
shocking and offensive.29  In one of the fullest expositions so far, Lord Justice 
Sedley, in Redmond-Bate v. DPP,30 stated that:  
 
‘Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, 
the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does not tend to provoke 
violence.  Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having’.31 
 
This echoes the findings of Lord Justice Hoffmann (as he then was) in R. v. Central 
Television plc,32 a case involving the parental jurisdiction of the court, and Diplock J. 
(as he then was) in Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd,33 a decision on fair 
comment in defamation cases.  In Central Television, Hoffmann stated that:  
 
‘Freedom means the right to publish things which government and judges, however well 
motivated, think should not be published.  It means the right to say things which ‘right-
thinking people’ regard as dangerous or irresponsible’.34   
 
In Silkin, Diplock stated that: 
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‘people are entitled to hold and to express freely on matters of public interest strong views, 
views which some of you, or indeed all of you, may think are exaggerated, obstinate or 
prejudiced, provided -- and this is the important thing -- that they are views which they 
honestly hold’.35   
 
Two important points should be made about these findings: first, although they are 
made in different contexts on different areas of law the general principle that free 
speech includes that which is offensive is not diminished; second, these findings do 
not say that offensive political speech will be protected, only that it is not excluded 
from protection simply because it is offensive. 
 As with the term ‘political speech’, it is essential to consider what type of 
speech is captured by the term ‘offensive’.  The term ‘offensive’ could be deployed in 
wide-ranging circumstances.  Of course, the requirement that the speech is political 
sets some limits on what speech is included.  Pornography, for example, tends to 
shock, offend or disturb but is rarely said to be a form of political speech.36  Also, it is 
important to acknowledge the effect that Article 17 has on the range of offensive 
political expression that may be captured by Article 10.  As mentioned above, any 
speech which undermines the democratic foundation of the Convention rights will not 
be protected and, therefore, hate speech, although generally recognised in theory as 
capable of advancing a political ideal, is outside the ambit of Article 10.37  
Furthermore, offensive political speech might also engage a competing Convention 
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right such as Article 8 or 9: as the decision in Otto-Preminger confirms in the context 
of Article 9, Article 10 includes ‘an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions 
that are gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights’.38  
Since this chapter considers the effect that the development of the ‘rights of others’ 
exception to include non-Convention rights has had on the prospect of offensive 
political speech being protected, the type of speech to be discussed in this chapter is 
not that which engages Article 17 or another Convention right.  Although this 
narrows down the ambit of what may constitute ‘offensive political speech’, it still 
contains a wide variety of expression.  In broad terms, such speech could be separated 
into two categories: first, ideas that are inherently offensive, disturbing or shocking 
or, secondly, non-offensive ideas that are expressed in an offensive manner, i.e., 
‘Fuck the draft!’39 or ‘Go fuck yourself with your atom bomb’.40  Expression 
concerning moral or ethical issues which are particularly prone to polarising opinion, 
such as abortion, animal rights, war, euthanasia or sexual orientation may be included 
in either or both of these categories.  The development of the right of others not to be 
offended stems from two decisions, both of which concerned abortion.  These cases 
are discussed below.41  Prior to that discussion, the following subsection discusses 
two recent Divisional Court decisions concerning politicians appealing against the 
findings of disciplinary tribunals that touch on the UK courts’ approach to the 
definition of ‘political’ in the context of offensive speech.  These are the decisions in 
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Sanders v. Kingston42 and Livingstone v. the Adjudication Panel for England.43  The 
facts of both cases are fairly lengthy but it is important to set them out fully for the 
purposes of discussion that follows. 
 
c) Two recent decisions on the definition of ‘political’ in the context of 
offensive expression 
 
i) Sanders v. Kingston 
 
In Sanders, the former leader of Peterborough City Council appealed against a 
tribunal decision that he had breached the Council’s Code of Conduct by not treating 
others with respect and bringing his office or authority into disrepute.  This breach 
was found to have arisen following Mr Sanders’s conduct of a request from 
Carrickfergus Borough Council, Northern Ireland (made to Chief Executives of all 
local authorities in the UK) to bring to their MP’s attention the unexplained death of a 
soldier with the Royal Irish Regiment in circumstances which suggested suicide, 
possibly as a result of bullying (and which followed a number of other similar deaths 
amongst Army personal).  It seems that Sanders misconstrued the letter as referring to 
a death in connection with ‘the Troubles’ and sent an ‘unreflective and immediate’ 
handwritten response: ‘Members of the Armed Forces DO get killed be it accident or 
design – THAT is what they are paid for’.44  The Chief Executive of Carrickfergus 
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replied, asking Sanders to identify himself as the author of these comments, to which 
Sanders wrote on the letter ‘PCC was elected to look after the local affairs of 
Peterborough NOT indulge in matters relating to the armed forces.  Many things 
happen in Ireland that defy common sense BUT that is a matter for the IRISH people 
not PCC’45 and returned it.   
The situation then escalated into a media event.  Following a ‘heated 
conversation’46 between a journalist at the Belgraph Telegraph and Sanders, the 
newspaper printed an article attributing ‘foul-mouthed, potentially racist and 
personally abusive’ comments to Sanders47 (the accuracy of which was disputed, 
Sanders maintaining ‘we were both being offensive, we were mutually offensive’48).  
It became clear from this interview and subsequent ones with Ulster TV and BBC 
Northern Ireland that Sanders remained ‘under the misapprehension that the 
‘unexplained deaths’…arose from the Troubles and not the way in which young 
recruits were being treated in training camps’.49  Indeed, in his interview with BBC 
Northern Ireland, Sanders maintained:  
 
‘I believe in my heart of hearts that Paul Cochrane’s family owe me an abject apology for the 
amount of time that I have spent on this particular cause because it is absolutely nothing to do 
with me.  I do not know why, I do not know when, I do not know how their son was either 
killed or committed suicide.  The circumstances are not within my power to investigate. 
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And I take very very serious offence to being asked to interfere in the affairs of state in 
Northern Ireland...  
 
…You’ve killed hundreds of my friends.  You’ve killed people in Peterborough.  You’ve 
caused distress to hundreds of families in England.  Now that one of your own has committed 
suicide – I presume in your own country – yet it suddenly becomes an Englishman’s fault. 
 
…When do I get my apology from the Cochrane family and when will the English people get 
an apology from the people of Northern Ireland for killing so many of our soldiers over the 
past 25 years? 
 
I think you should all hang your heads deeply in shame for involving the English people in 
your own quarrel’.50 
 
As should be expected Sanders’s behaviour attracted little sympathy: his views were 
variously labelled as ‘ignorant’, ‘disgraceful’ and ‘beneath comtempt’.51  His actions 
caused the Conservative Party to issue the statement that ‘none of what Mr Sanders 
said reflects the view of our party’.52  Sir Brian Mawhinney (MP for North West 
Cambridgeshire at the time) was reported as saying ‘these remarks don’t reflect the 
views of Peterborough, the Conservative party or me as the local MP.  I speak with 
some authority because I am one of those Northern Irish people about whom he is 
being so critical’.53  Yet Sanders was unrepentant: ‘I think it is an absolute cheek 
when one of their own commits suicide they come to me and ask me and our Council 
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for support.  I want an apology from Northern Ireland for hundreds of British 
policemen and soldiers they have killed’.54  Furthermore, he defended his actions on 
this basis: ‘My hallmark is plain speaking.  The electorate acknowledge my lower 
deck language and refusal to be influenced by blackmail, favours, friends, or enemies 
by installing the first PCC Conservative administrative since 1979’.55   
On the basis that he had breached the code of conduct established by s. 50 of 
the Local Government Act 2000, Mr. Sanders was removed as leader of the Council 
and as a member of the Conservative Party.  Later, the Adjudication Panel of England 
disqualified him from being a councillor for a period of two years but omitted to 
consider his claim that the disciplinary action amounted to a breach of Article 10: the 
Respondent, Mr. Kingston, the Ethical Standards Officer, had reported to the Panel 
prior to the tribunal hearing that ‘it is unclear precisely what Councillor Sanders is 
complaining about in that context.  It is my opinion that the Standards Board 
procedures are fully in accord with all applicable provision of the [HRA]’.56  Sanders 
appealed to the High Court on the basis that the tribunal failed to consider his Article 
10 complaint and, furthermore, since political speech was involved, that the highest 
level of protection should have been applied.  Finding against Sanders on this point 
(but finding for him on the severity of the penalty, which did not take into account 
that Sanders had been subsequently re-elected to the Council as an Independent), 
Wilkie J. refused to accept Counsel’s submission for the Defendant that ‘what a 
councillor says in the course of the discharge of his office can never amount to 
political expression…[It can] only [do so] when he is acting as a politician rather than 
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in his official capacity as member of a council’57 but did find that ‘there was nothing 
in what Councillor Sanders [did or said] which amounts to a political expression of 
views at all’.58  His initial response to Carrickfergus was ‘little more than an 
expression of personal anger at his time being wasted by Carrickfergus’s request’ 
whilst what he said to the BBC ‘amounts to no more than a personal attack upon the 
family of Paul Cochrane and the people of Northern Ireland.  It is little more than 
vulgar abuse’.59  On that basis, the comments were not entitled to the highest 
protection under Article 10.  Thus, whilst Wilkie J. noted the ECtHR decisions in 
Lingens v. Austria60 and Jerusalem v. Austria,61 both of which confirm that Article 10 
applies particularly to political expression, even that which shocks, offends or 
disturbs, especially where the speech is by an elected representative of the people, 
these principles did not apply: ‘the overwhelming impression [of Sanders’s views] is 
that they are the ill-tempered response of a person who thought that he should not be 
being troubled by the request of Carrickfergus and who has chosen to express his 
annoyance in personal and abusive terms’62 which ‘did not constitute political 
expression’.63 
Wilkie J.’s rationale for this decision could be interpreted in a number of 
ways.  It could be read as implying a connection between the level of offensiveness 
and the definition of political content: that Sanders’s speech was not political because 
it was offensive.  Alternatively, it could be read as implying no connection: that 
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Sanders’s speech was not political, just offensive.  The former interpretation seems to 
conflict with the notion of protecting offensive political expression and, amongst 
other things, would be contrary to the ‘mirror principle’ (discussed in the previous 
chapter) given the findings in Lingens v. Austria.  If the decision reflects the latter 
interpretation then the finding is unconvincing.  Wilkie J.’s finding that Sanders’s 
initial reaction to the Carrickfergus letter was born out of nothing more than irritation 
seems convincing based on the facts, however once the press became involved, 
Sanders was given a platform to express his views on the political situation in 
Northern Ireland (albeit in a brusque and insensitive manner).  Yet the reason why 
that platform was established (due to his misunderstanding) is surely irrelevant.  
Consequently, the fact that Sanders’s view is unattractive, unsustainable and insulting 
is a reason to condemn his political position and for the people of Peterborough not to 
re-elect him (which, however, they did).  In other words, it seems more accurate to 
say the speech was poor political speech rather than not political speech.  Although 
Wilkie J. might still have found Article 10 had not been violated (there is no absolute 
right to freedom of political expression) the higher level of judicial scrutiny into 
interferences with political expression ought to have been apparent.  This point is 
expanded upon, below.64 
 
ii) Livingstone v. the Adjudication Panel for England 
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 The decision in Livingstone provides points of comparison and contrast with 
the decision in Sanders.65  It concerned the behaviour of Ken Livingstone, whilst 
Mayor of London, toward a reporter, after leaving a reception to mark the twentieth 
anniversary of Chris Smith MP’s public declaration of his homosexuality.  When the 
reporter said he worked for the Evening Standard, Livingstone remarked ‘how awful 
for you…Have you thought of having treatment?’ (which the journalist ignored) 
before asking ‘Were you a German war criminal?’.  The reporter replied ‘No, I’m 
Jewish…I’m actually quite offended by that’ to which Livingstone said ‘Well you 
might be, but actually you are just like a concentration camp guard.  You’re just 
doing it ‘cause you’re paid to aren’t you?’ and, whilst continually ignoring the 
journalist’s question ‘How did tonight go?’, said, between interruptions by the 
journalist, ‘It’s nothing to do with you because your paper is a load of 
scumbags…It’s reactionary bigots…and who supported fascism…Well, work for a 
paper that isn’t…that hadn’t a record of supporting fascism’.66  Mr Livingstone 
appealed against the sanction imposed by the Adjudication Panel of England to 
suspend him consequently for four weeks on the basis, amongst other things, that his 
right to freedom of speech had been infringed.  Unlike in Sanders, the Court agreed 
that the right had been infringed by the sanction – not because the speech was 
political but because there were no clear and satisfactory reasons advanced to render 
him liable to sanctions.67  Collins J. did not accept the Tribunal’s reasoning that 
Livingstone’s actions implicated his position as Mayor.  Instead, the Court found that 
Livingstone was ‘off duty’ at the point at which the offensive remarks were made 
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and, furthermore, that the offensive remarks did not bring the office of London Mayor 
into disrepute therefore the code of conduct could not be applied.68 
Had the Divisional Court said nothing further, the decision would be 
unremarkable.  Yet Collins J. also found that the sanctions imposed on Livingstone 
amounted to a breach of Article 10.  His treatment of this claim is interesting for a 
number of reasons.  In general terms, the treatment of freedom of speech appears out 
of kilter with the narrow consequentialist approach seen in other Article 10 cases.69  
Also, the finding that the speech was not political seems contestable for similar 
reasons as with Sanders: Livingstone is making a comment on the Evening Standard 
and its journalists, in particular that they are ‘bigots…who supported fascism’.  This 
is not to say it is political expression in its best form or at its most persuasive but to 
say it is not political at all is hard to accept, especially since Collins J.’s treatment of 
this point is more declaratory than explanatory:  
 
‘I have no doubt that the appellant was not to be regarded as expressing a political opinion 
which attracts the high level of protection.  He was indulging in offensive abuse of a 
journalist whom he regarded as carrying out on his newspaper’s behalf activities which the 
appellant regarded as abhorrent’70  
 
As in Sanders, this finding might be read as suggesting that offensive speech and 
political speech are mutually exclusive.  Yet having found that the speech did not 
engage the higher level of protection afforded to political speech, Collins J. 
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nevertheless cited Hoffmann LJ’s findings in Central Television in the following 
terms in order to support his finding that freedom of speech under Article 10 covers 
abuse:  
 
‘Freedom means … the right to say things which ‘right-thinking people’ regard as dangerous 
or irresponsible.  This freedom is subject only to clearly defined exceptions laid down by 
common law or statute … It cannot be too strongly emphasised that outside the established 
exceptions … there is no question of balancing freedom of speech against other interests.  It is 
a trump card which always wins.’71   
 
Yet, as set out above, Hoffmann LJ’s comments were made in a case where both 
political expression and the freedom to publish were found to be at stake.  Given the 
liberalness of Hoffmann LJ’s approach to freedom of speech, it is apparent that he 
was applying a high level of protection to such expression.  Thus, by citing this 
passage in spite of finding that Livingstone’s expression did not deserve the highest 
level of protection, Collins J.’s analysis strongly suggests the application of that high 
level in any event.  Moreover, the reference to Hoffmann’s comment that freedom of 
speech is ‘trump card which always wins’ is not only unhelpful in the circumstances 
but also seems to suggest a right to abuse.  Such a finding seems not only 
unnecessary given the earlier finding that the code of conduct did not apply to the 
circumstances in any event but also risks overstating the significance of the 
expression at stake.  It is unremarkable to say that abuse is covered by Article 10: as 
set out above, the Strasbourg jurisprudence applies a low threshold.  It is concerning, 
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however, that Livingstone might be read as establishing a right to abuse.  
Furthermore, the finding is intriguing given the development of the ‘right of others’ 
exception to include ‘the right not to be offended’ (this point is discussed further in 
the following section). 
 
iii) Conclusions 
 
In many ways these two cases appear contradictory.  Whereas the decision in 
Livingstone suggests that the expression could be protected under Article 10 even 
though it was just abuse, the decision in Sanders suggests the opposite: that the 
expression could not be protected because it was just abuse.  Of course, it is 
important not to overlook the context of these decisions.  The key issue at stake in 
both was whether the expression brought the office in question into disrepute.  On 
that basis, it may be said that the issue was not what the individuals said but the 
circumstances in which they said them.  Thus, it was significant in Livingstone that 
Mr Livingstone was found to be ‘off-duty’ when speaking.  Similarly, it might be said 
that Mr Sanders was entitled to make his comments if speaking as a private citizen 
but not as leader of Peterborough City Council.  Yet it is the treatment of the Article 
10 claims in these decisions rather than the outcomes that is at the centre of the 
discussion above: it is the courts’ treatment of expression that shocks, offends or 
disturbs that is in issue.  Amongst other things, these decisions narrow down the 
ambit of what counts as ‘political’ in the context of offensive expression.  Whereas 
Sanders suggests the level of offensive may be such as to negate this categorisation, 
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Livingstone confirms that such categorisation stands or falls based on the plain 
meaning of the specific expression: a political texture cannot be inferred based on 
extrinsic evidence.  However, these interpretations of the term ‘political’ do not 
appear harmonious with the ECtHR’s finding in Vereinigung Bildender Kunstler 
(“VBK”) v. Austria,72 which it will be recalled was discussed in Chapter Three.73  In 
VBK, the ECtHR adopted a particularly liberal stance in which it accepted that the 
depiction of a politician ejaculating on Mother Teresa could be regarded as a form of 
‘counter attack’ against that the political party (that the politician had belonged to) 
who had previously criticised the artist.  Given that such an interpretation specifically 
required extrinsic knowledge of that previous criticism, it represents a point of 
contrast with the decision in Livingstone.  There is a further issue to be discussed in 
respect of these cases: as is well-established in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
politicians are provided with a further level of protection as speakers because of their 
place in the democratic process.  This point is specifically discussed in the following 
chapter, which examines the UK courts differential treatment of speakers based on 
their identity.74 
Moreover, these two cases are significant in so far as they relate to the theme 
of the next section, which explores the UK courts’ development of the ‘rights of 
others’ exception under Article 10(2).  By exploring this case law, the discussion in 
the next section builds toward the conclusion that the development of rights of others 
not to be offended, combined with the treatment of ‘political’ in decisions like 
                                                 
72
 (2007) ECDR 7. 
73
 See discussion at pages 112 to 115. 
74
 See discussion from pages 247 to 255 
190/385 
Sanders and Livingstone, do not qualify the commitment to protect offensive political 
expression so much as render it sterile. 
 
3. Development of the ‘rights of others’ exception 
 
 Within the exceptions to Article 10, listed in subsection 2, is the ‘rights of 
others’.  Clearly, this exception will apply where another Convention right is at stake 
and in that case, save for the situation where one of the absolute (or near-absolute 
rights) is in issue (Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7), neither right has presumptive priority:75 a 
close factual analysis is called for in which the appeal of both rights is closely 
scrutinised so that interferences with either are proportionate, otherwise known as the 
‘ultimate balancing act’.76  An interesting feature of the development of the ‘rights of 
others’ exception in the UK is its application in circumstances where another 
Convention right is not engaged.  In the House of Lords decision in ProLife, Lord 
Scott, whilst dissenting on the outcome of the balancing act, found that the reference 
in Article 10(2) to the ‘rights of others’: 
 
‘need not be limited to strictly legal rights…and is well capable of extending to a recognition 
of the sense of outrage that might be felt by ordinary members of the public who in the 
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privacy of their own homes had switched on the television set and been confronted by 
gratuitously offensive material’.77 
 
Thus the ‘rights of others’ exception applied to ‘the right of home-owners that 
offensive material should not be transmitted into their homes’.78  Lord Walker 
likewise found that the citizen ‘has a right not to be shocked or affronted by 
inappropriate material transmitted into the privacy of his home’.79  This aspect of the 
decision was applied in Connolly v. DPP (the facts of which are discussed in Chapter 
Six)80 where Dyson LJ found that the right extended to the workplace: 
 
‘just as members of the public have the right to be protected from such material (sent for such 
a purpose) in the privacy of their homes, so too, in general terms, do people in the 
workplace...The more offensive the material, the greater the likelihood that such persons have 
the right to be protected from receiving it’81  
 
This, he added, might be subject to the recipient’s profession: a doctor who routinely 
performs abortions ‘may well be materially different’82 from that of employees in a 
pharmacy. 
 Judicial recognition of these ‘rights’ not to be offended at home or in the 
workplace is intriguing on a number of levels.  For example, what does Lord Scott 
mean by ‘not…strictly legal rights’?  How does this fit with the established notions of 
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rights advanced by Dworkin83 or Hohfeld,84 for example?  In what circumstances can 
this right be deployed?  Can an individual initiate a claim based on an infringement of 
this right?  For example, is it a species of, or does it belong to, the concept of respect 
for the home which has been cautiously recognised by the ECtHR85 under Article 8 of 
the Convention?  The peaceful enjoyment of the home86 is a recognised aspect of this 
concept (albeit recognised in the context of noise87 and air pollution).88  However, 
Lord Scott’s reference to ‘not…strictly legal’ would seem to suggest otherwise given 
that Article 8 is a legal right under the Convention.  Yet these are important questions 
for which no immediate answers exist within Lord Scott’s judgment in ProLife. 
 In the context of the decision in ProLife, Collins J.’s approach to the 
expression in Livingstone is intriguing: certainly, it does not seem in keeping with the 
consequentialist approach to freedom of expression seen in other cases.  There is no 
reference to the right not to be offended in the judgment.  Instead, Collins J. found 
that: 
 
‘however offensive and undeserving of protection the appellant’s outburst may have appeared 
to some, it is important that any individual knows that he can say what he likes, provided that 
it is not unlawful, unless there are clear and satisfactory reasons within the terms of Article 
10(2) to render him liable to sanctions…The restraint was not in my judgment shown to be 
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necessary in a democratic society even though the higher level of protection appropriate for 
the expression of political opinion was not engaged’.89 
 
Given the finding that political expression was not at stake, the facts of this case 
would seem to provide fertile ground for the ‘right not to be offended’ to be applied.  
In other words, since the higher level of protection afforded to political expression 
was not applicable and since the ‘right not to be offended’ is a recognised exception 
by dint of the decision in ProLife, Collins J. could have found that the interference 
with the right was justifiable. 
 From the opposite perspective, the decision in Sanders is interesting.  Wilkie 
J. did not explicitly state that the right not to be offended applied.  However, he was 
referred in very general terms by Counsel for the Respondent to ProLife and he did 
refer to the legitimate aim of suppression being ‘the rights of others’,90 without 
further explanation of what specific ‘right’ was invoked.  Consequently, given the 
strong emphasis on Sanders’s speech being offensive, it might be implied that the 
‘right’ invoked by Article 10(2) was the right not to be offended.  Given that no other 
Convention right was specifically mentioned or implied, it is difficult to see what 
other right Wilkie J. might have been referring to.  In any event, the absence of 
further explanation of which ‘right of others’ applied suggests a loose and casual 
application of the right, which is troubling.  The application of the exception in this 
way is not just apparent in the lower courts.  In ADI, Lord Bingham stated that ‘the 
rights of others which a restriction on the exercise of the right to free expression may 
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properly be designed to protect must, in my judgment, include a right to be protected 
against the potential mischief of partial political advertising’,91 without any 
explanation of why or how the exception includes this particular non-Convention 
right.  Thus, the status of these ‘non-Convention rights’ is unresolved.  Lord Scott’s 
explanation that the right of others exception need not be limited to strictly legal 
rights is intriguing.  Yet these rights would seem to have no freestanding status: they 
do not seem to be the type of ‘legal rights’ that can be used to initiate an action.  
Since it is, typically, existing legislative provisions that are applied to deny the 
Article 10 claim, are these ‘rights’ parasitic so as to enhance the force of those 
legislative provisions?  Furthermore, although described as not ‘strictly legal rights’, 
the effect seems more comparable to legal rights than societal interests.  In theory, the 
distinction is crucial since the former holds the greater weight, acting as an equal but 
conflicting principle to the Article 10 right in action rather than a narrowly construed 
exception.92  Yet given that it remains unarticulated and capable of application to a 
wide variety of circumstances, the ‘right not to be offended’ does not seem equivalent 
to a narrowly construed exception: it seems fairly broad.  In this sense, it is 
disappointing that the House of Lords has not expanded upon the meaning, or 
provided guidance about the operation, of these non-Convention ‘rights’.   
In practice, however, the need to clarify status as ‘right’ or ‘societal interest’ 
may have little practical effect in any event since the operation of a real distinction 
between interest and right, as they operate to justify interferences, is not readily 
discernible in the HRA case law.  As Greer argues in the context of the Strasbourg 
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jurisprudence, the problem with the approach to societal interests lies with the use of 
the ‘balancing’ metaphor: it ‘is not the notion that Convention rights and competing 
social interests have to be weighed, but the implication that, prima facie, each has 
equal value’.93  Yet, even so, given how nebulous the ‘right not to be offended’ is, its 
application is troubling in free speech terms: certainly, its treatment so far does not 
suggest the application of a ‘narrowly construed exception’.  The following section 
expands upon the argument that this development of the rights of others exception 
represents a threat to freedom of expression that should not be ignored. 
 
4. The threat to free speech 
 
It is recognised that the use of the rights of others exception to uphold non-
Convention rights over freedom of expression has occurred in a small number of 
cases.  Yet at the same time, it is important not to downplay the significance of these 
cases for two reasons: first, the interpretation of the exception, to include a wide 
variety of non-specific non-Convention rights, is happening at House of Lords level 
and, secondly, the application of the exception by first instance judges is especially 
important because they are the frontline guardians of human rights protection.  The 
purpose of this section is to establish the argument that as a result of the paucity of 
guidance emanating from the courts on the ‘right not to be offended’, the threat to 
freedom of speech that exists in the exception is two-fold: first, it is turning judges 
into regulators of the public debate and, second, it risks becoming a charter for the 
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‘heckler’s veto’.  Given the dominance of the instrumentalist approach to free speech 
protection, it will be important to establish why this is an issue if the risk extends no 
further than to speech that contributes nothing much to public debate in any event. 
As Fenwick and Phillipson have argued in general terms, the courts’ 
consequentialist approach to Article 10 may favour journalists rather than non-
journalists.94  This seems particularly true where the ‘right not to be offended’ is 
applied.  This argument is more fully discussed in the next chapter.  Luzius 
Wildhaber, former President of the European Court of Human Rights has said that 
‘what the right to offend is intended to guarantee is the participation in the democratic 
process through public debate of questions of general concern.  The strength of the 
protection offered will depend on the extent to which the expression can be linked to 
the direct functioning of democratic society’.95  This principle is clear from 
Strasbourg decisions such as Handyside v. UK96 and Lingens v. Austria97 and is 
firmly established in the UK in cases such as ProLife.98  Thus, where offensive 
political speech offends, the conflict will be decided, ultimately, on the value of the 
speech at stake.  In this way, it seems that political expression will be protected to the 
extent that its associated offensiveness does not expunge its instrumental value.  In 
this regard, journalists may be in a better position than non-journalists based on the 
difference in effect between reporting and advocating offensive political speech.  As 
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Jersild v. Denmark99 evidences, journalists can better insulate themselves from the 
offensiveness of the ideas in question if they are reporting rather than advocating 
those ideas.  In Jersild, the fact that the journalist was said to be assisting in the 
dissemination of extreme racist views did not defeat the Article 10 claim because the 
journalist was fulfilling his duty to assist in the discussion of public interest matters.  
Furthermore, the reporting of offensive ideas, arguably, contextualises any associated 
advocacy that may take place: the argument that this advocacy fits the democratic 
process value is likely to be better received on the basis that the journalist is entitled 
to express a view on the issue, within reason.100  
 Yet it might be said that if the capacity to speak freely is diminished in 
circumstances where the speech, even political speech, offends then why mourn that 
loss if the speech does not contribute much to the democratic process value in any 
event?  So in the context of the cases discussed above, it might be asked why Mrs 
Connolly should not be prevented from upsetting pharmacy workers who are just 
doing their job?  Alternatively, it might be said, as Lord Hoffmann did, that a political 
broadcast on abortion has got very little to do with a general election.  Furthermore, it 
is important to recognise that, in the context of offensive political speech, public 
order issues and freedom of speech principles may be in direct conflict.  As much as 
it is possible to do so, the discussion in this thesis has sought to divorce the two, 
ignoring the public order principles in order to focus exclusively on the free speech 
ones.  Yet discussion of offensive political expression forces those public order issues 
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into the spotlight.  Obviously, it is important that freedom of speech is not so grossly 
exaggerated that the police, etc, feel impotent in the face of unrest (and worse) for 
fear of breaching Article 10.  Clearly, there are circumstances in which the political 
ideal is so offensive in its specific context that free speech principles must give 
way.101  Thus it is recognised that in some circumstances, the judiciary ought to 
decide against free speech principles because of those larger community concerns.  
Yet not all offensive political speech cases will involve such immediate public order 
issues, especially where there is no direct interaction between the speaker and the 
audience or bystanders.  Moreover, it is important that the judiciary are mindful of the 
free speech implications, particularly where public order issues arise.102  In particular, 
the judiciary should be mindful against installing themselves as regulators of the 
public debate at large and permitting the ‘heckler’s veto’ to gain a strong foothold.  
These are the principal threats to freedom of expression that the development of the 
‘rights of others not to be offended’ represents. 
Thus, the concern is that the judiciary may interpret the rights of others 
exception as essentially providing licence to dictate the quality of public debate: this 
risk is inherent in the exception being applied in a manner that is both largely 
unarticulated and unprincipled.  Yet there is no need for the courts to go so far.  
Albeit in the context of press freedom, Lord Hoffmann has previously warned against 
the dangers of the judiciary ‘whittling away’ freedom of speech by employing ‘ad hoc 
judge-made exceptions’ according to their own sensibilities of what is best for the 
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public: the point seems particularly prescient and equally applicable to the 
development of the rights of others exception.  His Lordship recognised that this 
might pit interests against each other that are ‘not easily commensurable’ but:  
 
‘no freedom is without cost…[yet] a freedom which is restricted to what judges think to be 
responsible or in the public interest is no freedom...In the area of human rights like freedom 
of speech, I respectfully doubt the wisdom of creating judge-made exceptions, particularly 
when they require a judicial balancing of interests.  The danger about such exceptions is that 
judges are tempted to use them.’103  
 
Whilst it could be argued that Lord Hoffmann’s fervour is for press freedom rather 
than freedom of speech for the individual, that is no reason why the principle cannot 
be universally applied, particularly since it seems to recognise the principle that 
‘freedom of expression cannot be exercised in a vacuum’.104 
Yet there are also issues about the competency of judges to determine what 
speech is ‘important’ to public debate.  Given the above quote, it is ironic that Lord 
Hoffmann should find in ProLife that the speech was hardly critical to a general 
election: as Barendt argues ‘it is surely not for the courts to determine the relevance 
of the Alliance PEB (or any political broadcast) to the electoral campaign waged by 
the main parties’.105  Furthermore, the potential for the judiciary to decide that speech 
is unbefitting public debate (and so deny the Article 10 claim) invites comparison 
with the dark days of the Licensing Act regime, which permitted the superintendence 
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of a licenser to regulate the printing press.106  This is not to say that the ‘right not to 
be offended’ will always act as a prior restraint but certainly it has the capacity to do 
so if the judiciary apply the right too literally or liberally.  Alternatively, it has the 
capacity to replicate the old ‘seditious libel’ offence which, as Levy observes, was a 
‘commodious concept encompassing anything from criticism of public policy to 
advocacy of overthrow of government’.107  It is (hopefully) highly unlikely that the 
judiciary would deny Article 10 protection because the speech criticises government 
in some way.  As Lord Scott said in the House of Lords decision in Rusbridger, ‘the 
United Kingdom is a mature democracy and in a mature democracy people do not get 
prosecuted for advocating political change by peaceful and constitutional means’.108  
Of course this is susceptible to a narrow reading of ‘peaceful and constitutional 
means’ since this stipulation may be read as requiring the non-journalist to 
communicate to a newspaper or politician so that these constitutional actors may take 
up the cudgels.  This narrowness is implicit in Connolly: Dyson LJ found that the 
prosecution of Mrs Connolly was necessary in a democratic society because, amongst 
other things, the photographs ‘were sent to persons who had not taken up a public 
position on the abortion issue and who, unlike, for example, politicians, could have 
no influence on what is ultimately a political debate’.109 
 The reaction of the ‘audience’ to the speech is also clearly critical and this 
raises the further concern that a literal and liberal application of the ‘right not to be 
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offended’ is a charter for the ‘heckler’s veto’ in which the ‘audience’ effectively 
controls what may or may not be said according to their own sensibilities; that the 
most aggressive or most sensitive members of the audience may prevent the speaker 
speaking.  The potential threat to freedom of political expression of the ‘heckler’s 
veto’ is well-recognised in case law and academic commentary.  Beatty v. Gilbanks110 
is the classic statement of what Barendt describes as ‘an uncompromisingly pro-free 
speech’111 stance on the issue.  In Brutus v. Cozens, the court found that s. 5 of the 
Public Order Act 1936 did not apply to all speech that was likely to occasion a breach 
of the peace otherwise ‘determined opponents may not shrink from organising or at 
least threatening [such] in order to silence a speaker whose view they detest’.112  
Redmond-Bate v. DPP113 is the most recent statement of protection in such 
uncompromising terms.  Yet these instances show the term deployed in public order 
contexts.  It is important that the judiciary is cautious not to limit the notion of the 
heckler’s veto as only applicable in public order contexts.  The same concerns apply 
in broader circumstances than street protest and seem particularly appropriate to the 
‘right not to be offended’.  It is important the judiciary do not allow the most 
vulnerable actual or potential audience member to determine what may or may not be 
said. 
‘Offence’ and ‘contribution to democratic process value’ are fairly elastic 
terms. The risk, discussed above, is that the courts’ approach to the right not to be 
offended may erode the commitment to protect offensive political speech in two 
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ways: first, the offensiveness of the speech may lead the court to classify or 
misclassify the speech as not ‘political’;114 secondly, the court may decide that the 
expression does not sufficiently contribute to the democratic process so as to warrant 
protection because, for example, it tends to alienate the audience from the speaker’s 
desired political objective due to its offensiveness.  Thus, the interpretation of the 
‘rights of others’ exception in ProLife and ADI may be treated as providing licence to 
the judiciary to use it as a ‘blocking device’ against the free speech arguments 
deployed.  Starting from the position that the speech in question does not significantly 
contribute to the democratic process value, the ‘rights of others’ exception may then 
be adjusted and labelled in whatever terms reflect the negative effect that the speech 
is said to have: if it offends, the exception manifests as the right not to be offended; if 
it misleads, it becomes the right not to be misled; if it sensationalises, it becomes the 
right not to be whipped into a frenzy; and so on.  Quite clearly, then, the UK courts 
interpretation of the ‘rights of others’ exception, so far, carries a wildcard quality.  
Moreover, used in this way, the ‘rights of others’ exception fences off the domain of 
Article 10 protection, reducing the space that Article 10 may inhabit.  The threat this 
poses to free speech is very real: that space may be reduced to a small area.  Thus, it 
is submitted that the approach to offensive political expression ought to be revisited.  
At present, because it is so heavily consequentialist focused, it requires the courts to 
balance the contribution made against the offence caused.  Yet the court cannot 
objectively determine such a balance and so must rely upon ad hoc calculations.  This 
is an inherently unreliable test.  An extreme example of this happening can be seen in 
Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in ProLife.  This produces a very narrow application of 
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the argument from participation in a democracy, i.e., it treats the rationale as a 
requirement that the expression results in an actual influence on the democratic 
process.  This goes further than a requirement that an intention to contribute to public 
debate is evident.115 
 
5. A resolution? 
 
 It will be argued in this section that the potential mischief to free speech 
principle that the development of the rights of others exception represents may be 
resolved in two ways, both of which involve greater adherence to the rationales 
outlined by Lord Steyn in ex parte Simms.  First, the judges could better realise the 
broader rationales that Lord Steyn refers to, as recognised in established theory by the 
arguments from self-fulfilment and truth or, even, the argument from autonomy.  
These theories were discussed in general terms in Chapter Two; the application of 
them to offensive political expression is considered in more detail below.  It is 
recognised that these broader approaches to freedom of expression may be 
unattractive to the UK judiciary: it may be concluded that such broader rationales 
conflict with the ECtHR’s approach to freedom of expression and, therefore, conflict 
with the ‘mirror principle’ under s. 2, HRA (as discussed in Chapter Four).  
Alternatively, the UK judiciary might adopt a broader approach to the argument from 
participation in a democracy evident in, for example, Meiklejohn’s conception of the 
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theory.116  No conflict need arise with the Strasbourg jurisprudence if the UK 
judiciary adopted such an approach – indeed, it was argued in Chapter Three that the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence seems to have greater parallels with Meiklejohn’s approach 
than the narrow consequentialist approach evident in the UK jurisprudence.  
Furthermore, such an approach would not require the judiciary to measure (or, at 
least, try to measure) the actual contribution of such speech to the democratic process 
but rather would require the judges to do no more than identify whether the speech 
intended to make such a contribution. 
 Arguably, the common law already contains signs of these broader approaches 
to freedom of expression.  For example, these can be seen in Lord Justice Sedley’s 
comments in Redmond-Bate: 
 
 ‘What Speaker's Corner (where the law applies as fully as anywhere else) demonstrates is the 
tolerance which is both extended by the law to opinion of every kind and expected by the law 
in the conduct of those who disagree, even strongly, with what they hear.  From the 
condemnation of Socrates to the persecution of modern writers and journalists, our world has 
seen too many examples of State control of unofficial ideas.  A central purpose of the 
[Convention] has been to set close limits to any such assumed power.’117 
 
Amongst other things, these comments emphasise the need for the judiciary to stop 
short of determining what value the expression actually makes to society at large.  
Likewise, the Court of Appeal decision in ProLife provides further evidence.  Lord 
Justice Laws noted that the intended PEB ‘is certainly graphic; and as I have said, 
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disturbing.  But if we are to take political free speech seriously, those characteristics 
cannot begin to justify the censorship that was done in this case’.118  Moreover, it 
reinforces the special role of the judiciary in protecting diverse sources of political 
expression: ‘I would assert that as a matter of domestic law the courts owe a special 
responsibility to the public as the constitutional guardian of the freedom of political 
debate’.119  Likewise, as noted above, Lord Justice Simon Brown found that ‘the 
importance of freedom of expression in the context of political speech is hard to 
exaggerate’.120 
The UK judiciary might also have regard to the broader consequentialist 
values evident in the established theories concerning the contribution free speech 
makes to the development of individual faculties.  The arguments for this rationale 
were discussed in Chapter Two and, as noted, have been well-established by 
commentators such as Emerson,121 Baker122 and Redish,123 to name a few.  Although 
such theories extend the ambit of free speech beyond the narrow conceptions of the 
democratic process value,124 they have also application to that process: as Baker 
argues, his model ‘emphasizes people’s self-fulfilment and participation in societal 
change’.125  Such theories go beyond the democratic process value because, as Redish 
argues, ‘the very exercise of one’s freedom to speak, write, create, appreciate or learn 
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represents a use, and therefore a development, of an individual’s uniquely human 
faculties’.126  This observation accords with Emerson’s view that ‘freedom of 
expression is essential to the full development of the human personality’127 or, as 
Perry puts it, that individuals achieve an ‘even better understanding of reality’.128  On 
this basis, the speech in ProLife seems to have a stronger position: it intends to depict 
a sharper image of the abortion process so as to provide a better understanding of 
reality.  This argument would seem to increase the range of reasons for protecting 
speech: it does not limit free speech to a narrow sense of contribution to the 
democratic process, i.e., to elect candidates to office and then scrutinise them once 
there, but rather it protects speech that provides the electorate with a deeper 
understanding of political issues in a more generalised way. 
Furthermore, the UK judiciary might apply the argument from truth more 
liberally.  As set out in Chapter Two, the argument is easily misunderstood as 
validating the exclusion of speech that is ‘false’: this can be seen, for example, in 
Lord Hobhouse’s judgment in Reynolds,  
 
‘The citizen is at liberty to comment and take part in free discussion.  It is of fundamental 
importance to a free society that this liberty be recognised and protected by the law. [Yet] 
there is no human right to disseminate information that is not true...The working of a 
democratic society depends on the members of that society, being informed not misinformed.  
Misleading people and the purveying as facts statements which are not true is destructive of 
the democratic society and should form no part of such a society’129 
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However, such resistance to falsehood may be challenged on the grounds put forward 
by J.S. Mill, explored in Chapter Two:130 that such exclusion is both an assumption of 
infallibility and neglects the importance of error (that a meaningful understanding of 
the truth can only be arrived through discussion of all views of it).  Furthermore, 
there is a discrepancy between Lord Hobhouse’s assessment and the recent findings 
of the ECtHR that Article 10 ‘as such does not prohibit discussion or dissemination of 
information received even if it is strongly suspected that this information might not 
be truthful’.131  This statement by the ECtHR seems in keeping with Mill’s argument 
from truth.   
 However, the judiciary might feel that greater recognition of these broader 
rationales for free speech protection would conflict with the established Strasbourg 
interpretation of the principles underpinning Article 10 (and, therefore, the courts’ 
obligations under s. 2 of the HRA), which clearly gives pre-eminence to a 
consequentialist rationale in keeping with the argument from participation in a 
democracy.132  As set out in Chapter Four, Lord Bingham has made it clear on a 
number of occasions, most recently in ADI, that fresh interpretation of those 
principles is not an option open to the UK courts.133  Yet greater recognition of these 
broader rationales need not clash with the Strasbourg approach.  Indeed, as is evident 
from the decision in Handyside, for example, these rationales are recognised by the 
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ECtHR.134  However, as other commentators have argued, these broader rationales 
have not been realised to their full extent in the Strasbourg jurisprudence:135 they are 
limited to the extent that the democratic process value must also be satisfied.  In other 
words, whilst self-fulfilment and truth are relevant, as former President of the 
ECtHR, Luzius Wildhaber has said of the Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘ultimately it is 
the role played in democratic society by the expression at issue which determines the 
level of protection that will be accorded to it’.136 
As set out in Chapter Two, however, there are several established theories 
centred on the argument from participation in a democracy and some are broader than 
others.  Thus, the UK courts could realise a broader approach to freedom of 
expression by adhering to one of these broader rationales, such as Meiklejohn’s 
conception which adopts a broad approach to definition of ‘political’ and places 
emphasis on the intention to contribute not the level of contribution made in terms of 
the protection to be afforded to the speech.137  Such an approach would also be in 
keeping with the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  For example, as set out in Chapter Three, 
the ECtHR has recently provided guidance on the question of what constitutes a 
matter of public interest in which it recommended a broad approach is taken to the 
subject matter and context.138  The liberal approach taken to the question of 
contribution is apparent, for example, in the VBK decision or, for that matter, in Salov 
v. Ukraine mentioned above, where the ECtHR found that the dissemination of untrue 
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statements that a political candidate had died still constituted ‘important issues which 
may give rise to a serious public interest’139 and therefore applied the highest level of 
protection afforded to political debate. 
As noted above, the UK judiciary appears to have adopted a narrower 
approach to the question of ‘contribution’ by seeking to measure the actual impact 
such speech has on public debate.  There is a dearth of case law on the question of 
defining ‘public interest’.  In non-free speech contexts, the term ‘political’ has tended 
to be interpreted narrowly.  For example, in charity cases, a ‘political object’ has been 
defined as that which seeks to further the interests of a political party or procure 
changes in laws, policies or administrative decisions, domestically or 
internationally.140  Similarly, in extradition and asylum cases, it has been found that 
‘offences of a political nature’ were those directed against the State in suffrage 
against laws and policies of that State.141  Thus there is a clear theme in such cases 
that in order to find positively for the accused, the accused must be ‘at odds with the 
state…on some issue connected with the political control or government of the 
country’142 and the offence must be directed against the State (possibly including 
opposition parties)143 in order to change its policies or laws:144 thus the criminal act 
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must affect only public officials145 and not innocent civilians.146  Furthermore, 
criminal acts by anarchists might not be captured on the basis they are ‘anti-political’ 
in nature.147  There is Canadian authority for the proposition that the phrase 
‘politician opinion’ embraces any ‘opinion on any matter in which the machinery of 
state, government and policy may be engaged’.148  In general overview, these 
decisions would seem to promote a narrow definition of ‘political’, restricted to 
specific actions of the State. 
However, two recent decisions (both, coincidently, concerning statements 
made by Baroness Hale) provide mixed signs for whether a more liberal approach to 
the definition may be realised.  The first provides some encouragement.  In Campbell 
v. MGN Ltd.,149 after noting that political speech is ‘top of the list’ of speech 
deserving protection in a democratic society,150 Baroness Hale expands upon what 
this would include:  
 
‘The free exchange of information and ideas on matters relevant to the organisation of the 
economic, social and political life of the country is crucial to any democracy.  Without this, it 
can scarcely be called a democracy at all.  This includes revealing information about public 
figures, especially those in elective office, which would otherwise be private but is relevant to 
their participation in public life.  Intellectual and educational speech and expression are also 
                                                 
145
 In In Re Castioni (1891) 1 QB 149 extradition was refused where dissidents killed a public official 
in course of attacking the municipal palace of a Swiss canton due to dissatisfaction with the 
government. 
146
 Therefore terrorism is excluded: see T. v. Immigration Officer, fn. 143. 
147
 In Re Meunier (1894) 2 QB 415. 
148
 Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward (1993) 2 SCR 689, 746-7, referred to by the Court of Appeal 
in Storozhenko v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001) EWCA Civ 895, [18]-[22] 
although in that case it was found to be unnecessary to reach any decisions on the boundaries of the 
expression. 
149
 Fn. 75. 
150
 Ibid., [148] 
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important in a democracy, not least because they enable the development of individuals’ 
potential to play a full part in society and in our domestic life’.151 
 
This list is not intended to be exhaustive and certainly seems shaped by context of the 
case: the extent to which revelations about Naomi Campbell’s private life engaged 
the right to free speech.152  However, to some extent, it echoes Meiklejohn’s 
categorisation of the speech that would be protected due to its effect on the 
audience’s capacity to fully engage with democracy.153 
 However, in the second case, Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe,154 the 
approach appears more cautious.  In this defamation action, the House of Lords 
applied the principle from Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd:155 i.e., publication 
being in the public interest as a defence to defamation.  In this context, and in 
explaining the nature of the defence, Baroness Hale commented on what she meant 
by ‘a real public interest’: 
 
‘this is, as we all know, very different from saying that it is information which interests the 
public – the most vapid tittle-tattle about the activities of footballers’ wives and girlfriends 
interests large sections of the public but no-one could claim any real public interest in our 
being told all about it.  It is also different from the test…of whether the information is 
‘newsworthy’.  That is too subjective a test, based on the target audience, inclinations and 
                                                 
151
 Ibid. 
152
 This case is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter at pages 239 to 247. 
153
 See discussion in Chapter Three. 
154
 (2007) 1 AC 359. 
155
 Fn. 15. 
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interests of the particular publication.  There must be some real public interest in having this 
information in the public domain.’156 
 
It has been argued that this assessment of ‘public interest’ is ‘arguably complacent’: 
‘there is a wide grey area between matters of crucial political import and mere trivia, 
and the tipping point will not always be obvious to either media practitioners or to the 
courts’.157  Thus, the definition is fairly empty: certainly, it does not indicate whether 
the UK judiciary will adopt a liberal or conservative approach to the question of 
‘real’.  Whilst it is fairly obvious that matters that interest the public are not 
necessarily in the public interest, Baroness Hale’s summary does not fully address the 
issue.  Neither does Lord Scott’s assessment that ‘information may be interesting but 
trivial…[or alternatively] it may be lacking in much interest but nonetheless 
important’.158 
 Finally, within this section, two other, more circumspect, arguments will be 
advanced.  First, that since the ‘rights of others not to be offended’ may be deployed 
in situations where those hearing the message are or might be offended, is it not 
equally important, on the same basis, to consider the ‘rights of other others’?, namely 
those who are not or might not be offended; those who may not think they want to 
hear the political view but, on hearing it, derive some positive benefit?  
Hypothetically, an individual exposed to a PEB by ProLife may be so educated 
through exposure to the graphic images as to decide either that, due to this 
                                                 
156
 Jameel, above, fn. 154, [147]. 
157
 Scott, ‘The same river twice?  Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe’ (2007) Communications Law 
52, 55.  Beattie offers a more supportive analysis of the decision: ‘New life for the Reynolds “public 
interest defence”? Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe’ (2007) EHRLR 81. 
158
 Jameel, fn. 154, [138] 
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improvement of their faculties, they would not want to proceed with an abortion or, 
alternatively, that this new information does not outweigh the important 
considerations that have led them to want an abortion in the first place.  This seems to 
accord with Lord Scott’s view in ProLife that censoring the intended PEB ‘denigrates 
the voting public, treating them like children who need to be protected from the 
unpleasant realities of life, [and] seriously undervalues their political maturity’.159  On 
this basis, the operation of the right not to be offended may be tempered by the 
consideration that the greater societal interest is not fully encapsulated by, and so 
cannot be dictated by, the most sensitive members of society. 
Secondly, the judiciary might also have greater regard to the limits of those 
‘constitutional means’ that Lord Scott mentions in Rusbridger to promote unpopular 
ideas.  Arguably, the capacity of the media, the executive or Parliament to devote 
time and energy to promoting and debating unpopular ideas is limited.  Consequently, 
to imply, as Lord Justice Dyson did in Connolly, that the object of free speech may be 
achieved by referring such matters to a local MP or newspaper is questionable.  It is 
self-evident that the executive and Parliament have limited time to discuss such 
issues, particularly where urgent matters of national security, etc, impinge.  
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the print media faces a looming crisis 
as it competes with the internet, television and other faster sources of information to 
survive: the need to ensure commercial viability (which has already been noted by the 
                                                 
159
 ProLife, fn. 21, [99].  Furthermore, although in a press freedom context, the view of Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR (as he then was) is relevant.  In 1993, in deciding that an interview with murderer Denis 
Nilsen be televised, he endorsed the view that: ‘it is quite unnecessary for any relative of any of 
Nilsen's victims to be distressed by this programme if broadcast in its existing form in any way at all, 
since all that anyone has to do is to switch off the programme,’ Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. Central Broadcasting Limited and Another (1993) EMLR 253, 271. 
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UK courts as a reason to protect media freedom)160 may distract the press from its 
public watchdog function as it seeks to sell newspapers through the (apparently) more 
lucrative appeal of celebrity gossip-focused, ‘confessional’-style journalism.161  
Consequently, ‘offensive’ political speech may be reduced to footnote status through 
any of these constitutional means and so not get the full exposure that passionate 
proponents of the idea feel it deserves (and, furthermore, those passionate proponents 
may be more convincing in their explanation of why these offensive ideas deserve 
political consideration). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Lord Justice Sedley’s principled stance on freedom of speech in Redmond-
Bate v. DPP seems outdated already.162  Rather than demonstrating that unpopular 
speech is protected because it is political despite being offensive the post-HRA case 
law suggests, instead, that the terms of the commitment to protect political expression 
have been altered so that, at most, offensive political speech may be protected if there 
is a clear connection to political expression and the offensive element is incidental or 
else justified by the circumstances.  Lord Bingham’s reference in ADI to a ‘level 
playing field’ for ideas to be debated suggests that all speakers are equal and so the 
quality of speech is irrelevant.  Yet the pre-eminence of an apparently narrow 
consequentialist approach to Article 10 protection suggests the opposite is true: that 
                                                 
160
 See judgments of Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale in Campbell, fn. 75 and Lord Woolf in A v. B 
plc (2003) QB 195. 
161
 See discussion in Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 94 on this point, 1-33. 
162
 As set out on p. 180, above. 
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the quality of speech is relevant when deciding whether to protect political speech.  
This is particularly pertinent where the speech is also labelled as ‘offensive’ since, it 
seems, the ‘right of others not to be offended’ becomes engaged.  Yet, as Handyside 
confirms, the commitment to protect political speech clearly includes offensive 
political expression.  The apparent tension between this right to offend and the right 
not to be offended is certainly capable of being resolved in favour of Article 10 where 
the media are involved, for two reasons: reporting offensive speech is not as 
objectionable as advocating offensive speech and, where some opinion is advanced, a 
collective (rather than individual) interest is likely to be at stake on the basis of the 
contribution that media freedom makes to the public interest and the proper 
functioning of a democracy.  However, where it is spoken by a non-journalist, the 
commitment to protect offensive political speech seems more uncertain and the 
zealous stance of Lord Justice Sedley in Redmond-Bate less likely to be apparent in 
the outcome.  Applying the consequentialist rationale, the prospect of such speech 
satisfactorily demonstrating a contribution to the democratic process which 
outweighs its offensiveness is questionable.  The significance of the speaker’s 
identity to determining the level of protection afforded is discussed in greater detail in 
the following chapter. 
The concern raised by this apparent treatment of offensive political speech, 
which should not be overstated but nevertheless recognised, is that it requires judges 
to assess the level of importance of the expression to public debate.  It is submitted 
that this is an assessment that the judiciary cannot accurately determine.  Moreover, 
the ‘right not to be offended’ risks becoming a charter for the heckler’s veto: that the 
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suppression of unpopular ideas is at the whim of the most sensitive actual or, even, 
hypothetical members of society.  The narrow consequentialist rationale, equality of 
societal interests with Convention rights and the paucity of guidance on the ‘right not 
to be offended’ exception is a heady combination that provides fertile ground for this 
risk to be realised.  Moreover, they raise the concern that these principles when 
combined effectively neutralise the claim that Article 10 applies to political 
expression that shocks, offends or disturbs. 
To avoid this possibility, judges might have greater regard to the broader 
rationales for protecting freedom of speech, evident in the arguments from self-
fulfilment and truth, in particular.  Although such an approach might conflict (or else 
be seen as conflicting with) the Strasbourg jurisprudence, a broader approach to the 
democratic process value offers no such conflict.  This would require a broader 
approach to both the definition of ‘public interest’ and toward the connection of the 
speech to the democratic process (in which the court should look no further than for 
evidence of an intention to contribute to such).  At present, it may be too soon to 
concede that the ‘freedom to speak inoffensively is not worth having’ since it may be 
the most pragmatic option available to the individual non-journalist if they are to be 
free to speak at all. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Beyond a simple taxonomy of the speech 
content:  
Speaker, speech and speech target 
valuations in determining the Article 10 
weight 
______________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Whereas the previous chapter explored the UK judiciary’s approach to speech 
content (i.e., offensive political expression), this chapter deals with the courts’ 
approach to free speech in broader terms.  It will be recalled that the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is said to reflect a hierarchical approach to content, which suggests that 
the determinative factor in assessing the weight of the Article 10 claim is the 
classification of the speech involved.  Thus, it has been said that this approach risks 
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reducing the judiciary to taxonomists.1  Yet, as other commentators have argued, in 
relation to political speech particularly, the content of the speech is not the only 
discernible factor in the UK’s Article 10 jurisprudence to determining the level of 
protection afforded.2  It will be argued that a broader assessment of the claim is made 
based not only on the taxonomy of the speech at stake but also the qualities of the 
speaker and speech target and how these three factors connect to the consequentialist 
underpinning of Article 10.  It is this combined weight that is then balanced against 
the competing claim.  Moreover, as in the previous chapter, it will be argued that the 
UK courts’ tend to seek to measure the actual contribution to the democratic process 
value in order to determine the level of protection.  Thus the more significantly the 
speaker, speech or speech target contributes to the democratic process, the greater the 
chance that the Article 10 claim will succeed.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
identify this pattern in operation in the post-Human Rights Act (the “HRA”) case law. 
 
2. Outlining the ‘speaker, speech, speech target’ pattern 
 
As outlined in Chapter One, free speech protection is determined according to 
the outcome of a balancing process.  Thus the free speech claim is afforded weight as 
is the competing claim.  In determining the strength of this opposing claim, differing 
weight values are assigned.  The guiding principle is that competing Convention 
rights are taken to hold equal face value to free speech; neither takes automatic 
                                                 
1
 Tony Martino, ‘In conversation with Professor Eric Barendt: hatred, ridicule, contempt and plain 
bigotry’ (2007) 18(2) Entertainment Law Review 48, 51. 
2
 See, for example, Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act, (OUP, 
2006), 107 onwards. 
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precedence over the other.3  In theory, this presumptive parity does not apply to 
competing interests: since these are not Convention rights they should only interfere 
with such rights in very limited circumstances.4  However, this distinction is not 
abundantly apparent in practice.5  As discussed in Chapter Three, the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence clearly evidences a hierarchical approach to Article 10 in which the 
weight of the claim depends upon categorisation of the speech, with political 
expression at the top and commercial expression bottom.  Consequently, it may be 
thought that the UK courts determine the weight of the Article 10 claim by this 
taxonomical approach.  Yet it will be argued that the approach is more nuanced.  In 
relation to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, Fenwick and Phillipson have argued that 
‘political expression is…divisible in normative terms’ so that some speakers are 
better placed to mount a successful free speech claim than others.6  It is submitted 
that this division is also apparent in the UK jurisprudence so that the qualities of the 
speaker and speech target, in terms of their contribution or significance to the 
consequentialist rationale, also determine the strength of the claim.  Thus, it will be 
argued that there is a discernible, emergent theme in the UK Article 10 jurisprudence 
in which the UK courts determine the significance of the speech at stake by reference 
to the connection between each of these three elements (i.e., speaker, speech and 
speech target) and the ‘democratic process’ value.  Thus: politicians and the media 
score higher on the speaker valuation than non-journalists or protesters with prisoners 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] 2 All ER 995, [55], [138]; Re S [2004] UKHL 47 
4
 Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 2, 589, although see discussion of this analysis in 
Chapter Three at pages 120 to 123. 
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receiving the lowest valuation; speech about a core political issue scores higher than 
speech about isolated or peripheral political concerns; speech about a politician scores 
higher than speech about celebrities. 
It is acknowledged that this is not an absolute rule and the UK courts have not 
articulated their approach to Article 10 in these terms.  Yet there does seem to be a 
discernible theme to this effect.  This pattern seems to emerge, it is submitted, as a 
consequence, or manifestation, of the overarching theme in Article 10 cases outlined 
in previous chapters: that speech is given the highest protection where it benefits the 
democratic process most.  Since it is a theme and not an absolute rule, naturally there 
are exceptions which defy explanation on these terms.  For example, free speech 
cases involving Royalty seem to contradict this approach: for reasons which are 
unarticulated (and unclear), speech concerning Royalty is typically afforded a low 
valuation in speech and speech target terms so that their competing privacy claims 
tend to succeed.7  On a similar theme, the development of other Convention rights 
may affect the pattern, particularly Article 8.8  Thus it should be recognised that the 
weight allocated to the opposing claim may represent something of a wildcard which 
might affect the pattern.  That aside, an important consequence of this pattern in 
action is that the speaker at the lowest end of the value spectrum may find his or her 
claim disadvantaged in the balancing process even though the speech content might 
                                                 
7
 See Prince Radu of Hohenzollern v. Houston [2007] EWHC 2735; HRH Prince of Wales v. 
Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 1685; AG v. Parry [2002] EWHC 3201; Argyll (Duchess) 
v. Duke of Argyll [1965] 1 All ER 611; Albert (Prince) v. Strange (1849) De G & Sm 652, LC.  
8
 For example, the decision in A v. B plc [2003] QB 195 compared to Mosley v. News Group 
Newspapers Ltd (2008) EWHC 687.  These cases are discussed below. 
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attract a high valuation on account of its political theme.9  By comparison, speakers 
of (judicially perceived) greater value may obtain Article 10 protection for speech of 
a more trivial nature (such as celebrity gossip).10  The following sections evidence 
this pattern at work, first in relation to those speakers afforded evident greater value 
and then those afforded lesser value. 
 
3. Of greater value: the media and politicians 
 
a) Journalists 
 
i) Open justice 
 
 In keeping with the notion that the free speech weight has three elements, the 
strength of the journalist’s right to speak depends on the circumstances.  Media 
freedom, though, consistently receives strong (if not the strongest) speaker status.11  
Arguably, the strongest ‘speech’ and ‘speech target’ valuations occur when reporting 
criminal proceedings and, for slightly different reasons, family proceedings.12  It is a 
                                                 
9
 See R. (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport (2008) UKHL 15 and R. (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v. British 
Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23.  These cases are also discussed below. 
10
 E.g., A v. B plc, fn. 8. 
11
 See Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 2. 
12
 There is a separate debate to this discussion that family law proceedings are shrouded in secrecy.  
Ryder J. in BBC v. Rochdale MBC [2005] EWHC 2862 reports, at [62], that there is a consequent 
‘increasing recognition of the need to permit greater openness in family cases’.  See also, W (Children) 
(Identification: Restrictions on Publication), Re [2005] EWHC 1564; H (Children), Re [2005] EWCA 
Civ 1325; B (A Child) (Disclosure), Re [2004] EWHC 411.  The issues are different though compared 
to criminal proceedings, not least that in family law proceedings the need to protect the identity of 
children involved has a statutory footing.   
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longstanding principle that ‘open justice’ is secured by such free reporting.13  Thus 
‘the ordinary rule is that the press, as the watchdog of the public, may report 
everything that takes place in a criminal court’.14  This is a strong rule,15 which is 
now ‘buttressed’ by Article 10:16 ‘it can only be displaced by unusual or exceptional 
circumstances’.17  It is necessary not only to protect the accused’s interest in a fair 
trial18 (which is the defendant’s ‘birthright’)19 but also maintain public confidence in 
the justice system.20  Thus it ensures those participating, including judges, are put 
‘under intense scrutiny’, so that trials are ‘properly conducted’21 and that informed 
public debate may follow.22  Consequently, it has been said that ‘it is impossible to 
over emphasise the importance to be attached to the ability of the media’23 to freely 
report such.  This principle has resonance in any court matter.24  The court is advised 
to be ‘vigilant [against] the natural tendency for the general principle to be eroded 
and for exceptions to grow by accretion’.25 
 However ‘it is not a mechanical rule’.26  The court has power to disapply the 
rule but only in exceptional circumstances.  This is ‘a power which should be used 
                                                 
13
 See the leading decision of Re S, fn. 3 
14
 Ibid., [18] per Lord Steyn 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 R v. J [2003] EWCA Crim 3268 [2] 
17
 Re S., fn. 3, [18] per Lord Steyn 
18
 R (on the application of Trinity Mirror plc) v. Croydon Crown Court [2008] EWCA Crim 50, [17] 
19
 R. v. Bentley [2001] 1 CAR 307, per Lord Bingham 
20
 Re S, fn. 3, [30]; Re Webster (A Child) [2006] EWHC 2898, per Munby J., where a miscarriage of 
justice is alleged, ‘there is a pressing social need for public confidence to be restored – either by the 
public and convincing demonstration that there has not been a miscarriage of justice or, as the case 
may be, by public acknowledgement that there has been’, [104]. 
21
 Re S, ibid.  
22
 Ibid., [34] 
23
 Trinity Mirror plc, fn. 18, [32] 
24
 For example, in Re Webster, fn. 20, the principle was applied in care proceedings. 
25
 R v. Legal Aid Board, ex parte Kaim Todner [1999] QB 966, 977 per Lord Woolf. 
26
 Re S, fn. 3, [18]. 
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sparingly…based only on convincing evidence of the need for it’.27  It is used where 
publicity ‘would frustrate or render impracticable the administration of justice’.28  
This is a well-established power that has survived the post-HRA transition.  Cases are 
now decided according to the balance of Articles 8 and 10.  An important aspect of 
publicity is the public interest in the administration of justice being secured, amongst 
other things, by ensuring the identity of those convicted is not concealed: 
‘uncomfortable though it may be…that is a normal consequence of…crime’.29  
Without such identity, it is often said, the trial report would be ‘disembodied’ and, 
consequently, ‘informed debate about criminal justice would suffer’.30  Yet it may be 
necessary to keep this identity concealed, although mere embarrassment is not 
sufficient31 and neither is the ‘misery, shame and disadvantage’ caused to relations of 
the defendant:32 there must be reasons ‘of a nature that such scrutiny would prove not 
only embarrassing but positively damaging’.33  A significant mental34 or physical35 
harm must be established, such as a serious psychological effect on a related child36 
or consequential prejudicial effect upon placement of a related child into care.37  Yet 
the ‘onus firmly rests upon an applicant who seeks a departure from ‘the general 
rule’;38 ‘the burden is heavy one’.39  These principles equally apply to similar issues 
                                                 
27
 R v. J, fn. 16, [4]. 
28
 AG v. Leveller Magazine (1979) AC 440, [450], per Lord Diplock. 
29
 Trinity Mirror plc, fn. 18, [32], expanded in [33]. 
30
 Re S, fn. 3, [34]. 
31
 Crawford v. Crown Prosecution Service [2008] EWHC 854 (Admin), [31]. 
32
 Trinity Mirror plc, fn. 18, [33]. 
33
 H v. The Ministry of Defence [1991] 2 QB 103, 106H, per Donaldson MR. 
34
 R v. J, supra, fn. 16. 
35
 Carr v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [2005] EWHC 971 (QB). 
36
 Re LM (Reporting Restrictions: Coroner’s Inquest) [2007] EWHC 1902 (Fam); cf. Crawford v. 
Crown Prosecution Service [2008] EWHC 854 and A Local Authority v. PD [2005] EWHC 1832 
(Fam). 
37
 Re W, fn. 12, [77]. 
38
 R v. J, fn. 16. 
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affecting witnesses.40  Statutory provisions may also justify interference with the 
rule41 though may be vulnerable to s. 4 HRA claims42 and any such interference must 
be necessary and proportionate (Article 10(2)).  Likewise, if an order against 
publication is granted, it must be made ‘in clear and unambiguous terms’.43 
 It has been said that there is no ‘presumptive priority’ that the media’s Article 
10 claim will succeed any competing Article 8 one.44  However, this finding is hard 
to accept in the context, particularly, of ‘open justice’ cases; the case law does not 
seem to significantly bear out the claim.45  Given the strength of the rule in favour of 
media freedom, the balance seems decidedly tipped; it requires circumstances of the 
utmost contrary public interest to nullify the heavy public interest in unimpeded 
reporting.46  Although it is perhaps necessary to state there is no presumptive priority 
due to the overarching recognition that the Convention rights are equal amongst 
themselves, the denial seems no more than a paper exercise.47  Cram has previously 
noted the courts’ failure in the context of minors’ privacy: ‘to probe free speech 
                                                                                                                                           
39
 A Local Authority v. PD, fn. 36, [30].  The proposed publication of private medical information may 
not be enough to discharge the burden, especially where a strong public interest in disclosure exists: 
Stone v. South East Coast Strategic Health Authority [2006] EWHC 1668 (Admin) though compare Z 
v. Finland [1997] 25 EHRR 371 where the ECtHR found the protection of private medical date to be 
of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of Article 8. 
40
 BBC v. Rochdale MBC [2005] EWHC 2862 (Fam). 
41
 i.e., the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, s.1(1) prohibits publication of name and photograph 
of child who is victim of a sexual offence: O’Riordan v. DPP [2005] EWHC 1240 (Admin); likewise, 
the Contempt of Court Act 1981 may justify interference in matters involving national security (R v. 
Times Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Crim 1925 and AG v. Punch Ltd and another [2003] 1 AC 
1046).  
42
 Pelling v. Bruce-Williams [2004] EWCA Civ 845 represents a failed attempt. 
43
 Briffett v. DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 841, [24]. 
44
 Re S, fn. 3, [17] and in Re W, fn. 12, [39]. 
45
 See Fenwick, ‘Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act’ (2004) 67(6) 
Modern Law Review 889.  
46
 For example, the provision of total anonymity has occurred in rare cases where genuine threats to 
life and/or significant risk to health arise due to the widespread notoriety of individuals involved: Carr, 
fn. 35; X (formerly known as Mary Bell) v. SO (2003) EWHC 1101 (QB); Thompson and Venables v. 
News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 FLR 791. 
47
 Fenwick makes a similar argument, fn. 45. 
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claims advanced by the media by reference to accepted free speech rationales’.48  
Furthermore, it is difficult to see why an admission of presumptive priority for Article 
10 in this context cannot be made, especially since this admission would not 
guarantee success for the free speech claim.  The clash of Article 8 and Article 10 
claims in other media freedom contexts will be discussed further in the following 
section in the context of broader public interest matters.  The strength of media 
freedom in ‘open justice’ is consistent with Strasbourg principles since such cases 
concern, inter alia, matters of significant public concern.  The ECtHR has recently 
reiterated its long held stance that ‘the most careful scrutiny…is called for when…the 
measures taken or sanctions imposed by the national authority are capable of 
discouraging the participation of the press in debates over matters of legitimate public 
concern’,49 which includes allowing the press to scrutinise the performance of the 
judiciary.50  However, a considerable issue with domestic application of this principle 
is the degree of scrutiny attached to the term ‘legitimate public concern’, as the 
following section explores. 
 
ii) Matters of public interest 
 
                                                 
48
 Ian Cram, ‘Minors’ Privacy, Free Speech and the Courts’ (1997) Public Law 410, 419. 
49
 Tonsbergs Blad as and Haukom v. Norway [2008] 46 EHRR 40, [88] reiterating the position taken in 
Jersild v. Denmark [1995] 19 EHRR 1 and Bergens Tidende v. Norway [2001] 31 EHRR 16. 
50
 Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria [1996] 21 EHRR 1, ‘this undoubtedly includes questions 
concerning the functioning of the system of justice, an institution that is essential for any democratic 
society.  The press is one of the means by which politicians and public opinion can verify that judges 
are discharging their heavy responsibilities in a matter that is in conformity with the aim which is the 
basis of the task entrusted to them’ [34]. 
226/385 
It might be thought that cases involving broader issues of public interest 
provide the media with a lesser accumulative free speech weight than those involving 
open justice, given that there is unlikely to be any issue of confidence in the justice 
system involved in such instances.  However, there are two additional principles, 
particularly apparent at Strasbourg level, which assist the media in such cases: first, 
the press has a ‘vital role of public watchdog’51 to play: ‘not only does the press have 
the task of imparting…information and ideas [of public interest], the public also has a 
right to receive them’.52  Secondly, and consequently, as noted, the court must give 
the ‘closest scrutiny’ to measures that would otherwise discourage public debate over 
matters of legitimate public concern.  Thus the distinction in the weight afforded 
speech of general public interest compared to open justice speech may be slight if not 
non-existent, particularly where the need for the public to be informed is high.  Thus, 
in H,53 the Court of Appeal confirmed that ‘the right of the press to inform the public, 
and of the public to be informed by the press…is an aspect of the right to freedom of 
expression…that is of paramount importance’54 and one which will be ‘rarely’55 
interfered with.  However, despite it being a matter of ‘strong public interest’56 that 
the public be informed of an HIV positive healthcare worker, that interest did not 
extend to identifying H or the Health Authority involved.57  Yet, this type of limited 
interference is equally likely in open justice cases: in W,58 an open justice case, the 
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 Jersild, fn. 49, [31] 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 H (A Healthcare Worker) v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 195 
54
 Ibid., [23] 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Ibid., [24] 
57
 Ibid., [58], although it did permit identification of his speciality, [59]. 
58
 Fn. 12 
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particular stigma of AIDS justified preserving anonymity.59  In H, the decision to 
preserve anonymity was, evidently, influenced by the countervailing public interest in 
preserving the confidentiality of HIV positive healthcare workers so as to maintain 
the incentive of others to declare (rather than hide) their condition and, further, there 
being no issue of culpability against H. 
 In evaluating the strength of general public interest claims, compared to open 
justice ones, it is important to note the competing claim is likely to be of a different 
quality.  Theoretically, there is greater scope for successful interference with speech; 
beyond narrower conceptions of ‘privacy’, the claim may be for protection of 
reputation or breach of confidence (under Article 8).  As noted, neither Convention 
right is treated as having presumptive priority yet the absence of the ‘open justice’ 
element removes the shackles that might otherwise restrict the force of the Article 8 
argument.  Of course, this does not provide the competing claim with an automatic 
advantage; a reasonable expectation of privacy must first be established and 
sustained.60  This may be particularly unlikely in circumstances where the disclosure 
of information will affect public confidence in public services.61  However, the court 
may be more willing to interfere if it is to restrain publication of specific details that 
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would not ‘disembody’ the debate.  This is evident in Green Corns Ltd,62 which 
concerned the public furore following a newspaper campaign where addresses of 
properties operating, or intending to be operated, as care homes for troubled teenagers 
and sex offenders were published.  The court recognised that a strong public interest 
existed but distinguished between the public interest in the policy of how such 
children should be cared for and the private interest in where such houses should be.63  
Thus the public interest debate was not affected by restraining publication of such 
addresses.64  The court was particularly concerned by the actions of an angry mob 
that had formed outside one of the care homes resulting in a 15-year-old child and 
two carers inside having to be escorted by the police from the house.65  Further acts of 
violence, vandalism and damage occurred at the property.66  For the court, this 
rendered the argument of legitimate public protest nugatory since such behaviour was 
‘the opposite of democratic’.67  Clearly, the court was influenced by this behaviour 
and so made the public/private distinction, which it may be said is not otherwise 
particularly compelling. 
The presence of a strong public interest in the speech target likewise bolsters 
the free speech claim.  In Browne,68 the Mail on Sunday sought to publish various 
allegations against the claimant group chief executive of BP plc concerning the use of 
BP plc resources to assist his sexual partner and disclosure of confidential BP plc 
information to him, and, further, within this story, the newspaper sought to publish 
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the fact of their homosexual relationship.  The claimant sought an injunction on 
Article 8 grounds.  Being a public listed company, the public interest in the claimant 
and BP plc was not disputed.69  The newspaper, additionally, was required to argue in 
respect of the intended speech.  Dismissing the claim, the Court of Appeal found that 
the bare fact of the relationship contextualised the other issues of public interest and 
thus was satisfied that the information ‘would make no sense without [such] 
publication’.70  Likewise, in Long Beach Ltd,71 the court dismissed an injunction 
application due to the important public interest in publishing documents which 
inferred that the President of Congo’s son had obtained secret profits from a public 
company:72 ‘once there is good reason to doubt the propriety of the financial affairs 
of a public official, there is a public interest in those affairs being open to public 
scrutiny’.73  Conversely, in Northern Rock plc,74 the Financial Times had obtained, 
and then published in full on its website, a confidential financial document.  Certain 
other news outlets had published some, but not all, information from this document.  
The public interest in the speech target, a public listed company, was not in dispute, 
or that the financial difficulties of the company were high profile, however Tugendhat 
J. was satisfied that there was not a sufficiently high public interest to necessitate 
continued or further publication of the document in full,75 despite certain information 
already being in the public domain. 
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Further, the public interest in the speech and/or speech target may be so 
significant as to permit false information to be protected.76  This type of qualified 
privilege (i.e. the Reynolds privilege), as a defence to defamation, applies to 
information presented as fact.  In such cases, the media must satisfy the court that: i) 
taken as a whole, the public interest in the subject matter permits publication despite 
the presence of untruth; and, ii) the steps taken to gather and publish the information 
were responsible and fair.77  Similarly, the newspaper may have a defence of 
‘reportage’ if it neutrally reports a defamatory statement made elsewhere.78  
Protection is lost if the journalist adopts what has been said and makes it his own or 
else fails to report in a neutral manner.79  The availability of the Reynolds privilege 
may also lend weight to the argument that the media receive a higher speaker status 
than others.  Although the privilege is not confined, in theory, to the media (indeed in 
Jameel, Lord Hoffman noted that although the privilege was established ‘in the 
context of publication in a newspaper…the defence is of course available to anyone 
who publishes material of public interest in any medium’)80 the news media might 
find it easier to make a successful case on account of circumstances peculiar to them.  
The offending material must be viewed as a whole81 thus the significance of a 
defamatory passage may be reduced, especially in a voluminous tome.  The court 
should also consider the time pressures placed on journalists, which may affect their 
assessment of the article: ‘journalists act without the benefit of the clear light of 
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hindsight.  Matters which are obvious in retrospect may have been far from clear in 
the heat of the moment’;82 and, further, the urgency of the matter: ‘news is often a 
perishable commodity’.83  This may be more relevant to the initial reporting of the 
news than post-reporting analysis.  Thus non-journalists such as ‘bloggers’ and 
protesters may find it difficult to sustain the point since they are unlikely to be under 
any real, immediate or significant time pressures to report and so there might be a 
greater expectation of reflection prior to publication.  Likewise, they may struggle to 
demonstrate there was any duty to publish;84 ‘not only do the media have the task of 
imparting [matters of public interest] in such information and ideas: the public also 
has a right to receive them’.85  Further, in this regard, reliance is placed upon editorial 
judgment:  
 
‘it [has] to be a body other than the publisher, namely the court, which [decides] whether a 
publication was protected by qualified privilege.  But this does not mean that the editorial 
decisions and judgments made at the time, without the knowledge of falsity which is a benefit 
of hindsight, are irrelevant.  Weight should ordinarily be given to the professional judgment 
of an editor or journalist in the absence of some indication that it was made in a casual, 
cavalier, slipshod or careless manner’86 
 
In Charman, it was similarly noted that:  
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‘Jameel emphasises how important it is that weight be given to the professional judgment of 
the journalist.  Where opinions may reasonably differ over the details which are needed to 
convey the general message, then deference has to be paid to the editorial decisions of the 
author, journalist or editor.  True it may be that the journalist has to subject the material, as 
the judge held, to “critical analysis”.  But it is his assessment of that evaluation which is 
important, not the judge’s own evaluation of the material conducted with the benefit of 
hindsight and with the sharp eye of a trained lawyer’.87  
 
Non-journalists are unlikely to benefit from this principle and, perhaps, for good 
reason.  Editors and journalists are appointed by their peers with their performance 
closely monitored.  Non-journalists, regardless of the observable merits in their work, 
may be observed by no-one (they may be read by no-one).  Thus the consequences of 
shoddy workmanship may be more keenly guarded against by such journalists, 
particularly those in the most serious and prestigious mediums, than, say, ‘bloggers’ 
and protesters who perhaps wish, first and foremost, to be heard rather than respected. 
This consideration is borne out by previous judicial findings, derived from the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, that the form of speech is a matter for journalists rather 
than the court.88  Perhaps the high point of the principle (for reasons discussed below) 
was Lord Woolf’s finding in A v. B plc89 that ‘once it is accepted that the freedom of 
the press should prevail, then the form of reporting in the press is not a matter for the 
courts but for the Press Complaints Commission and the customers of the newspaper 
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concerned’.90  This may be an overstatement and, certainly, the principle should not 
be exaggerated:  the Strasbourg jurisprudence makes it clear that the media are to be 
permitted a degree of exaggeration or, even, provocation in their reporting,91 
particularly where politicians are the speech target,92 yet, regardless of the Reynolds 
privilege, ‘there is no public interest in the dissemination of falsehood’.93  Thus even 
the media will fail in their claim, despite the generous principles afforded to them, if 
the defamatory words were adopted and embellished ‘with relish’94. 
The protection afforded to the press when discussing matters of public interest 
is strong.  This strength is also confirmed by the high level of protection afforded to 
journalistic sources,95 which the ECtHR describes as ‘one of the basic conditions for 
press freedom’.96  As recognised in the Strasbourg jurisprudence,97 it is important that 
the press are free to scrutinise the activities of the executive, Parliament and judiciary 
and report back their findings to the public.  However, arguably, the UK judiciary is 
so enamoured with media freedom that some concerns arise.  Fenwick and Phillipson, 
in particular, criticise the tendency to over-protect media expression, arguing that the 
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court should assess the free speech claims more ‘rigorously and sceptically’.98  
Indeed, although writing in 2002, Amos’s evaluation of the court’s approach to 
freedom of expression is distinctly prescient: ‘the importance of the freedom of the 
press has begun to eclipse the importance of freedom of expression’.99  Given the 
apparent strength of the press, these concerns arise particularly where the press 
focuses its critical lens not on the government but the public itself, especially on 
those it terms ‘celebrities’.  The following section will explore the judiciary’s 
position on matters that interest the public and will argue that although the position 
appears to be hardening against the press, nevertheless the weight of the media’s 
speaker status still provides some cause for concern that the strength of their free 
speech right may be abused. 
 
iii) Matters of interest to the public? 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, free speech theories that reserve protection for 
‘political speech’ are susceptible to heavy criticism that the definition may be 
manipulated to suit certain ends: it may be interpreted narrowly, as Bork does, so 
that, say, only serious political speech is included100 or it may be interpreted broadly 
so as to lose all meaning, as Baker warns against.101  In the UK, it is debatable 
whether the notion of ‘public interest’ has been fixed at any point in this spectrum in 
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relation to the media.  For example, in Jameel, in the context of the Reynolds 
privilege, Baroness Hale defined public interest as something ‘very different 
from…information which interests the public – the most vapid tittle-tattle about the 
activities of footballers’ wives and girlfriends interests large sections of the public but 
no-one could claim any real public interest in our being told about it’.102  As set out in 
the previous chapter, aside from excluding an obvious example of information 
lacking genuine public interest, this assessment does not provide any clear insight 
into the meaning of ‘real’ public interest.103  Further, the early ‘celebrity gossip’ cases 
(media attempts to publish stories exposing the private lives of celebrity figures) post-
HRA gave the impression of a broader notion of ‘public interest’ being used to 
determine the weight of the free speech claim, even in cases where the Article 10 
claim was unsuccessful.104  Yet given the recent decision in Mosley105 perhaps the 
attitude toward the media in these cases is hardening. 
As noted above, the high-point for celebrity gossip cases was, arguably, the 
Court of Appeal decision in A v. B plc.106  Briefly, the case involved an injunction 
application by A, a Premiership footballer, against newspaper B and individuals C 
and D, both of whom A had had extra-marital affairs with and, consequently, both of 
whom wished to sell their respective stories to newspaper B.  Finding against A, Lord 
Woolf set out a number of principles, some of which proved to be contentious, to be 
applied in future injunctive relief claims.  In particular, Lord Woolf found the 
continuing commercial viability of the newspaper to be relevant: ‘the courts must not 
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ignore the fact that if newspapers do not publish information which the public are 
interested in, there will be fewer newspapers published, which will not be in the 
public interest’.107  Further, having noted that A had only a ‘very modest’ claim to 
confidentiality,108 his Lordship resisted the notion that details of the affair lacked 
public interest:  
 
‘it is not self-evident that how a well known premiership football player…chooses to spend 
his time off the football field does not have a modicum of public interest.  Footballers are role 
models for young people and undesirable behaviour on their part can set an unfortunate 
example’109 
 
Thus the public interest subsisted in the media’s need to sell newspapers (speaker 
valuation), the premiership footballer as a role model (speech target valuation) and 
details of his unsavoury behaviour which were not in keeping with his role model 
status (speech valuation).  Lord Woolf’s observation on the importance of the 
newspaper’s commercial viability also bolstered the strength of both the speech and 
speaker valuation, providing the expression with, it is submitted, a disproportionately 
strong claim.  Similar – if not identical – views about the significance of the print 
media’s commercial viability can also be found in the House of Lords judgment of 
the leading celebrity gossip decision, Campbell,110 (which is discussed in more detail 
shortly).  Here, Lord Hoffman, dissenting, noted ‘we value the freedom of the press 
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but the press is a commercial enterprise and can flourish only by selling 
newspapers’.111  Baroness Hale likewise noted ‘one reason why press freedom is so 
important is that we need newspapers to sell in order to ensure that we still have 
newspapers at all’.112 
A later, differently composed, Court of Appeal in McKennitt,113 expressed 
doubt on the viability of Lord Woolf’s view.  The facts of McKennitt were 
significantly different to A v. B plc; Ms McKennitt, a singer, sought to restrain the 
publication of a book by a former friend, detailing parts of her private life but which 
contained no allegations of wrongdoing.114  Buxton LJ, delivering judgment, 
criticised Lord Woolf’s view: ‘that weight must be given to the commercial interest 
of newspapers in reporting matter that interests the public’115 but, mysteriously, cited 
Lord Phillips in the Court of Appeal decision in Campbell to support that criticism, 
thus overlooking the House of Lords decision and the citations set out above: 
 
‘[Lord Woolf’s] view has also received criticism, and it seems clear that this court in 
Campbell, in the passage cited above, was not entirely happy with it.  It is difficult to 
reconcile with the long-standing view that what interests the public is not necessarily in the 
public interest’.116 
 
Buxton then cited Baroness Hale in Jameel (set out above) as evidence of that latter 
point.  However, it might be said that Baroness Hale’s comment in Jameel is limited 
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to instances relating to the use of the Reynolds privilege rather than celebrity gossip 
cases, i.e., cases in which the truth is disputed rather than where it is not.  Yet such an 
argument is not particularly convincing: Lord Justice Buxton makes a forceful point 
in saying the two issues are not easily reconcilable.  It is relevant, however, to note 
that Baroness Hale also stated in Campbell that she did not believe anodyne 
photographs, such as of a celebrity ‘popping out for a bottle of milk’ for example, 
would provide for a strong Article 8 claim on the basis that ‘there is nothing 
essentially private about the information nor can it be expected to damage her private 
life’.117  Expression of this kind may represent a situation where information that 
interests the public would be protected to the extent that an Article 8 claim to 
suppress the information would, applying this principle, fail.  It has been argued that 
this finding might be in contravention of the ECtHR decision in Von Hannover,118 
where it was found that a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
whenever they were engaged in activities that did not form part of their official 
duties.119  Discussion of the UK courts’ approach to Article 8 is outside the scope of 
this thesis,120 however if the Von Hannover argument were to gain currency in the 
UK, then it would be for the press to put up an Article 10 defence and the 
‘commercial viability’ claim might be one method of doing so (albeit not a 
particularly convincing one).  In any event, of course, Baroness Hale’s finding in 
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Campbell is tempered somewhat by the finding in Murray that the expectation of 
privacy for a child – particularly the child of a celebrity who is not ‘famous’ in their 
own right – may be less than that of the celebrity parent.121 
 Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the question of whether 
information is of public interest or simply interests the public is further complicated 
by the broad approach to the definition of ‘public figure’ that both the UK and 
Strasbourg jurisprudence122 adopts.  In other words, whilst there might be no public 
interest in knowing of instances where ‘ordinary’ citizens have lied, there might be 
where that individual is a public figure.  This is evident, for example, in the decision 
of Campbell, in which fashion model Naomi Campbell brought Article 8 proceedings 
against the Daily Mirror following a series of articles exposing her attendance at 
Narcotics Anonymous meetings for drug addiction.  Further, one such story carried 
photographs of her leaving a meeting, taken by a telescopic lens.  Finding in her 
favour by majority decision, the House was divided on the level of private 
information divulged by the articles (including information within the photographs) 
with the majority considering that the newspaper had gone too far: there being a 
significant public interest in the anonymity of receiving such treatment.123  Yet the 
House was in agreement that the fact of Ms Campbell’s drug addiction and that she 
was engaged in therapy were appropriate matters for publication on public interest 
grounds because Campbell had previously represented herself as someone who did 
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not take drugs.124  Thus, the public interest in knowing of Campbell’s hypocrisy was 
heightened by the Court’s treatment of her as a ‘public figure’, which arguably 
instilled in her certain duties and responsibilities toward the public that ordinary 
citizens would not necessarily have.  Had the Court adopted a narrower approach to 
the definition of public figure to, say, limit it to those who hold public office, for 
example, then the strength of the media’s claim may have diminished in this respect.  
Of course, it should not be overlooked that it is on account of the media that Naomi 
Campbell, for example, is a celebrity figure; certainly, she would not be so 
recognisable without the significant media attention she has received: indeed, 
Baroness Hale described it as a symbiotic relationship.125  Yet it is somewhat 
problematic that the media may determine who is a ‘public figure’.  Whilst there is 
undoubtedly a category of individuals who are naturally termed ‘public figures’ on 
account of holding public office (for example), there is another category of 
individuals who hold no such public responsibility but, nevertheless, might be 
elevated to the position of public figure by dint of constant media attention, i.e., 
Jordan or ‘Big Brother’ contestants such as the late Jade Goody.  Thus whilst it is 
ultimately a decision for the courts to determine when information amounts to being 
of public interest, the press have a certain level of advantage in establishing the public 
interest claim because they control who becomes a publicly recognisable figure. 
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  Of course, as the recent decision in Mosley126 evidences, there are limits to 
this advantage.  Furthermore, although at Divisional Court level, the decision 
suggests that immoral rather than illegal behaviour may be of lesser comparative 
public interest.  Mosley concerned ‘clandestine reporting…on a massive scale’127 of 
Max Mosley’s (head of the FIA) sexual antics with five prostitutes described by the 
newspaper, erroneously the court found, as a ‘sick Nazi orgy’ involving a sustained 
Nazi and/or Holocaust theme.  Having ‘enlisted’128 the help of one of the prostitutes, 
the newspaper published information, photographs and a video extract (on its 
website) of the events.  Finding for the claimant, Eady J. found there to be no public 
interest in Mosley’s ‘parties’129 regardless of whether they may be considered 
immoral:130 ‘I accept that such behaviour is viewed by some people with distaste and 
moral disapproval, but in the light of modern rights-based jurisprudence that does not 
provide any justification for the intrusion on the personal privacy of the Claimant’.131   
It may be thought that Mosley is confined to its particularly extreme facts; 
certainly Eady J. thought there was ‘nothing landmark’ about the decision.132  Indeed, 
it is in keeping with remarks made by Lord Hoffmann in Campbell in which he 
postulated that even if ‘there is a public interest in the disclosure of the existence of a 
sexual relationship… the addition of salacious details or intimate photographs is 
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disproportionate and unacceptable.  The latter, even if accompanying a legitimate 
disclosure of the sexual relationship, would be too intrusive and demeaning’.133  
However, the Mosley decision was not reached solely on the newspaper going too far 
in its reporting but that there was no public interest in the exposed behaviour or, even 
if adulterous, ‘it by no means follows that they are matters of genuine public 
interest’.134  Despite Eady J.’s conclusion, the case may be considered landmark 
given the close scrutiny as to whether a genuine public interest was established (of 
which it is the court’s not the journalist’s perception that is significant).135  
Regardless of its significance, there still remain issues about the strength of the 
media’s position in determining who is of public interest combined with the weight of 
the speaker valuation typically applied.  On this basis, there remains cause for 
concern that the media may abuse its privileged position as public watchdog where it 
suits its commercial ends. 
 
b) Politicians 
 
 The significance of ensuring politicians are able to speak freely is well-
recognised in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  As the ECtHR noted in the well-known 
case of Castells v. Spain:136 ‘while freedom of expression is important for everybody, 
it is especially so for an elected representative of the people.  He represents his 
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electorate, draws attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests’.137  
Accordingly, the ECtHR treats politicians as a special category of speaker in which 
any interference with their freedom of expression ‘call[s] for the closest scrutiny’.138  
Whilst this significance is recognised in the UK when politicians speak in Parliament 
(clause 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689139 guarantees a near absolute form of free speech 
to MPs in Parliament140), the post-HRA case law does not provide much evidence of 
the principle from Castells in action when politicians speak outside Parliament. 
 Before addressing the post-HRA case law, it is useful for the purposes of the 
discussion that follows to set out the decision in Castells in more detail.  Castells was 
an elected representative of an opposition party in Spain who published an article in a 
weekly magazine severely criticising the government, blaming them directly for the 
failure to identify those responsible for terrorist activities in the Basque region.  
Consequently, Castells was prosecuted under the Criminal Code for insulting the 
Government.  Castells sought to adduce evidence to establish the truth of the 
allegations but the court refused to admit such evidence on the basis that the accuracy 
of the information was not decisive for a charge of insulting the government.  As part 
of its reasoning to imprison Castells for a year and a day (although this sentence was 
later stayed for two years) and disqualify him for the same period from holding public 
office or exercising a profession, the court at first instance noted that Castells could 
have made his comments in the senate as a senator and the fact that he had failed to 
                                                 
137
 Ibid., [42]. 
138
 Ibid. 
139
 ‘…the freedome of speech and debates or proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in a court of place out of Parlyament’. 
140
 The ECtHR has recently considered this immunity: A v. UK (2003) 36 EHRR 51, [27], [86] in 
which the ECtHR noted with approval that each House of Parliament has its own mechanism for 
disciplining members who deliberately make false statements in the course of debates thus providing 
victims of defamatory misstatement in Parliament with a limited means of redress. 
244/385 
do so meant that he could not claim to have acted on behalf of his electorate.141  
Furthermore, it found that the comments had gone beyond the limits of political 
criticism and were, instead, insults that attacked the Government’s honour.142  In 
dismissing Castells’s appeal, the Constitutional Court of Spain agreed with the public 
prosecutor that Castells had not been acting in an official capacity and, therefore, he 
had to be treated in the same way as any other citizen.143  The court also had regard to 
the fact that state security could be jeopardised by attempts to discredit democratic 
institutions.144  Castells complained to the ECtHR that there had been a breach of 
Articles 6, 7, 10 and 14.  Castell’s made two complaints under Article 10: first, that 
he had been convicted for making statements, the truth of which he had been 
prevented from establishing and, secondly, that the contested article came within the 
sphere of political criticism which it was the duty of any elected representative to 
engage in.145  In finding that there had been a violation of Article 10, the ECtHR 
emphasised both the high importance of politicians being able to speak on matters of 
public concern and the significance of the press in that regard.  Furthermore, the 
Court reiterated that the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the 
Government than in relation to a private citizen or even a politician and therefore 
although it remained open to the relevant authorities to adopt measures – including 
criminal ones – to deal with defamatory accusations devoid of foundation in the 
interests of public order, nevertheless the Government must show restraint before 
resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means were available for 
                                                 
141
 Fn. 92, [13]. 
142
 Ibid. 
143
 Ibid., [16] and [17]. 
144
 Ibid., [17]. 
145
 Ibid., [28]. 
245/385 
replying to unjustified attacks or criticisms.146  Therefore the truth of the statements 
was a relevant consideration that the Spanish court should have had regard to.147 
One case where Castells was specifically considered is Quinan v. Carnegie,148 
in which a Scottish MP appealed against his conviction for breach of the peace 
(whilst peacefully protesting about the continuation of a nuclear submarine facility) 
by reason of his obstruction of the highway outside the naval base and refusal to 
move when asked to do so by the police.  The MP was one of 20 or 30 protesters who 
had been sat in the road with their arms linked.  When asked to move the MP simply 
shook his head.  He was fined £100 by the court.  In dismissing the appeal, the 
Scottish court took a fairly narrow view of its obligations stemming from the decision 
in Castells, interpreting the decision as indicating no more than:  
 
‘the necessity for a court to scrutinise with particular care interferences with the freedom of 
expression of elected representatives when acting as such.  That is because the exercise of that 
freedom by such a person acting in such a capacity may, in particular circumstances, be an 
aspect of the democratic process.  Accordingly, the court must consider whether the bringing 
of criminal proceedings was, in the circumstances, necessary in a democratic society or, in 
other words, was proportionate to the aim pursued’149  
 
Since the court is required to take such an approach to every interference with 
freedom of expression – i.e., determine whether it is proportionate to the aim pursued 
– it is difficult to accept that this achieves the higher threshold envisaged by Castells 
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or that such an approach demonstrates a ‘particular care’ toward interferences with a 
politician’s freedom of expression.  The court in Quinan found that the interference 
was proportionate ‘even on the basis that the appellant was, and conceived himself to 
be, acting in a representative rather than in a personal capacity at the material 
time’.150  It justified this finding in the following terms: ‘in the present context, where 
the democratic interest in freedom of expression by elected representatives can be 
met as readily by such a representative publicly demonstrating lawfully as 
unlawfully, we see no ground for holding that it is disproportionate to apply the law 
to him in the same way as to his fellow citizens’.151 
 The court’s findings in Quinan are more declaratory than explanatory, 
particularly on the question of lawfulness.  Furthermore, the court seemed particularly 
keen to emphasise the ‘equality before the law’ aspect of the decision.  Yet this seems 
to take a particularly narrow view of the principle in Castells.  The decision in 
Castells emphasises the importance of politicians’ being able to draw attention to 
matters preoccupying public opinion, thus enabling everyone to participate in free 
political debate.  Whereas Mr Castells spoke through the press, Mr Quinan spoke 
through public protest.  It does not seem to be in issue in Quinan that public protest 
represents a legitimate means of participating in a democratic society: this point is 
well-established in academic literature152 and the Strasbourg jurisprudence.153  Thus 
both Castells and Quinan concern the issue of whether a lawful medium has been 
used unlawfully such that the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 is not 
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violated.  Whereas Castells evidences intense scrutiny of this issue, Quinan does not 
demonstrate a preparedness to vigorously explore and question the need to prosecute 
peaceful demonstrations that obstruct the highway directly outside a naval base.  In 
the context of the Highways Act 1980, Fenwick has argued that the issue of lawful 
obstruction of the highway involves asking whether the obstructive behaviour was 
reasonable or not in the circumstances.154  Furthermore, she argues that ‘the use of a 
criminal charge against peaceful protesters who had caused some obstruction cannot 
be defended on proportionality grounds’.155  She suggests that since obstruction is not 
necessarily equivalent to disorder, in order to be proportionate a risk to safety or a 
disproportionate impact on freedom of movement due to its length must be achieved 
by the peaceful obstructive assembly in order to amount to an unreasonable user of 
the highway.156  The finding that Quinan could have made his point lawfully rather 
deflects away from the issue. 
 A similar point occurred in the Divisional Court decision in Horsnell v. 
Boston BC,157 which concerned the revocation/denial of a market stall licence to a 
UKIP candidate, who had wanted to use the stall for the purpose of publicising the 
UKIP and his own candidacy in the General Election.  The Court upheld the local 
council’s decision on that basis that the use of the stall for the purposes of canvassing 
electors would put the council in breach of s. 2(3) of the Local Government Act 1986, 
which states that ‘a local authority shall not give financial or other assistance to a 
person for the publication of material which the authority are prohibited from 
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publishing themselves’.  Section 2(1) of the same Act prohibits local authorities from 
publishing material which appears to be designed to affect public support for a 
political party.  As in Quinan, the court placed weight on the fact that the politician 
affected could have expressed his views by other means, i.e., by canvassing in the 
marketplace.158  However, this finding has merit in the sense that the state is both 
under no positive obligation to assist individuals to speak (i.e., by providing market 
stalls) and, further, that it should not treat particular candidates preferentially, which 
may have been an issue if subsequent to granting a licence there were not enough 
stalls to provide other candidates with.159 
 Like Quinan, the decision in Sanders v. Kingston,160 discussed at length in the 
previous chapter161 also bears some comparison with Castells.  By way of brief 
reminder, Sanders concerned the leader of Peterborough City Council who had 
reacted with hostility to the request to petition central government over the treatment 
of soldiers at a barracks in Northern Ireland.  Sanders’s stubborn refusal to apologise 
for his error (he had thought the issue related to the Troubles) had resulted in a media 
circus.  Like the first instance court in Castells, the disciplinary tribunal in Sanders 
disqualified Sanders from holding public office (although this was overturned on 
appeal).  It will be recalled that Collins J. in the Division Court had determined that 
the expression in question ‘amounted to no more than expressions of personal anger 
and personal abuse’162 and therefore was not political expression.  The court’s 
approach to the interference with Sanders’s expression does not readily equate to an 
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intense scrutiny of the necessity of the interference as seen in the ECtHR decision in 
Castells: Collins J. adopted a fairly dismissive and minimalist approach to both the 
taxonomy of the speech and the necessity to interfere.  This may be accounted for by 
the extraordinary facts of Sanders.  However the decision raises some interesting 
hypothetical questions.  It might be said that Sanders could have expressed his 
opinions in other circumstances but not as leader of Peterborough City Council.  In 
other words, Sanders voluntarily accepted limits on his capacity to speak when he 
became leader of the Council by reason of the local council code of conduct in 
operation under s. 50 of the Local Government Act 2000.  However, on the face of it 
at least, this would appear to reverse the Castells principle: rather than affording a 
greater free speech right to politicians over citizens, it would seem to provide a lesser 
right if Sanders was free to say something as citizen that he could not say as a 
councillor.  Of course, the right to freedom of political expression is not absolute 
therefore perhaps the decision in Sanders may be explained alternatively on the basis 
that it demonstrates the operation of the ‘reputation of others’ exception under Article 
10(2).  As set out in the previous chapter, Collins J.’s finding that the expression did 
not amount to political expression is hard to accept.  However, even if the court had 
accepted that the speech was political, it might have been determined that the 
expression went beyond the acceptable limits of criticism and, furthermore, since 
Sanders was speaking as a representative of Peterborough City Council, the 
interference was justifiable on the basis that it tarnished the reputation of both the 
Council and the Conservative Party. 
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In surveying these decisions involving politicians, it might be questioned 
whether the principle that freedom of expression is especially important for elected 
representatives of the people has been fully realised in the UK post-HRA.  Certainly, 
it does not seem to be consistently recognised in every case involving politicians.  In 
Mahmood v. Galloway,163 for example, although it was ultimately unnecessary for the 
court to examine the free speech rights of an MP seeking to expose the investigative 
reporting practices of a notorious undercover journalist (since the Claimant reporter 
was unable to establish a convincing Article 8 claim), the court nevertheless opined 
that the public interest was against publication of the Claimant’s true identity but 
made no reference to the superior free speech status of politicians in its assessment.164  
It may be that since the free speech right for politicians is particularly strong inside 
Parliament the court feels little obligation to extend that protection beyond it.165  
However, that view is arguably inconsistent with Strasbourg case law, as discussed.  
It might be said that these cases say little about politicians’ free speech status given 
the unorthodox or contentious speech issues involved in each although that would 
seem to be a generous concession.  Certainly, the rigorous scrutiny of interferences 
with political speech by politicians, evident at Strasbourg level, is not readily 
apparent in these decisions.  Furthermore, it is intriguing that the right to free speech 
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does not appear as jealously guarded by the courts in these cases as it is in cases 
involving the press. 
 
4. Of lesser value: from non-journalists to prisoners  
 
 Previously, Fenwick and Phillipson, in noting that different judicial 
approaches are taken to political speech by the media compared to protesters, have 
argued that different outcomes follow because, for the former, the starting point for 
decisions are ‘the values underlying free expression’ whereas for the latter it was, 
pre-HRA at least, the ‘legal content of the restrictions on public protest’,166 with little 
or no regard to those free speech values.  The term protester tends to be used in a 
narrow context in the academic literature, to refer to street demonstrators in order to 
discuss the broader public order issues which are often intertwined with the free 
speech issues involved.  As noted in Chapter One, it is beyond the ambit of this thesis 
to discuss those public order issues and, instead, the discussion concentrates 
exclusively on the free speech issues.  In this context, it will be argued that the term 
‘protester’ can be applied more broadly to include those individuals who 
communicate their protest without engaging in street demonstration.  In order to draw 
out the central theme of this section that journalists receive better treatment than these 
speakers even where the content of the speech may be similar, these individuals will 
be referred to as non-journalists.  Naturally, this includes a broad category of 
speakers, yet this is an important element of the argument: the lesser treatment of 
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‘non-journalists’ implicates a great many people.  It will be argued that whilst the 
courts have demonstrated some recognition of free speech values for these non-
journalists, they have tended to do so in a minimal or superficial manner.  A partial 
explanation of this differential treatment is the absence of the ‘public watchdog’ 
principle for non-journalists: this principle clearly assists the media speaker attain 
higher prospective levels of protection, although the absence of it in non-journalistic 
cases remains unarticulated.  In any event, it seems that Fenwick and Phillipson’s 
view remains accurate: there is ‘little recognition of the distinctive value of public 
protest’167 when non-journalists speak. 
 
a) Non-journalists 
 
Traditionally, protesters have not enjoyed the same speech freedom as the 
media.168  The judicial endorsement of free speech principles, so jealously guarded by 
the courts when applied to the press, is generally more subdued in such cases.169  
There is a discernible theme of a restrained attitude toward protection where 
‘extreme’ speech and speakers are involved, with the value of free speech principle 
rarely defended and, often, barely considered.170  This judicial attitude is evident in 
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the recent decision of Connolly,171 which was briefly mentioned in the previous 
chapter.172  It will be recalled that the case involved a sole protester who lost her 
appeal against conviction for sending graphic pictures of aborted foetuses to three 
pharmacies which stocked the ‘morning after’ pill.  This behaviour was found to be 
‘grossly offensive or indecent’ by the Crown Court and so prosecution under the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 followed.  The Divisional Court found that the 
expression constituted political expression and, moreover, recognised that as a 
consequence the highest level of protection to freedom of speech applied: 
 
 ‘the sending of photographs … was not the mere sending of an offensive article: the article 
contained a message, namely that abortion involves the destruction of life and should be 
prohibited.  Since it related to political issues, it was an expression of the kind that is regarded 
as particularly entitled to protection by Article 10.’173 
 
Yet, despite this, the court found that the right of Mrs Connolly under Article 10(1) to 
express her deeply held belief that abortion was murder did not outweigh the ‘rights 
of others’ exception in Article 10(2), including the pharmacy workers’ ‘right not to 
have sent to them material of the kind that she sent when it was her purpose, or one of 
her purposes, to cause distress or anxiety to the recipient’.174  Since the UK courts’ 
approach to the right of others not to be offended was considered in detail in the 
previous chapter, it is not considered here.  Instead, the discussion focuses on the 
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court’s approach in Connolly to the expression at stake and it will be argued that the 
reasoning in the decision suggests a fairly dismissive approach. 
Whilst the outcome of Connolly is not particularly troubling from a free 
speech perspective, it is submitted that the reasoning applied contains elements that 
are concerning.  In particular, in finding against the speech, Lord Justice Dyson noted 
that ‘of particular significance is the fact that those who work in the three pharmacies 
were not targeted because they were in a position to influence a public debate on 
abortion’.175  Expanding on this point, he said,  
 
‘in any event, even if the three pharmacies were persuaded to stop selling the pill, it is 
difficult to see what contribution this would make to any public debate about abortion 
generally and how that would increase the likelihood that abortion would be 
prohibited’176…‘disseminating material of this kind to a number of pharmacists because they 
sell the ‘morning after pill’ is hardly an effective way of promoting the anti-abortion 
cause’.177 
 
Dyson LJ concluded that Connolly could have made her concerns to someone in a 
position to influence the debate, such as a politician or, even, a doctor.178  In effect, 
Lord Justice Dyson is measuring the effectiveness of the speech in the democratic 
process.  Arguably, this finding adds nothing to the decision: he could, instead, have 
limited his judgment to a finding that Connolly’s expression overstepped the line in 
terms of acceptable behaviour.  Instead, Dyson LJ’s approach seems to confirm that 
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the status of the speaker is relevant: i.e., if a speaker such as Connolly or the 
expression or both had had a greater relevance to the democratic process then the 
Article 10 claim might have fared better.  It is concerning that this type of reasoning 
might be applied in a future case in order to justify the differential treatment of non-
journalists compared to journalists since this approach undermines the spirit of the 
established rationales for protecting freedom of speech.  Moreover, if the actual 
contribution to the democratic process is a key factor then how are judges to 
effectively measure this contribution?  It is submitted that no safe method exists by 
which to do so. 
The Divisional Court’s approach in Connolly is consistent with the decisions 
in ProLife,179 Hammond,180 and Percy,181 which also involved suppression of (and, in 
most, conviction for) ‘insulting’ expression.  Yet, although the court found the 
behaviour insulting in each, and mostly for manifest reasons, each concerned clear 
political behaviour that should not be overlooked.  In Connolly and ProLife, the 
expression concerned abortion.  In Hammond, it concerned homosexuality.  Whilst in 
Hammond the views expressed were particularly odious and in Connolly and ProLife 
shocking, such reasons ought not to prohibit free speech protection: as Handyside 
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establishes, Article 10 applies equally to speech which shocks or offends182 although 
the evidence of this principle in action is far from compelling, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.   
The ProLife183 decision likewise evidences a diminished free speech weight 
being afforded to extreme speakers.  Although ‘the media’ was implicated – to the 
extent that a broadcast was at the centre of the claim – the ProLife Alliance is not a 
body of journalists and was not treated like such a body either.  In this case, various 
broadcasters, but specifically the BBC, had refused to screen ProLife’s Party Election 
Broadcast (PEB) on the basis their campaign, for absolute respect for innocent life, 
contained prolonged and graphic images that would be likely to offend very large 
numbers of viewers.  In a decision that contains particularly liberal statements of free 
speech principle, the Court of Appeal found this decision to be in breach of Article 
10.  In particular, the Court heavily relied upon the constant principle of the ECtHR 
that political expression can only be interfered with in narrow circumstances, 
particularly in the context of a general election.184  The Court’s heavily free speech 
orientated approach was, as Fenwick and Phillipson describe it, ‘a 
seminal...principled ruling that looked closely at the importance of the type of speech 
in question and found that flexibility had to be imposed on the regulatory scheme in 
order to accommodate it’.185  By contrast, the House of Lords decision was 
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‘disappointing’.186  In allowing the appeal, their Lordships gave differing reasons for 
their decision although a common theme seems to have been that the case involved 
matters of judicial review procedure rather than substantive free speech issues.  Thus, 
Lord Nicholls, with whom Lord Millett agreed, emphasised that the Court of Appeal 
had underestimated the significance of the statutory provision governing the original 
decision; that the Court of Appeal had neglected the limitations that the statutory 
provision imposed upon the broadcasters.187  Lord Hoffmann, noting that there is ‘no 
human right to use a television channel’, questioned whether the primary right under 
Article 10 was actually engaged and, instead, suggested that the only significant 
question was whether the broadcasters had acted in a discriminatory way.188  As 
noted in the previous chapter, Lord Walker found the competing interest to be most 
significant; in particular, that ‘the citizen has a right not to be shocked or affronted by 
inappropriate material transmitted into the privacy of his home’189 and thus 
recognised that ‘the broadcasters also had to take into account the special power and 
intrusiveness of television’:190 a point which, as noted in Chapter Two,191 cropped up 
later in ADI although with no reference to ProLife. 
The House of Lords decision in ProLife has generated criticism from several 
free speech commentators192  As Barendt has argued, the reasoning in the decision 
was ‘baffling or, to be frank, obscure’.193  There is no compelling reason why a 
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statutory provision to maintain standards of taste and decency should have 
constrained either the court or original decision-maker in this way.  Both were 
required under s. 3 of the HRA 1998 to read the provision compatibly with the 
Convention rights (and Article 10, in this case).194  Lord Hoffmann’s suggestion, in 
particular, that the primary right to speak was not engaged is mysterious; it was 
precisely because of what ProLife wanted to say that their speech was interfered 
with.195  Therefore his Lordship’s finding that there is no human right to broadcast, 
whilst undoubtedly correct, was irrelevant.  At the point of interference, the 
opportunity to broadcast a PEB was secured (and, indeed, a heavily censored version 
was broadcast) and thus the situation was analogous to an author who – likewise has 
no positive right to be published – undoubtedly has an Article 10 claim, for breach of 
the primary right, if his unpublished work is interfered with by the state.  As Barendt 
argues, it ‘is clear that [the House] misunderstood the character of the Alliance Party 
case’.196  The House of Lords also showed little understanding of fundamental 
theoretical principles such as, as Barendt notes,197 the significance of speaker freedom 
to control form and content.  The idea that Article 10 applies equally to the form of 
the expression is well-established in the Strasbourg jurisprudence.198  The House of 
Lords apparently dismissive approach to form also contrasts with the courts’ 
approach to the press: in news media cases, it is well-recognised that the form of 
expression is not a matter for the judiciary to interfere with.199 
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It is also clear that the court attached little weight to the importance of the 
speaker (as a political organisation) or the speech (being political speech) or, even, 
the occasion (a general election); only Lord Scott, dissenting, attached significant 
weight to these points, and, in doing so, found for ProLife.200  Clearly the content of 
ProLife’s intended PEB was problematic, for the BBC and the Court, yet as Lord 
Nicholls noted ‘from time to time harrowing scenes are screened as part of news 
programmes or documentaries or other suitable programmes’.201  Thus, the content of 
ProLife’s intended PEB should not have been fatal.  Arguably, the use of the word 
‘suitable’ in Lord Nicholls dicta may be instructive: it suggests that certain speakers 
may have stronger claims to show harrowing images than others based on their 
‘suitability to speak’ which may be interpreted as either a reference to their 
seriousness or relevance as sources of information.  The general theme of the 
majority’s reasoning suggests that little weight was attached to ProLife as a speaker.  
Indeed, Lord Hoffmann, addressing the point explicitly, in effect, notes, dismissively, 
that ProLife were hardly in a position to affect the general election by advocacy on a 
single issue matter.202  As Barendt argues ‘the implication seems to be that the 
Alliance broadcast was not a genuine PEB or should not be taken seriously as the 
exercise of political speech in the context of an election.  This argument is a very bad 
one’.203  The decision appears consistent with the narrow consequentialist attitude 
toward Article 10 identified in previous chapters: ProLife were fighting a single issue 
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and, in Lord Hoffmann’s words, were not serious about competing in a general 
election beyond gaining cheap publicity for their cause. 
It has been argued in this chapter that there exists an apparent difference in 
treatment between classes of speaker depending on the contribution that speaker is 
perceived to make to the democratic process value.  As discussed in Chapter Three, 
Fenwick and Phillipson have previously argued that this differential approach to the 
press compared to non-journalist speakers is also evident in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.204  It was argued in Chapter Three that the margin of appreciation may 
account for the difference in outcomes for journalists compared to non-journalists in 
ECtHR decisions but, as the case of Steel & Morris v. UK demonstrates,205 the 
ECtHR does not adopt an overt preference for journalists over non-journalists.206  It 
seems, however, that the UK judiciary has adopted a particularly narrow approach to 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  The UK courts’ appear to have recognised that ‘the 
[ECtHR] closely scrutinizes any interference with speech and associated activities 
(particularly those of the press and broadcasters) which may advance democratic 
participation or accountability or the free market of ideas.’207  Yet, in doing so, appear 
to have designated this approach to be the primary if not solitary function of Article 
10.  This would, for example, explain the apparent differing levels of weight afforded 
to speakers based on their identity: to use the consequentialist approach as a blunt 
instrument when applying Article 10 principles indirectly creates distinctions 
between speakers based on their capacity to directly contribute to the democratic 
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process value.  In this sense, traditional protesters may be better placed than 
unconventional protesters such as Mrs Connolly whose ‘protest’, directed to an 
extremely limited audience is less likely to engage the democratic process value than 
if she had organised a rally on the topic in London.  This argument is returned to in 
Chapter Eight.  To complete the argument that distinctions are made based on the 
type of speaker involved, the following section explores the protection afforded to 
prisoners, who are, arguably, afforded the lowest speaker valuation.   
 
b) Prisoners 
 
As noted above, arguably, the lowest speaker valuation is given to prisoners.  
Naturally, the competing public interest justifying this low valuation is that ‘a 
sentence of imprisonment is intended to restrict the rights and freedoms of a 
prisoner’.208  This does not mean that prisoners may be silenced altogether.  There is a 
strong potential connection with ‘open justice’ cases: even after incarceration, the 
public interest that justice was done continues.  Consequently, if a prisoner wishes to 
challenge the safety of his or her conviction, the speech target (the justice system) and 
speech are of the highest value; it is highly unlikely a higher competing claims exists 
to deny the exercise of the right.209  Yet because the speaker valuation is low, 
prisoners have had to fight in order to have this strong right (albeit in a narrow 
context) recognised, as demonstrated by ex parte Simms,210 in which two convicted 
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murderers sought judicial review of the decision that visiting journalists could not use 
any information obtained from the prisoners for professional purposes.  The prisoners 
sought to exercise their right to free speech for the specific reason that access to 
journalists would permit the safety of their conviction to be challenged through the 
media.  In finding for them, the House of Lords held that allowing prisoners to 
discuss their cases with journalists acts as a ‘safety valve’ against the fallibility of the 
justice system.211  Thus, it is the high importance of the speech and speech target that 
strengthens the prisoner’s free speech claim.  This is illustrated in situations where 
the speech is of significantly lesser value.  For example, if the prisoner wishes to ‘sell 
his story’ of the crimes he committed, the claim is likely to fail, as shown by the 
decision in Nilsen.212 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The domestic treatment of free speech in practice suggests that, in general, 
there will be a consideration of the public interest in the speech and the counter public 
interest in suppressing speech.  These two interests are ‘balanced’ with the heavier 
weight determining the outcome.  It seems that in a number of cases the free speech 
weight is the combined weight of the different public interest valuations based on the 
perceived contributions to the democratic process value inherent in the speaker, 
speech and speech target.  As other commentators have said, the UK courts’ have 
adopted a pragmatic approach to free speech which does not convincingly 
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demonstrate a rights-based analysis at work.213  Moreover, as a consequence of this 
approach, certain types of speakers seem capable of achieving a potentially higher 
free speech weight than others.  Consequently, assuming a constant public interest in 
the content, speech by the media will be better protected than the same speech by a 
non-journalist.  In general terms, the view of Fenwick and Phillipson coincides with 
the view expressed on the media in this thesis: it is important that the media is 
strongly protected where it does indeed fulfil its ‘public watchdog’ role against 
‘oppressive legislation, governmental interference, or wealthy, powerful individuals 
using libel or privacy actions to stifle legitimate, important public debate’214 but not 
on other occasions.  This thesis agrees with their ethos: ‘we are not media freedom 
fundamentalists, seeing media freedom as an unqualified good…we therefore 
advocate a preparedness to strip away Article 10 protection…or to minimize it, where 
there is no substantive claim that the free speech rationales are being furthered’.215  
Consequently, they argue against the privileging of the journalist above the non-
journalist.216  This is an eminently sensible proposition, which may be achieved in a 
number of ways, such as by a more universal application of the ‘public watchdog’ 
concept and/or recognising in stronger terms the broader rationales for protecting free 
speech.  Furthermore, the rationale for the public watchdog function ought to be 
revisited on the basis that, as other commentators have recently noted, the threat to 
traditional printing that the internet represents combined with the phenomena of 
social networking sites, ‘wikis’, ‘blogs’ and ‘twitters’ means that it is no longer safe 
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to assume that the traditional media exclusively influences the forming of popular 
views.217 
Arguably, the theme emerging from the cases discussed above (that different 
free speech weights are applied to different speakers) is a consequence of the 
apparent application of consequentialist principles as a blunt instrument when 
determining Article 10 claims: certain speakers have an advantage over others in 
arguing their speech benefits the democratic process.  The following chapter 
considers how this consequentialist rationale affects the level of protection that may 
be afforded to non-political expression. 
.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Identifying the domestic judiciary’s 
approach to ‘non-political’ speech 
______________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Unlike established theory, the European Court of Human Rights (the 
“ECtHR”) sets a low threshold for what counts as ‘expression’ for the purposes of 
Article 10.  It has been said that the UK judiciary adopts the same approach: as 
Merris Amos has previously noted, ‘it is very rare for a UK court to find Article 10 is 
not engaged when freedom of expression is argued’.1  Established theory, however, 
adopts a different approach on the basis that some speech ‘simply [has] nothing to do 
with what the concept of free speech is all about’.2  Thus the critical test is not 
whether the activity in question amounts to ‘expression’ but rather whether that 
expression fits with the justificatory argument under consideration.  Consequently, in 
theoretical terms, the question of what type of expression beyond political speech 
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falls within the ambit of a free speech guarantee is hotly contested.  As set out in 
Chapter Two, some commentators would exclude all speech that is not strictly 
political.3  It will be argued in this chapter that although the UK courts’ approach is 
not this pronounced there are notable similarities with this type of narrow approach.  
Thus, whilst the UK courts have recognised post-Human Rights Act (“HRA”) that the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence adopts a hierarchical approach to protection,4 their approach 
to securing protection for non-political speech does not seem to follow the same 
contours as the ECtHR’s.  Because the UK courts appear to have aligned themselves 
to a narrow interpretation of the argument from participation in a democratic society, 
the prospect of protection for any speech that does not reflect the democratic process 
valued may be doubtful.  In order to establish this argument, this chapter explores the 
post-HRA case law in relation to artistic, commercial and pornographic expression.  
So far there have only been a handful of cases involving non-political speech and 
often the Article 10 claim has been at the periphery.  However, should the apparent 
narrow approach to non-political speech become established, it is submitted that the 
trend raises serious concerns.  The prospect of ultimately dismissing the Article 10 
claim, particularly artistic expression, for want of a significant public interest being at 
stake is troubling.  It is well-established in theory that non-political speech serves 
broader values than its contribution to the democratic process, as will be shown.  In 
broad terms, it will be argued that this approach risks overstating the significance of 
commercial expression (almost giving it parity with political speech) but under-
                                                 
3
 i.e., Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” [1971] 47 Indiana Law 
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4
 R. v. British American Tobacco UK Ltd and others (2004) EWHC 2493 (Admin).  See also judgment 
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protects artistic expression.  The domestic courts’ apparent dismissive approach to 
pornography is concerning only to the extent that it may affect artistic expression. 
 
2. Artistic expression 
 
Whereas the ECtHR has been called upon to consider artistic expression in a 
number of cases, the post-HRA domestic case law contains few instances of such 
speech being at stake.  As set out in Chapter Three, the ECtHR protects artistic 
expression under Article 10 on the basis that ‘those who create, perform, distribute or 
exhibit works of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and opinions which is 
essential for a democratic society.  Hence the obligation on the State not to encroach 
unduly on their freedom of expression’.5  This consequentialist approach to artistic 
expression echoes the approach to political expression yet does not fully articulate the 
broader values that artistic expression contributes.  As will be shown below, such 
broader values are evident in other consequentialist rationales such as the argument 
from self-fulfilment6 and, even, Meiklejohn’s conception of the argument from 
participation in a democracy.7  Although the UK judiciary have confirmed in British 
and American Tobacco8 that political and artistic expression is treated more 
favourably than commercial expression, the post-HRA case law contains signs that it 
takes the same approach to artistic expression as political expression and thus 
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examines such expression for its contribution to the democratic process.  Should this 
approach take root, aside from neglecting broader contributions that artistic 
expression makes, it raises the same competency issue discussed in Chapter Five:9 no 
independent measurement can be made of the actual contribution that artistic 
expression makes to the democratic process value and so the courts are left to make 
ad hoc balancing decisions.   
As mentioned above, in several cases involving artistic expression, the Article 
10 issue has played little or no part in the outcome of the case.  This can be seen, for 
example, in the high profile Divisional Court decision in Green,10 which concerned a 
failed private prosecution for blasphemous libel in respect of a theatrical work 
entitled ‘Jerry Springer: the Opera’ in which the eponymous chat show host is 
parodied.  The second act of this play depicts Springer in Hell hosting his chat show 
with Satan, Jesus Christ, God, the Virgin Mary and Adam and Eve as his guests.  The 
characters, at various points, behave as Springer’s regular guests would, i.e., swearing 
and insulting each other.  The legal action failed because the elements of the offence 
had not been made out: in particular, it had not been shown that the play had induced 
a reaction involving civil strife, damage to the fabric of society or an equivalent.11  
Consequently, there was no need for the court to consider the Article 10 defence in 
any detail.12  Arguably, however, if the law had been such as to allow a prima facie 
case to prohibit the play then the Article 10 defence might have been weak given the 
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approach of the ECtHR in Otto-Preminger,13 which concerned a film distinctly 
similar in theme to the second act of ‘Jerry Springer: the Opera’.  In this case, the 
ECtHR found that Member States have a wider margin of appreciation where 
religious sensibilities are affronted on the basis that there is no discernible consensus 
on the significance of religion in society.14  Furthermore, the ECtHR found that 
Article 10(2) includes the ‘obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are 
gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights, and which 
therefore do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering 
progress in human affairs’.15  One distinction of possible significance is that in Green 
the court found that the play had ‘as the object of its attack not religion but the 
exploitative television chat show’.16  Furthermore, the court stated ‘it does not seem 
to us that insulting a man’s religious beliefs, deeply held though they are likely to be, 
will normally amount to an infringement of his Article 9 rights since his right to hold 
[such views] is generally unaffected by such insults’.17  This contrasts with the 
finding in Otto-Preminger that such insults could (and did) constitute a breach of 
Article 9.  The distinction, however, may be explained by the difference in 
circumstances.  In Otto-Preminger the ECtHR found the film to be ‘an abusive 
attack’ on the Roman Catholic religion in a region where ‘the Roman Catholic 
religion is the religion of the overwhelming majority’.18  Such cultural circumstances 
could not be said to apply in Green. 
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In R (on the application of British Board of Film Classification) v. Video 
Appeals Committee,19 the court was asked to review the decision of the VAC to 
overturn the BBFC’s refusal to classify a video game entitled ‘Manhunter 2’ whose 
object was said to be ‘brutal and unremitting violence’20 toward the humans depicted 
within it.  In concluding that the decision was in error, the Court quashed the decision 
and remitted the case for re-examination.  The Article 10 claim did not form the 
critical basis of this appeal and so was not considered in any detail.  The only 
treatment of the claim was for the court to note that ‘the word ‘harm’ in Section 
4A(1) [Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994] must be construed as referring 
only to harm of a kind identified in Article 10(2)’.21  Given that the ECtHR affords 
member states a wide margin of appreciation where the protection of morals is at 
stake (as discussed in Chapter Three), arguably, the Article 10 claim in this case is 
not strong. 
In P v. Quigley,22 Quigley, a disgruntled former employee of Company R, of 
which second claimant Q was a former director and chief executive (P & Q being 
husband and wife), threatened to publish a novella on the internet in ‘which P and Q 
would appear, thinly disguised, as partaking in various unsavoury and fictitious 
sexual activities’.23  In restricting publication on the basis of there being ‘no 
conceivable public interest in making such scurrilous allegations against P and Q, 
whether directly or under the transparent disguise mentioned’,24 Eady J. noted that 
                                                 
19
 R (on the application of British Board of Film Classification) v. Video Appeals Committee (2008) 
EWHC 203 (Admin) 
20
 Ibid., [7]. 
21
 Ibid., [29]. 
22
 P v. Quigley (2008) EWHC 1051. 
23
 Ibid., [6]. 
24
 Ibid., [7]. 
271/385 
‘although the threats related to imaginary activities, the publication would plainly be 
likely to cause distress and embarrassment and would constitute an unacceptable 
intrusion into a personal and intimate area of their lives’.25  It is clear from the 
judgment that Eady J. treated this case as having little to do with artistic expression: 
the medium of a novella seemed to be an excuse to launch a stinging attack against P 
& Q in apparent retribution for a criminal prosecution they had previously initiated 
against Quigley.  This was not a disguised libel claim but rather, as Eady J. 
concludes, ‘what they [P & Q] are seeking to restrain is the publication of clearly 
scandalous matter which serves no legitimate purpose’.26  The judgment is 
particularly short and so there is no explanation of Quigley’s motive to publish the 
novella beyond seeking to intimidate or embarrass P & Q and, accordingly, no 
consideration of whether the novella might have had artistic merit, etc, which might 
have made the balancing act between Articles 8 and 10 more finely balanced.  
Instead, Eady J.’s approach echoes that adopted for political expression: the lack of 
an identifiably valuable contribution to the democratic process provided for an 
apparently dismissive approach to the claim. 
Whilst this approach may be entirely defensible on the facts, it is important 
that the court is sensitive to the facts of each case of artistic expression used to make 
comment about public figures.  As discussed in Chapter Three, the ECtHR decision 
in VBK v. Austria27 concerned similar issues.  The decision is significant in this 
context for the liberal approach the court took to the issue of political comment.  As 
set out in Chapter Three, the court was satisfied that a painting depicting a number of 
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recognisable figures (including some from the Austrian Freedom Party) in sexually 
explicit poses could represent some sort of ‘counter-attack’ against the Austrian 
Freedom Party, whose members had strongly criticised the painter’s work.28  This 
finding is particularly significant because the court did not seek to decipher the actual 
message within the painting and neither did it seek to measure the actual contribution 
made by the expression.  Thus it was satisfied that the painting might make such a 
contribution.  Of course, in this way the art is the medium by which the political 
message is made (and therefore the case might be treated as a political expression 
claim).  VBK also illustrates how the ECtHR adopts a broad approach to the 
definition of public figure.  In other cases, the ECtHR has included businessmen 
within that definition.29  It was noted in Chapter Six that the UK judiciary also 
appears to have adopted a broad approach to the definition of ‘public figure’.30  Thus, 
it would seem that after VBK the fact that the artistic expression is ‘scurrilous’ (as 
Eady J. noted of the expression in P v. Quigley) is not, necessarily, a bar on finding 
that it contributes to the democratic process according to the ECtHR.  Of course, 
where a businessman rather than a politician is the speech target, the court may have 
regard to the Strasbourg principle that politicians are expected to tolerate a greater 
degree of criticism than regular citizens31 (with businessmen sitting somewhere 
between the two).  In this regard, the decision in Murray32 is relevant. 
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In Murray, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal by Mr and Mrs Murray 
(Mrs Murray being better known as J. K. Rowling) against the first instance decision 
to strike out the Article 8 claim made in respect of unauthorised surreptitious 
photography of their young son, David in a public place.  It is well-established in 
theory33 and practice34 that photographs constitute expression for the purposes of 
applying a free speech clause.  Yet since it was for the Murrays to first establish a 
claim (which they had been unable to do at first instance), the nature of the Article 10 
claim was not explored, either in the first instance or Court of Appeal decision.  In 
finding that the child of a celebrity may establish a prima facie Article 8 claim in 
circumstances where the celebrity parent may not, the Court set out the test to be 
followed to determine the case, indicating that in such cases two questions should be 
answered: ‘first, whether the information is private in the sense that it is in principle 
protected by Article 8 (i.e. such that Article 8 is in principle engaged) and, secondly, 
if so, whether in all the circumstances the interest of the owner of the information 
must yield to the right to freedom of expression conferred on the publisher by Article 
10’.35 Sir Anthony Clarke MR, giving the sole judgment, then proceeded to consider 
in detail how the first question should be tackled but did not address the second.  In 
many ways, this is disappointing since it would have been interesting to learn what 
the Article 10 claim was premised on in this case.  Perhaps the Court of Appeal felt 
the claim was obvious given the implication that a legitimate interest in 
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photographing a celebrity was at stake.36  Yet how should such pictures be treated?  
Are they a form of political expression: does the photograph depict a matter of public 
interest because Murray is a celebrity?  Or are the photographs protected because the 
composition of them is of artistic value?  Alternatively, is it commercial expression?  
As Lord Hoffmann recognised in Campbell, photographs grab attention (they are 
worth a thousand words),37 corroborate the written story and so help sell 
newspapers.38  On a similar theme, photographs of the Douglas/Zeta-Jones wedding 
were found to be information of commercial value.39  Clearly, the answers to these 
questions are significant in determining the level of protection the expression should 
be afforded (assuming the hierarchical approach evident in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is followed). 
It has been noted in previous chapters that the UK judiciary’s approach to 
freedom of expression bears strong resemblances to Bork’s conception of the 
argument from participation in a democratic society.  Such alignment, however, is 
troubling for the protection of artistic expression since Bork’s theory would not 
protect any expression that is not ‘explicitly political’.40  Whilst the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence clearly extends protection to artistic expression it has already been 
noted by Fenwick and Phillipson that such statements of principle have greater 
rhetorical significance than practical value given that the outcomes of artistic 
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expression claims do not tend to reinforce these statements.41  Thus adherence to the 
mirror principle may not safeguard artistic expression.  Of course, this point should 
not be overstated: as Schauer observes, ‘there are works commonly referred to as ‘art’ 
whose content clearly places them within the range of the type of communication 
covered by the free speech principle’42 not least because the positive contribution 
made is readily apparent or otherwise uncontested.  Art may seek to directly or 
indirectly comment on political and religious matters or it may seek no such thing and 
yet be considered highly beneficial to improving mental faculties.  However, for 
reasons of competency (set out above) it is important the judiciary adopt a broad 
approach to artistic expression.  This need not entail a departure from a 
consequentialist rationale based on the argument from participation in a democracy.  
Meiklejohn’s conception of this argument, for example, explicitly recognises the 
contribution that literature and the arts make toward improving the voter’s capacity to 
make informed decisions.43  Moreover, Perry has argued that Bork’s argument is 
‘seriously flawed’ because much artistic expression ‘must be understood as moral in 
character…[and] every moral vision is ultimately and irreducibly a political vision: a 
vision (or understanding or experience) of the world and of our place, as 
fundamentally social beings, in that world’.44  Thus, he concludes: ‘to say that efforts 
to express political vision should be protected…is necessarily to say that efforts to 
express moral vision, and access to such expression, should be protected as well’.45  
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Furthermore, as set out previously, any narrow approach by the court to question of 
contribution made by artistic expression to society at large is unsafe: the judiciary are 
entirely unqualified to know the wider impact art has on society at large. 
 
3. Commercial speech 
 
 As with artistic expression, there has only been a handful of cases post-HRA 
involving commercial expression.  The first case, British American Tobacco,46 
concerned the lawfulness of the Tobacco Advertising and Promotion (Point of Sale) 
Regulations 2004.  The Divisional Court was asked to consider the claim that, 
amongst other things, the Regulations were disproportionate to the aim of promoting 
health because they allowed so little advertising as to impair the ‘very essence’ of 
commercial free speech under Article 10.  McCombe J., demonstrating a minimalist 
approach to the Article 10 claim, found that since ‘freedom of commercial expression 
has been treated traditionally as of less significance than freedom of political or 
artistic expression’47 it was not ‘disproportionate to meet the objective of promoting 
health by restricting advertising at POS to a single advert of the type to be 
permitted’.48  To a certain extent, this approach to commercial expression may be 
contrasted with the more liberal approach evident in North Cyprus Tourism Centre,49 
in which the claimant sought judicial review of a decision of the defendant (Transport 
for London) to stop carrying advertisements promoting holidays in North Cyprus.  
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The advertisements were removed following complaints that North Cyprus was not a 
country recognised by the UK government because it was illegally occupied by 
Turkey.  It was not suggested by the claimant that the advertisements were a form of 
political expression: on the contrary, the claimant argued that the advertisements were 
wholly unconnected to the political landscape of the region (bearing only an 
innocuous strapline).  Rather than find that the speech concerned was of limited 
significance in Article 10 terms, Newman J. in the Divisional Court upheld the 
Article 10 claim on the basis that since the defendant had not identified a legitimate 
aim in removing the advertisements50 and neither had it demonstrated any pressing 
social need for the interference,51 there had been a violation. 
 Since that decision both the Divisional Court52 and the Court of Appeal has 
considered the Article 10 claims of commercial expression in respect of comparative 
advertising.  In the Court of Appeal decision in Boehringer,53 Vetplus UK, the 
respondent, claimed, amongst other things, that a product made by Boehringer was of 
inferior quality to the claims made on its label.  Dismissing the appeal, the court 
found that it would offend the rule against prior restraint to grant an injunction in 
circumstances where the claimant had not shown the publication was libellous or 
untrue.54  Thus there was no reason to suppress the speech regardless of the fact it 
was also commercial in nature.  Furthermore, the case involved issues beyond Article 
10.  In recognising this, Lord Justice Jacob stated that ‘although there is an important 
issue of free speech involved in comparative advertising, other more complex factors 
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are involved too’.55  The finding that the expression involved ‘important issues of free 
speech’ is, however, significant in Article 10 terms.  This approach is consistent with 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence on commercial expression, as discussed in Chapter 
Three.56  It will be recalled that the ECtHR stated in Casado Coca57 that ‘for the 
citizen, advertising is a means of discovering the characteristics of goods and services 
offered to him’.58  As noted, this approach has obvious comparisons with the 
approach to freedom of political expression: when assessing whether the expression 
should be protected, the court examines the extent to which information is 
communicated that assists individual decision-making.59  This may account for 
Richards J. finding in the Divisional Court decision in Red Dot Technologies60 that 
‘comparative advertising is also a form of expression which, if fair and not 
misleading, is in the public interest’.61 
 Yet to treat commercial expression as involving matters of public interest 
risks elevating such speech to the same level of importance as political speech: 
indeed, it might be said that it is tantamount to treating such expression as a form of 
political speech.  Although the decision, for example, in North Cyprus Tourism 
Centre is explainable by reference to the weakness of the defence, it is intriguing that 
the Court found that the decision to remove the advertisements ‘restricted 
the…claimant’s freedom of expression by denying it a vital medium for its 
advertisements.  The decision involves a ‘restriction’ regardless of the possibility that 
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the…claimant could advertise elsewhere’.62  This provides an interesting point of 
comparison with the later House of Lords decision in ADI,63 which was discussed in 
the previous two chapters.  In that case, which it will be recalled involved a ban on 
political advertising using the broadcast media, Lord Bingham found the opportunity 
of advertising elsewhere to be a ‘factor of some weight’64 in determining that the ban 
in question was not disproportionate even though his Lordship recognised that the 
broadcast media was the ‘most effective advertising media’.65  The decision in ADI 
does not expressly overrule North Cyprus Tourism Centre: indeed, none of the 
commercial speech cases were referred to by the House of Lords.  These two sets of 
principle do not marry up well; arguably, the only means by which to preserve both is 
to confine them to the specific categories of speech to which they apply.  Of course, 
this would obviously place political advertising in a comparatively weaker position 
than commercial advertising.  Given the preponderance of the courts in other Article 
10 cases to find that alternative means of speaking is a relevant factor,66 it is arguable 
that this principle in North Cyprus Tourism Centre is now out of touch with other 
case law and, for that reason, a court may be less inclined to follow this principle 
where it arose in future decisions. 
In more general terms, these statements of principle connote a more serious 
approach to the free speech claims of commercial expression than has been seen in 
relation to pornographic speech, as will be shown.  Yet this need not be the case: as 
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noted, at Strasbourg level it has been found that for commercial speech – like 
pornographic speech – the member state is afforded a wide margin of appreciation.  
Indeed, in Casado Coco,67 a case commonly cited in commercial expression cases, 
the claimant lost his commercial speech claim: the ECtHR recognised that the margin 
of appreciation was ‘particularly essential’ since advertising like unfair competition 
was an area of ‘complex and fluctuating’ issues and the Court ‘confined’ itself to the 
question of whether the interference was justifiable and proportionate.68  Thus, as was 
argued in Chapter Four, in situations such as this, the UK judiciary has considerable 
scope to rationalise the protection afforded commercial expression so that it sits 
within the hierarchy more recognisably.  Yet, from the brief foray of the case law set 
out above, it seems the UK judiciary has not taken account of this margin and, 
instead, is receptive to the argument that the commercial expression is important for 
its contribution to individual decision-making.  As with pornography, in identifying 
the value at stake the court might refer to the significant debate about the free speech 
claims of commercial expression.  Indeed, the comparison to pornography has been 
taken further: it has been said that ‘advertising is the pornography of capitalism, 
intended to arouse desire for objects rather than for person’.69  In its approach to 
commercial expression, as with its approach to freedom of speech more generally, the 
UK courts have had little regard to the intense academic debate that exists in respect 
of commercial expression. 
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 As this debate demonstrates, the idea that free speech theory should cover 
(and protect) commercial expression divides opinion.  Those that maintain that it is 
‘intuitive’ that commercial expression is excluded,70 since inclusion would 
‘trivialise’71 the concept of free speech clash with those that say ‘the 
commercial/noncommercial speech dichotomy is illusory, undefinable, based on 
erroneous assumptions, and should be eradicated’.72  For such divided opinion there 
is no middle ground that would satisfy both and so, arguably, the two-tier 
categorisation (where commercial expression enjoys a lesser status to political 
expression), which may be seen as a middle ground, arguably satisfies neither camp.  
The conservative approach to coverage would exclude commercial speech because it 
is significantly different to the type of public discourse that political speech 
represents.  As Post notes,  
 
‘commercial speech…does not seem a likely candidate for inclusion … because we most 
naturally understand persons who are advertising products for sale as seeking to advance their 
commercial interest rather than as participating in the public life of the nation…if pressed, 
this is not ultimately a judgment about the motivations of particular persons, but instead about 
the social significance of a certain kind of speech’73 
 
Thus, a Canadian judge has found that:  
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‘Commercial speech contributes nothing to democratic government because it says nothing 
about how people are governed or how they should govern themselves.  It does not relate to 
government policies or matters of public concern essential to a democratic process.  It 
pertains to the economic realm and is a matter appropriate to regulation by the Legislature’.74 
 
Yet since the UK courts have not substantially engaged with the academic debate in 
this regard, arguments such as these have not been addressed.  Although the UK 
courts seem satisfied that certain types of commercial expression, at least, promote 
the democratic process value, such a finding does not entirely address the argument 
that ‘the censorship of commercial speech does not endanger the process of 
democratic legitimation.  It does not threaten to alienate citizens from their 
government or to render the state heteronymous with respect to speakers’.75 
 In this respect, however, the UK courts might have regard to the challenges 
that have been made against the conservative position.  For example, against the 
argument that the ‘profit motive’ of commercial expression should defeat its claim to 
freedom of speech status, it has been argued that: 
 
‘the greatest irony in the widespread disdain for self-interested expression inherent in the 
commercial speech distinction is the fact that in many other aspects of legal and political 
culture our society actually places a premium on self-interest.  Indeed, the entire premise of 
our largely capitalistic economic system is the belief that reliance on self-interest will 
maximise societal welfare.  The central assumption of capitalism, of course, is that the 
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individual’s incentive to maximize profits will lead to the creation of improvements in 
products and services.’76 
 
The ‘profit motive’ argument, for example, is difficult to sustain since newspapers, in 
particular, depend upon their commercial success in order to survive and thrive.77  
Aside from the difficulty of determining coverage where political and commercial 
expression converges and co-exists, a judge is presented with difficulties if 
expression driven by a commercial incentive must be excluded.  To say that 
newspapers engage the free speech principle because they occupy the position of 
‘public watchdog’78 may lead to awkward conclusions if that coverage is unavailable 
for corporations, even though a clear public element may be discernible in a 
commercial advertisement.  Indeed, many forms of political expression may have 
profit and, more broadly conceived, monetary considerations at their heart, 
particularly any criticisms of government spending tax-payers’ money: for example, 
in criticising the government, the motive of the speaker may well be financially-
driven.  In any event, the Strasbourg jurisprudence establishes that the ‘profit motive’ 
argument is ineffective for Article 10 claims: the ECtHR has previously said that 
because Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression to “everyone” ‘no distinction is 
made in it according to whether the type of aim pursued is profit-making or not’.79 
The liberal argument for coverage tends to be that commercial expression aids 
self-fulfilment.  It will be recalled that freedom of expression under Article 10 
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‘constitutes one of the essential foundations...for each individual’s self-fulfilment’.80  
Barendt, for example, has challenged this argument on the basis that ‘it is nonsense to 
contend that advertising is vital to a corporation’s sense of its ability to develop or 
achieve self-fulfilment, in the same way that the freedom to write or to paint is 
essential to the identity and self-fulfilment of authors and artists’.81  Yet Redish is 
dismissive of this ‘corporate speaker’ analysis, arguing that ‘at least a significant 
portion of the value served by free expression is the benefit received by the reader, 
viewer or listener’.82  On this basis, ‘logically neither the motivation for the speech 
nor its effect on the speaker should be dispositive of its [protection] status’.83  Redish 
concludes that ‘the only other conceivable explanation for the reduced level of First 
Amendment protection afforded commercial advertising, then, is some sort of 
ideologically based distaste for, or rejection of, the value of the commercial 
promotion of a product or service’.84 
Shiffrin has argued that there is no ‘squeaky-clean separation between 
commercial advertising and political speech’.85  Likewise, Redish argues that any 
distinction between commercial speech and political expression is ‘irrational’ since 
‘commercial speech may serve the very same values as are fostered by political 
expression, in that it facilitates an individual’s “private self-governing” process.  It 
thereby assists in attainment of the values of individual autonomy and self-
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realization’.86  Thus coverage should not be denied under ‘the self-realization model, 
[as] advertising deserves substantial constitutional protection since advertising 
provides information which is more useful in life decisions than what is available 
from other sources’.87  Likewise, whilst it may be said, ‘purely commercial speech 
plays little role in the exposition and debate of political ideas, (political speech might 
be about commercial matters, but it does more than propose a commercial 
transaction)’,88 and that ‘commercial speech differs from public discourse because it 
is constitutionally valued merely for the information it disseminates, rather than for 
being itself a valuable way of participating in democratic self-determination,’89 a 
convincing rejoinder is that ‘the interplay between the forces of a free market and 
democracy are not a one-way street.  A free market economy can be both conducive 
and detrimental to a pluralistic political system.’90  Likewise, Post notes that ‘visions 
of the good life articulated within commercial advertisements are relevant to this 
[political] process’91 whilst Shiffrin concludes ‘there is good reason to think that 
much so-called economic regulation touches speech of political importance’.92 
 Admittedly, the transactional element of commercial advertising cannot be 
ignored or else commercial speech may be imbued with an importance it is genuinely 
undeserving of.  Farber, for example, notes there is an ‘intuitive belief that 
commercial speech is somehow more akin to conduct than are other forms of speech’ 
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on the basis that ‘it is a prelude to and therefore becomes integrated into, a contract, 
the essence of which is the presence of a promise.’93  Consequently, since ‘a promise 
is an undertaking to ensure that a certain state of affairs takes place, promises 
obviously have a closer connection with conduct than with self-expression.’94  On 
this basis, ‘false advertisements are indistinguishable from unfulfilled contractual 
promises’.95  Thus it has been said that commercial speech should be treated as ‘no 
more than proposing a commercial transaction’.96  Yet Kozinski and Banner, for 
example, contest this line of reasoning, arguing that modern advertising does not 
typically contain the essential elements of a commercial transaction, such as price or 
purchase location.97  Instead, advertisers tend to link their product to achievement of 
an image or ideal.  It may be said that politicians do something similar by trying to 
sell an image or ideal to the voter and linking a political party to achievement of such. 
 Thus, the UK courts might better explicate the reasons for protecting 
commercial expression by having regard to the academic debate on this point.  For 
example, Redish has said that ‘commercial speech serves the values of free speech 
protection as much or more than does any category of fully protected expression’98 
and, further, that ‘careful examination reveals that without question, none of the 
remaining arguments relied upon to justify commercial speech’s second class status 
justifies the distinction’s continued existence’.99  Similarly, Post notes,  
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‘underlying [the view that commercial speech may be of public interest] is the notion that 
citizens may acquire information from commercial speech that is highly relevant to the 
formation of democratic public opinion.  Democratic public opinion, in turn, is the ultimate 
source of government decision making.  If citizens learn from commercial advertising that 
pharmacy drugs are too expensive, for example, they might organize politically to advocate 
within public discourse for the creation of national health insurance’.100   
 
This line of reasoning would seem to have currency in Article 10 terms: certainly, it 
seems in keeping with the UK and Strasbourg findings that commercial expression 
may involve ‘important issues of free speech’.  Yet the UK courts’ have not fully 
articulated their approach to commercial expression in such terms and, neither have 
they demonstrated any engagement with the countervailing arguments.  Redish may 
be right when he says that ‘most of these attacks [on free speech protection for 
commercial speech] – much like similar attacks against obscenity protection – may be 
deconstructed into little more than a result-orientated attempt to stifle advocacy of a 
particular ideological perspective or point of view’.101  Yet what these differing 
viewpoints demonstrate is the need for the UK judiciary to engage with this debate in 
order to resolve the uncertainty because, presently, the connection between 
commercial expression and the democratic process, together with the apparent parity 
in strength between political and commercial speech presents a risk that the 
importance of commercial expression is overstated.   
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4. Pornography 
 
Shortly before the main HRA provisions became operational, Hooper J., in 
considering an appeal concerning the BBFC classification of a pornographic film, 
briefly referred to Article 10 but without fuller consideration of how it would be 
treated in the post-HRA landscape.102  This brief mention however suggested that a 
liberal approach to pornographic expression might follow.  A similarly liberal 
approach is apparent in the first post-HRA pornographic expression decision, 
O’Shea,103 which Amos discusses in her article.104  Here, the Divisional Court held 
that a pornographic advertisement was form of protected speech under Article 10.  
The facts of O’Shea are novel: it concerned an individual who claimed that an 
advertisement for an adult internet service was defamatory because the glamour 
model used in that advertisement closely resembled her.  In considering whether the 
strict liability principle within the Defamation Act 1952 interfered with Article 10, 
Morland J. commented that the advertisement ‘will have been regarded by many as 
squalid and degrading to women but distasteful though it may be, it is not unlawful 
and in accordance with European law is a form of expression protected by Article 
10’.105  However, as with Hooper J.’s assessment, this decision is not fully reasoned: 
most notably, there is no identification of the value or values at stake in the 
suppression of such speech. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly given the establishment of a firmly consequentialist 
approach to Article 10 in the UK, the liberalism that underpins the decision in O’Shea 
has not established itself in the post-HRA pornographic expression case law.  The 
Court of Appeal briefly considered Article 10 in a pornographic context in R. v. 
Perrin,106 which concerned a conviction for publishing an obscene website depicting 
‘people covered in faeces, coprophilia or coprophagia, and men involved in 
fellatio’.107  The Court did not fully engage with the Article 10 claim; instead, finding 
that any interference with the right was justified under Article 10(2).  In Interfact,108 
which concerned prosecutions against two licensed sex shops in breach of a statutory 
prohibition on mail order sales of R18 videos,109 the Divisional Court reached a 
similar conclusion as in Perrin.  The affected companies argued that the prohibition 
violated their Article 10 rights.  In common with Perrin, the Court did not consider in 
any detail the Article 10 claim, instead concluding that the right had not been violated 
because the protection of health or morals exception applied under Article 10(2). 
 Since Interfact, the House of Lords has considered the status of pornographic 
speech within Article 10 in Miss Behavin’ Ltd,110 which was an appeal concerning an 
unsuccessful application for a sex shop licence.  In considering whether the original 
decision-maker had fully considered the alleged Article 10 claim at stake, their 
Lordships found that whilst vending pornographic material engaged Article 10, it did 
so ‘at a very low level’111 and ‘hardly in a very compelling sense’.112  Lord Hoffmann 
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explained that ‘the right to vend pornography is not the most important right of free 
expression in a democratic society’.113  The focus of the claim in this case concerned 
the licence application rather than the merits of the literature itself and therefore the 
Article 10 claim centred on whether vending pornography constituted an act of free 
speech.  Yet the judgment reveals telling signs of the Court’s attitude toward 
pornography: for example, at one point in her judgment Baroness Hale notes that 
‘there are far more important human rights in this world...Pornography comes well 
below celebrity gossip in the hierarchy of speech which deserves the protection of the 
law.  Far too often it entails the sexual exploitation and degradation of women for the 
titillation of men’.114   
 Such harmful effects of pornography were at the forefront of the claim in In 
Re St Peter and St Paul’s Church,115 which concerned an appeal against the decision 
to prevent installation of a telecommunications mast in a church tower due to the risk 
that pornographic images may be transmitted to adults and children.  However, 
applying the rationale in Miss Behavin’ Ltd, the Arches Court of Canterbury found 
that the issue may either not engage Article 10 at all or else at such a low level that 
the chances of free speech being disproportionately limited were highly unlikely: 
 
‘Provided the consistory court follows the correct procedure of balancing the arguments in the 
case before it, we do not consider that by the attachment of conditions to the grant of a faculty 
where the question of distribution of pornography arises there will necessarily be any 
engagement with Article 10.  It is not every apparent interference with a person’s rights under 
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Article 10 which necessarily amounts to a breach of those rights.  Alternatively, in view of the 
“very low level” of any such engagement a reasoned decision should make any argument of 
disproportionate limitation on a right to freedom of expression untenable.’116 
 
Thus, as with Miss Behavin’ Ltd, it may be said that this case does not readily engage 
with the pornographic expression itself but the distribution of it.  Of course, it may be 
said that this is not much of a distinction.  Interferences with the ready availability of 
specific expression also prevent the expression itself being seen (or heard).  Indeed, 
given the pre-eminence of the consequentialist rationale, it is surprising that their 
Lordships in Miss Behavin’ Ltd. were not clearer about the status of pornography 
under Article 10 in the UK: since it seems readily accepted in the academic literature 
that pornography gains little support for protection under the argument from 
participation in democracy117 and given that the ECtHR leaves the treatment of 
pornography to Member States to determine, the Court might have excluded it from 
protection altogether.118  Such an approach to pornography is apparent in, for 
example, the theories advanced by Bork119 and BeVier120 who expressly exclude it.  
Thus, the UK courts’ approach to pornographic expression may be criticised on the 
basis it lacks real clarity.  It is submitted that clarity on this point is important in order 
to ensure that artistic expression is not prejudiced as a consequence: there is a risk 
that a dismissive stigmatic approach to pornography unduly harms artistic expression.  
This point seems to be recognised by Baroness Hale in Miss Behavin’ Ltd: having 
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questioned the value of pornography, Baroness Hale goes on to say ‘but there is 
always room for debate on what constitutes pornography.  We can all think of 
wonderful works of literature which once were banned for their supposed 
immorality’.121  Since Miss Behavin’ Ltd involved no question of artistic merit the 
point was not expanded upon.   
For this reason, it is important that, once the opportunity arises, the UK court 
drills down into the deeper issues surrounding pornography as a form of protected 
expression: i.e., the UK judiciary should engage with the arguments that it destroys 
morals or family values (the conservative position);122 is harmful to women (the 
feminist position);123 or, conversely, that since censorship could not be limited 
exclusively to pornography, it may have a chilling effect on other types of expression 
that ought to be protected124 or, moreover, that censorship offends against individual 
autonomy to decide on morality (the liberal position).125  These differing attitudes 
toward pornography have been extensively explored in the academic literature126 and 
are briefly explored in the following discussion in order to support the argument 
made: there is an apparent dismissive attitude toward pornography in the UK courts 
approach however it is important that such an attitude does not cloud the view 
entirely since the expression at stake may uphold Article 10 values.  For example, as 
seen in the decision in VBK v. Austria,127 although the medium of the expression was 
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a pornographic image, the ECtHR was prepared to find that the expression itself had a 
political context.128  The UK courts have not had to consider such circumstances.  
Perhaps the closest so far was the unsuccessful argument made in Mosley129 where a 
sex video of Max Mosley, engaged in (allegedly) ‘Nazi’ role play with five 
prostitutes, was posted on the News of the World’s website under the thin pretence 
that some vague ‘public interest’ was at stake.130  The dismissive approach taken in 
Mosley was entirely justifiable on the facts.  However, given the dismissive approach 
to pornography so far, would the UK courts have reached a similar decision to the 
ECtHR if presented with a similar factual matrix as in VBK?  Would it find that it 
must ‘mirror’ the decision or would it instead focus on the wide margin of 
appreciation afforded to Member States to determine moral issues (it will be recalled 
that the protection of morals was not found to be a reason for interfering with the 
expression in VBK)? 
Of course, it is recognised that the argument for a permissive approach to the 
consumption of pornography is not, necessarily, an argument that pornography is 
covered by free speech principle.  It has been said that the notion of liberty in general 
requires such permissiveness131 whilst, in response, it has been said that the 
causality132 between pornography and rape, sexual violence or degrading treatment 
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demands its suppression,133 and, even, that pornography is both a cause and form of 
sex trafficking:134 these issues are beyond the ambit of this thesis.  As might be 
expected, the liberal position on pornography appears to be in the ascendancy in the 
academic literature.  Instead of indignantly asking how pornography could possibly 
be covered by free speech theory,135 the question now seems to be more how 
pornography could not be so covered.136  Of course, this is not to say that there are 
not cogent arguments made against the inclusion of pornography within free speech 
principle.  Indeed, an appropriate starting point is the view that pornography, though 
typically verbal or visual, is not ‘speech’ in the free speech sense.  Instead, 
pornography is said to be images of sexual behaviour in order to stimulate more such 
sexual behaviour.137  Equally, it is said pornography is not speech because 
pornography is what it does, not what it says.138  Yet whilst there is much to be said 
for the view that pornography is no more speech than a visit to the prostitute139 or that 
                                                 
133
 Catherine MacKinnon, Only Words, (Harvard University Press, 1993); Andrea Dworkin, “Against 
the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality,” (1985) 8 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 1.  
Both have consistently argued that pornography promotes continuing gender segregation in a way 
which, apparently, female only journals do not. 
134
 Catherine MacKinnon, “Pornography as trafficking,” [2005] 26 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 993, 999, ‘The pornography industry, in production, creates demand for prostitution, hence for 
trafficking, because it is itself a form of prostitution and trafficking’. 
135
 Ronald Dworkin said, in 1981, that ‘the majority of people in [the UK and US] would prefer (or so 
it seems) substantial censorship if not outright prohibition of ‘sexually explicit’ books, magazines, 
photographs and films,’ (Dworkin, fn. 125, 177); James Weinstein notes that it was not until well into 
the 1960’s that the US courts treated pornography as covered by the First Amendment, (James 
Weinstein, Hate Speech, Pornography and the Radical Attack on Free Speech Doctrine (Westview 
Press, 1999), 141). 
136
 See, for example, Weinstein, ibid., 51, ‘many radical critics acknowledge that any attempt 
to…prohibit sexually explicit material demeaning to women is unconstitutional under current free 
speech doctrine’ though Thomas Scanlon asked in 1979, ‘the question to ask about pornography is, 
why restrict it?’ (Thomas Scanlon, “Freedom of expression and categories of expression,” [1979] 40 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 519, 542). 
137
 Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime and the Uses of Language, (Oxford University Press, 1989), 149. 
138
 MacKinnon, fn. 133, 11-19. 
139
 Barendt, fn. 81, 356. 
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it is a sex aid,140 there is some merit in the argument that it expresses an opinion, no 
matter how low grade,141 even if it is to say something about contemporary outlooks 
on morality142 or just that ‘sex is fun’.143  Indeed, it has been said that pornography is 
a form of political speech: ‘there is no denying that obscene pornography constitutes 
a political-moral vision.  Even obscene pornography communicates, often with 
implicit approval, certain ideas, values, and sensibilities regarding human sexuality 
and, usually and particularly, the status of women’.144  Although this seems to be an 
exaggerated claim, others have said similarly, including the argument that 
pornographers are comparable to participants in political activity in that they are 
‘entitled to at least a certain degree of access even to unwilling audiences’ if it may be 
said they seek ‘a fair opportunity to influence the sexual mores of the society’.145  In 
this limited sense, they may be akin to the political extremist and so difficult 
questions of how offensive political speech should be handled may be implicated.146   
Yet these arguments seem to imbue pornography with a level of sophistication 
that is often unmerited and certainly not apparent on all occasions.  As Scanlon 
admits of his own argument, ‘whilst some publishers of “obscene” materials have this 
kind of crusading intent, undoubtedly many others do not’.147  Moreover, without 
more argument, it is unconvincing that pornographers would have such grand aims: 
                                                 
140
 MacKinnon, fn. 133, 17, ‘Pornography is masturbation material.  It is used as sex.  It therefore is 
sex.  Men know this’; Robin West, “The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 
1986 Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography Report,” (1987) American Bar Foundation 
Research Journal 681, ‘whatever else it may be, pornography is an aid to sexual pleasure’.  
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 See Alexander, fn. 7. 
142
 Greenawalt, fn. 137, 150. 
143
 ‘Does hardcore pornography communicate ideas or thoughts?  Well, yes, that sex is fun,’ Tony 
Martino, “In conversation with Professor Eric Barendt: hatred, ridicule, contempt and plain bigotry,” 
(2007) Entertainment Law Review 48, 51. 
144
 Perry, fn. 44, 1182. 
145
 Scanlon, fn. 136, 545. 
146
 See discussion in Chapter Five. 
147
 Ibid., 546. 
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as Barendt argues, ‘whilst even the shabbiest politician wants his audience to believe 
what he has to say or to vote for him, a porn merchant simply wants consumers to 
purchase his wares.  As far as he is concerned they can throw them away 
afterwards’.148  However, one potential difficulty with this argument is that, if 
generally applied, it may have a limiting effect on free speech principle: as explored 
in the previous section, the motive that an individual has in speaking ought to be 
considered irrelevant.  Indeed, in a separate publication, Barendt provides the 
argument that would caveat his point: ‘the fact that the work is published for a motive 
that we don’t much like doesn’t mean that the work itself or the ideas implicit or 
explicit in the work are not of value and shouldn’t be debated’.149  The point seems 
equally applicable to the shabby politician who may seek office for the prestige, 
lifestyle or wealth but not because of any genuine concern about how his/her political 
ideals contribute to society at large.  Furthermore, the requirement that some political 
intent must be established in order that pornographic expression is protected may be 
unlikely since ‘expression dealing with sex is particularly likely to be characterized, 
by those who disapprove of it, as frivolous, unserious and of interest only to dirty 
minds’.150  This seems particularly evident in the judgments of the House of Lords in 
Miss Behavin’ Ltd.151  For this reason it ought not to be ignored that the term 
‘pornography’ has stigmatic qualities and may be bestowed on speech that is disliked.  
In any event, there remains the argument that pornography may also not be protected 
on the basis that speech seeking to engage debate on sexual mores ‘may be put in a 
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 Barendt, fn. 81, 360.   
149
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 Fn. 110. 
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sober and non-offensive manner’152 if it is a genuine attempt at engaging free speech 
principle. 
The argument against coverage has been developed, though, to say that even 
if pornography is speech and even if it cannot be said it is not valuable speech153 
exclusion from coverage (or protection) may be justified on the basis of the harm 
caused by its consumption.  The extreme feminist position is that since the harm 
caused by pornography is severe,154 invoking dangerous, automatic155 responses in 
men who observe it, it is irrelevant whether the consumption is done publicly or 
privately.156  This position, though, is not entirely built on solid foundations.  To say 
‘nothing else does what pornography does’157 is, arguably, too simplistic a view of 
the harm ‘apparent’ in pornography compared to other sources.  It is unconvincing to 
suggest men have a mechanical response to pornography that requires them to attack 
women, physically158 or mentally,159 as a consequence.  Although the extreme 
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 Ibid., 547. 
153
 Alternatively, even if determination of whether it is valuable is an irrelevant consideration (see 
Alexander, fn. 7). 
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 Murder, rape, and humiliation of women (for example, see MacKinnon, fn. 133). 
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 ‘Sooner or later, in one way or another, the consumers want to live out the pornography further in 
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 MacKinnon, fn. 133, 15. 
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MacKinnon, fn. 133, 16; Pauline Bart, “Pornography: Institutionalizing woman-hating and eroticizing 
dominance and submission for fun and profit,” (1985) 2 Justice Quarterly 283, 284: interviews of 
convicted rapists find a parallel between pornography’s vision of women and the rapist’s articulation 
of his motives, ‘women are sexual commodities to be used or conquered’. 
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 ‘Sexualised racism and visual pornography have been integral to sexual harassment all along,’ 
(MacKinnon, fn. 133), 45; likewise see Bart, fn. 158, 284, ‘men do not inherently believe that women 
enjoy forced sex.  Like racial and religious prejudice, it has to be learned.  Pornography masterfully 
teaches them not only that women exist simply for men’s pleasure, insatiably craving precisely those 
sexual behaviors that men prefer, but also that women enjoy bondage, battery and torture’. 
298/385 
feminist position, typified by MacKinnon, is said to be built on a number of 
‘undeniable truths’, such truths often seem empirically suspect.160  It is undeniable 
that pornography, particularly hardcore pornography, has the capacity to shock, 
offend and degrade in varying degrees, yet these are not compelling criteria to 
suppress since, as Dworkin puts it, ‘we cannot consider that a sufficient reason for 
banning it without destroying the principle that the speech we hate is as much entitled 
to protection as any other’.161  Further, as Dworkin suggests,162 the extreme feminist 
position163 on harm is most likely damaged by the uncompromising ‘certainties’ they 
are built on, encapsulated, for example, in this view: ‘what feminists have begun to 
understand is that not only are the specific victims of criminal sexual violence 
inspired by pornography harmed, but also all other women who are affected by the 
sexual reality defined by pornography’.164  This viewpoint links pornography to harm 
to women in a way that does not account for harms that would occur without 
pornography being available.165  Yet the concerns that pornography has the 
significant potential to harm women either directly or indirectly should not be ignored 
or belittled.  Fenwick and Phillipson, for example, discuss a number of cases in which 
women working in the adult entertainment industry have been harmed during the 
                                                 
160
 That pornography is responsible for rape and degrading treatment of women (MacKinnon, Only 
Words, fn. 133); that ‘society does not think to question the reality that sex is for men; that women 
serve men; that control is erotic; that force and violence are stimulating; that domination is sexy’ 
(Bartlett, fn. 167, 73). 
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 Though it would be a mistake, identical to MacKinnon’s, to suggest that all feminists speak with 
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(1993) 79 Virginia Law Review 1099. 
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production of pornographic films.166  There is also the broader feminist argument that 
pornography reduces women to ‘panting playthings’:167 ‘Pornography is the act, the 
pain, the harm; it does not “speak” that women are subordinate.  It is woman 
subordinate’.168 
Fenwick and Phillipson adopt a sensible and pragmatic approach to 
pornography, arguing that it is important not to confuse ‘shockingly explicit 
depictions of lawful acts…and depictions of rape, violence and torture’.169  They 
suggest fresh legislation is required, orientated around principles of equality and 
human dignity but not so as to catch material which is ‘a genuine exploration of 
sexual identity or fantasy and not in fact likely to inculcate damaging sexual 
attitudes’.170  Thus whilst it is accepted that the Millian argument might be put that 
what is required to combat the effects of pornography is not less but more sexual 
speech, in opposition,171 it is submitted that such a view may be in danger of 
underestimating the seriousness of the issue and overestimating the free speech value 
at stake.  Arguably, this is evident in the following commentary.  Dworkin argues that 
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 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 41, 391. 
167
 Katherine Bartlett, “Porno-symbolism: a response to Professor McConahay,” (1988) 51 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 71, 72, ‘the overwhelming message of this predominant form of 
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censorship of pornography violates the individual moral or political rights of citizens 
who resent the censorship.172  Emerson, likewise argues that:  
 
‘the values served by a system of free expression – individual self-fulfilment, advancement of 
knowledge, participation in self-government, and promotion of consensus by non-violent 
means – form the bedrock of our government.  The state must seek to achieve its social goals 
by methods other than the suppression of expression…Clearly the suppression of 
pornographic speech, on the ground that it causes or reflects discrimination against women, 
would run afoul of the basic mandate of the First Amendment’.173 
 
Yet this is not a convincing argument.  For one, it undervalues the importance of 
government being able to suppress speech on occasion.174  Also, it assigns a value to 
pornography that may be generally misplaced, (as Dworkin notes, ‘it seems 
implausible that any important human interests are damaged by denying dirty books 
or films’)175 or else assigns pornography a significance that it does not deserve (it has 
been said that protecting pornography within the First Amendment contradicts free 
speech goals since ‘it fails to take into account the concrete harm of speech to a group 
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 Dworkin, fn. 125. 
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 Thomas Emerson, ‘Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon’ 
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that is powerless’ and so, ‘effectively silences dissent’176 – it has been doubted that 
pornography is so powerful).177 
The debate in the academic literature on pornography is not only extensive but 
also well-developed.  By tapping into this debate, the judiciary has a ready source of 
arguments by which to shape its approach to pornography so as to ensure a richer, 
fully-formed approach emerges.  If the dismissive approach to pornography pervades, 
then the context of the pornographic expression might not be recognised: in other 
words, any political comment or context may also be dismissed.  Moreover, as with 
artistic expression, close adherence to the democratic process value may miss the 
broader values that may also be served by the expression, such as self-fulfilment.  
This is not to ignore the feminist position, which is important, but to safeguard 
against the stigmatic quality that the label ‘pornography’ may have on the expression.  
It may be that in a number of cases, the court can safeguard the artistic expression 
claim by determining whether the expression is commercial or artistic.  Even so, the 
judiciary must still be cautious and recognise limitations in its competency to decide 
on matters of artistic merit. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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 Rebecca Benson, “Pornography and the First Amendment: American Booksellers v. Hudnut,” 
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 In common with political expression, as the approach toward Article 10 has 
settled, the glimpses of liberalism shown in respect of non-political speech have 
hardened into a narrower approach.  This is not entirely unsurprising.  The notion that 
free speech clauses should extend beyond political speech is not without controversy.  
Long before the HRA was conceived, Barendt, for example, argued that all courts 
‘are wise to construe a free speech clause fairly narrowly.  In particular, they are right 
to accord political speech a preferred position and not to give any, or any significant 
degree of, protection to commercial advertising or hard core pornography’.178  
Furthermore, given the pre-eminence of the consequentialist rationale, at Strasbourg 
and domestic level, it was unlikely that the UK courts would adopt a particularly 
liberal approach toward the protection of non-political expression.  Although there 
have only been a handful of claims involving non-political expression, there are signs 
that the courts approach to such speech resembles its approach towards political 
expression: the level of protection to be afforded such speech depends upon the 
public interest in such speech.  As set out above, such an approach risks overstating 
the significance of commercial expression – elevating its position at the foot of the 
hierarchy to something more akin to political speech – whilst understating the 
importance of artistic expression, particularly that which has aesthetic qualities but 
only a tenuous connection with the democratic process or other public interest.  
Closer adherence to the argument from self-fulfilment would safeguard against this 
risk, as would an approach more closely resembling Meiklejohn’s argument from 
participation in a democratic society.  The UK courts’ approach to pornography, 
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which seems to be fairly dismissive, is not problematic so long as it does not unduly 
impact upon artistic expression. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
______________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is important not to exaggerate the negative aspects of the UK courts’ 
approach to Article 10 so far.  The common law evidences a rich tradition in 
protecting freedom of expression so it is hardly the case that the UK judiciary does 
not recognise its significance at all.  Likewise, it has not been the intention of this 
thesis to suggest that the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) has introduced some 
novel right that the UK judiciary has no understanding of and has been playing catch 
up with ever since October 2, 2000.  Yet at the same time, it is apparent that in very 
significant ways the UK judiciary has largely followed the same contours in their 
treatment of free speech under Article 10 as they did previously with free speech 
under the common law.  As set out in Chapter One, compelling criticisms were made 
of the common law’s approach to free speech pre-HRA.  It was argued that the 
foundations of free speech were insecure1 and that the law had developed ‘in an 
                                                 
1
 Rabinder Singh, ‘The indirect regulation of speech: a time and a place for everything’ (1988) Public 
Law 212. 
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incoherent fashion’.2  Barendt, in particular, attributed such issues to the absence of 
an appropriate constitutional measure, which meant the court were ‘unable to give 
adequate weight to the freedom when it conflicts with other public values and 
interests’.3  That constitutional measure has now been introduced and yet the 
foundations of free speech still seem insecure.  Recently, Hare commented that 
‘domestic free speech doctrine remains heavily under-theorised...the United Kingdom 
is still far from having a philosophically coherent method for dealing with free speech 
disputes’.4  This concern is evident in the views of other commentators5 and has led 
to ‘disappointment’6 being expressed about several significant free speech decisions.  
Eric Barendt described the House of Lords decision in ProLife7 as ‘a bad day for free 
speech’8 whilst, following their decision in ADI,9 Knight accused the House of Lords 
of ‘monkeying around with free speech’.10  These cases, in particular, have been 
referred to on several occasions within this thesis because, for a number of reasons, 
they are very troubling.  These are not trivial cases dealing with peripheral or 
theoretical applications of free speech: they deal with political expression – the very 
core of the Article 10 right.11  As the discussion in Chapter Three identified, the 
Strasbourg approach to Article 10 is firmly consequentialist.  It is clear from Chapters 
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 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties, (Cavendish Publishing, 1998, 2nd edn.), 144. 
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 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (OUP, 1985, 1st edn.), 299. 
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Five to Seven that the UK judiciary – in keeping with their commitment to ‘mirror’ 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence12 – also adopts a consequentialist approach.  Yet it has 
been argued throughout this thesis that there are notable differences between the two 
approaches.  The object of this chapter is to unpack these arguments in order to draw 
conclusions about the discernible UK judicial approach to Article 10.  The first part 
of this section will discuss the courts’ approach to free speech principle whilst the 
second seeks to understand what the UK judiciary’s strategy is toward Article 10.  
Following this discussion, argument will be put forward about the possible causes 
and consequences of this approach before this thesis concludes by discussing how 
these issues might be remedied. 
 
2. Unpacking the UK judiciary’s consequentialist approach to Article 
10 
 
a) Approach to free speech principle 
 
As set out in Chapter Two, there are a number of established justificatory 
theories that would protect a broad range of expression both for its instrumental 
(short-term and long-term) and intrinsic value, with the aim of maximising the 
protection afforded to expression.  The emergent theme from this critique of UK 
jurisprudence post-HRA is that, overall, despite the court identifying these 
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established theories in ex parte Simms13 on the basis for protecting speech,14 the 
liberal approach to freedom of expression that these theories tend to embody is not 
readily apparent.  There is no real evidence of protection of free speech for its 
intrinsic worth in the domestic Article 10 jurisprudence.  Moreover, the approach to 
protection on instrumentalist grounds has been fairly narrowly construed, based more 
on short-term than long-term valuations.  Yet there is a certain enigmatic quality to 
the UK judiciary’s approach to Article 10: as argued in Chapter Six, and as other 
commentators have said, the court may be criticised for having adopted an approach 
to media expression that is often very liberal.15  Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 
Seven, the Court of Appeal, in particular, adopted a liberal stance on the protection of 
commercial expression under Article 10 in Boehringer.16  The courts’ approach to 
commercial expression is considered in more detail in the following subsection.17  In 
relation to the media, it is apparent from the case law that the UK courts readily 
accept that the press has a vital function to perform in a democratic society18 (and this 
principle is also evident in the Strasbourg jurisprudence19), which suggests a long-
term approach to its instrumental value.  However, even the liberalness of the UK 
courts’ approach to media freedom is debatable.  For example, as is clear from the 
discussion in Chapter Six, the decision in Campbell v. MGN Ltd20 denotes a stricter 
approach to the nature of the media’s ‘vital role’ than was apparent in, say, A v. B 
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 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Simms (2000) 2 AC 115. 
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 See discussion in Chapter Six, in particular. 
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 See further Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 8, who argue similarly. 
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 (2004) 2 All ER 995; see also McKennitt v. Ash (2006) EWCA Civ 1714. 
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plc.21  This stricter approach is also apparent in several recent high court decisions, 
also discussed in Chapter Six.22  Therefore, whilst in comparative terms, the approach 
of the UK judiciary toward media freedom seems more liberal than its approach to 
individual expression, it does not necessarily follow that it is safe to conclude the UK 
courts’ approach to media freedom, overall, is liberal.  Indeed, as Chapter Six 
evidences, it might be said that the courts examine how the media’s ‘vital role’ is 
borne out on the facts of the case, i.e. in the short-term, and therefore that the long-
term significance of the media has lesser weight.  This point may also be illustrated 
by comparing two pre-HRA decisions on media freedom compared to a post-HRA 
decision. 
Re X,23 a Court of Appeal decision from 1975, concerned a child who was 
made a ward of court by her stepfather in the hope that the Court would subsequently 
issue an injunction to restrain publication of a biography containing graphic and lurid 
revelations about her deceased father’s life.  However, in a judgment that is 
uncompromisingly pro-free speech, the Court dismissed the application because the 
extension to the wardship jurisdiction which it implicated conflicted with the 
principle of free speech.  Giving the leading judgment, Lord Denning emphasised that 
freedom of speech did not simply involve a ‘balancing act’ to be taken in respect of 
the competing interests at stake in areas beyond the established exceptions to free 
speech: ‘if the function of the judges was simply a balancing function – to balance the 
competing interests – there would be much to be said for [the view that the book 
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 (2003) QB 195. 
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 Green Corns Ltd. v. Claverly Group Ltd (2005) EWJC 958; Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. 
(2008) EWHC 687; Murray v. Express Newspapers Plc (2008) EWCA Civ 446. 
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should be banned]’24 because ‘on the one hand, there is the freedom of the Media to 
consider; on the other hand, the protection of a young child from harm’.25  Indeed, his 
Lordship found it ‘difficult to see there is any public interest to be served 
by...publication.  But this is where freedom of speech comes in.  It means freedom, 
not only for the statements of opinion of which we approve, but also for those of 
which we most heartily disapprove’.26  Lord Denning set out the rationale for this 
decision in the following terms:  
 
‘The reason why...the law gives no remedy is because of the importance it attaches to the 
freedom of the press; or, better put, the importance in a free society of the circulation of true 
information.  The metres and bounds of this are already staked out by the rules of law...It 
would be a mistake to extend these so as to give the judges a power to stop publication of true 
matter whenever the judges -- or any particular judge -- thought that it was in the interests of a 
child to do so.’27  
 
Clearly, such reasoning evidences a principled approach to freedom of speech in 
refusing to extend the wardship jurisdiction that values the media’s instrumentalist 
worth on a broad and long-term basis, i.e., that although the expression may cause 
short-term harm, such harm is outweighed by the long-term importance of such 
freedom. 
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Similar reasoning is evident in another pre-HRA decision, R. v. Central 
Independent Television plc,28 which concerned an application for injunction against 
the broadcasting of a documentary about an individual imprisoned for six years on 
two charges of indecency involving young boys.  The application was brought by the 
mother of the child whose father was the subject of this documentary.  As might be 
expected, the mother was very concerned about the obvious serious distress and 
disruption that would be caused to her life and her child’s as a result of the broadcast.  
Yet the application was dismissed, with Lord Justice Hoffmann (as he then was) in 
the Court of Appeal, in particular, adopting a principled approach to the issue.  In a 
much cited judgment, he notes ‘…publication may cause needless pain, distress and 
damage to individuals or harm to other aspects of the public interest.  But a freedom 
which is restricted to what judges think to be responsible or in the public interest is no 
freedom’.29  In following Lord Denning’s approach that the wardship jurisdiction 
could not be extended, he cited the Article 10 exceptions listed in Article 10(2) but, 
apparently, found no reason to deny the speech on account of those exceptions, 
instead commenting that: 
 
‘the interests of the individual litigant and the public interest in the freedom of the press are 
not easily commensurable…but no freedom is without cost and in my view the judiciary 
should not whittle away freedom of speech with ad hoc exceptions.  The principle that the 
press is free from both government and judicial control is more important than the particular 
case’.30 
 
                                                 
28
 (1994) 3 All ER 641. 
29
 Ibid., 652 (emphasis added). 
30
 Ibid., 653. 
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These decisions may be compared with the post-HRA decision in Re W.31  
This case concerned an application by a local authority for an injunction restraining 
publication of the identity of the parties in a criminal trial.  As Chapter Six 
establishes, the media has a strong and well-established free speech right to 
uninhibited publication of criminal trials in order to ensure the long-term aim of open 
justice;32 indeed, as further reported in that chapter, the UK judiciary has said that ‘it 
is impossible to over emphasise the importance to be attached to the ability of the 
media’33 to freely report such and, therefore, the courts must be ‘vigilant [against] the 
natural tendency for the general principle to be eroded and for exceptions to grow by 
accretion’.34  Clearly, these statements of principle resonate with the approach to 
freedom of expression in X and Central Independent Television.  Re W concerned a 
criminal trial in which the defendant had pleaded guilty to knowingly infecting the 
victim with HIV.  The defendant and victim had had two children together and the 
local authority sought an injunction on the basis that disclosure of the parent’s 
identity would prejudice their attempts to place the children in care either within their 
extended family or outside because of the stigma attached to HIV.  In granting the 
injunction, Sir Mark Potter in the Divisional Court accepted that suppression of 
identification would lead to a ‘disembodied trial’ but that since the novelty of the 
facts gave the case ‘high interest’ in any event such suppression would not render the 
reporting ‘significantly inhibited’.35  He considered that ‘naming and shaming’ would 
occur if uninhibited publication occurred leading to ‘a focus of attention, pressure and 
                                                 
31
 Re W (Identification: Restrictions on publication) (2005) EWHC 1564 (Fam). 
32
 E.g. see the House of Lords decision in Re S (2004) UKHL 47.  
33
 R (on the application of Trinity Mirror plc) v. Croydon Crown Court (2008) EWCA Crim 50, [17]. 
34
 R v. Legal Aid Board ex parte Kaim Todner (1999) QB 966, 977 per Lord Woolf. 
35
 Re W, fn. 31, [74]. 
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harassment upon the children and the families concerned and potentially concerned 
with their care of a far higher profile and more intense degree than would be the case 
if the injunction is not granted’.36  Thus he concluded that ‘in my view it is both 
necessary and proportionate to protect the children against what I consider is 
established as a likelihood of harm which will be avoided, or at any rate diminished, 
if the injunction is granted’.37  This decision is in stark contrast to both Re X and 
Central Independent Television plc: whereas in those cases it was accepted that 
freedom of speech may cause needless pain, distress and damage to individuals, in Re 
W the finding that identification would cause needless pain, distress and damage was 
the reason why the injunction was granted.  Naturally, the context of the reasoning in 
Re X and Central Independent Television plc should not be overlooked: Lord 
Denning and Lord Justice Hoffmann do not say that freedom of expression should 
never be interfered with where it causes needless pain, etc, – i.e., their reasoning has 
no bearing on defamation laws or breach of confidence (misuse of private 
information)38 claims – but rather that the judiciary must be careful not to damage the 
long-term goals of freedom of expression by short-term gains.  The decision in Re W 
therefore contrasts with this approach: it appears to assume that no damage to this 
long-term goal results from this short-term interference.  The purpose of this 
comparison, though, is not to engage in debate on the merits of Re W or whether it 
represents the ‘thin end of the wedge’ but, instead, to note as a matter of interest that 
the more liberal approach to media freedom appears in the pre-HRA case law (rather 
                                                 
36
 Ibid., [76]. 
37
 Ibid., [78]. 
38
 As Lord Nicholls termed it in Campbell v. MGN Ltd, fn. 20, [12]; see use of term in McKennitt v. 
Ash, fn. 20 
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than post-HRA).  In other words, the effect of the HRA in strengthening the right to 
freedom of expression appears doubtful when comparing these cases. 
Of course, it is important to factor into the discussion the fact that the HRA 
did not just introduce Article 10 into domestic law but rather it introduced a raft of 
Convention rights including the Article 8 right to respect for privacy.  The effect of 
Article 8 is clearly apparent in Re W as compared to Re X and Central Independent 
Television plc.  Yet what the comparison between these cases also shows is a more 
pragmatic approach where two Convention rights conflict.  As Chapter Five 
demonstrates, this pragmatic approach is also apparent in cases where non-
Convention rights are implicated such as the right not to be offended.  However, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, this more pragmatic approach is noticeably different to a 
more principled approach.  The advantage of the pragmatic approach is that, as in Re 
W, it might allow both competing Convention rights to be preserved, i.e., that by 
modifying certain aspects of it, the speech may still be made.  However, it is 
important not to assume that such an approach is appropriate in every case.  It is often 
the case that speech can be put more temperately or stripped of hyperbole or offence 
or, even, the ends achieved by a different constitutional means (i.e., a letter to one’s 
MP or to the editor of The Times).  Yet this is to miss the point: whilst such 
interferences may not prevent the right to speak, sometimes it is the mere fact of 
interference – not the extent of it – that conflicts with free speech principle.  This 
point is reflected in the Strasbourg jurisprudence: interferences, however slight, have 
symbolic value, e.g., fines of any amount, suspended sentences, etc.39 
                                                 
39
 Amihalachioaie v. Moldova (2005) 40 EHRR 35, [38]. 
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Moreover, the argument was made in Chapter Two, Five, Six and Seven, in 
particular, that a broader approach to the justificatory theories that underpin Article 
10 protection ought to emerge within the UK judiciary’s approach.  It is submitted 
that it is insufficient to adopt, as the judges apparently have, a narrow view of the 
argument from participation in democracy since this seems to reserve strong 
protection for expression which actually influences or affects democracy.  This 
narrowness is particularly evident, for example, in Lord Hoffmann’s dismissive 
approach to the ProLife Alliance Party Election Broadcast that it ‘had virtually 
nothing to do with the fact that a general election was taking place’.40  As Fenwick 
and Phillipson comment, on this point ‘Lord Hoffmann fell into error…in his 
dismissal of the speech…as of limited value.  It remained a form of highly significant 
political expression, partly due to its very nature and partly due to the less central 
election-related values underlying it’.41  Even if the UK judiciary feel that protection 
of free speech for its intrinsic value alone would put the UK courts at odds with 
Strasbourg jurisprudence,42 a broader approach based on such other instrumentalist 
grounds as are evident in the arguments from self-fulfilment (or self-realisation)43 or 
truth44 would not.  Even Meiklejohn’s conception of the argument from participation 
in democracy45 might provide a broader system of protection.  Of course, it might be 
                                                 
40
 ProLife, fn. 7, [68]. 
41
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 8, 589. 
42
 See discussion in Chapter Three. 
43
 Martin Redish, “The Value of Free Speech”, (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
591; Joseph Raz, “Free Expression and Personal Identification,” in Free Expression: Essays in Law 
and Philosophy, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), 10; C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom 
of Speech, (OUP, 1989); Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, (New York: 
Random House, 1970). 
44
 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, (London: Routledge, 1991), (1st. ed., 1859). 
45
 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government, (New York: Harper, 1948) 
and “The First Amendment is an absolute,” [1961] Supreme Court Review 245 
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said that the UK judiciary do adopt such a principled approach to free speech because 
there are instances of liberal statements within the case law which clearly recognise 
the significance of free speech and political speech in particular.  Yet the importance 
of free speech must be recognised in the outcome of the case and not just the 
preamble to it.  The UK jurisprudence is littered with hollow sentiments which 
apparently recognise the importance of free speech.46  Yet recognition is fairly futile 
unless a guarantee emerges from it. 
As Barendt has long argued, the meaning and scope of freedom of speech can 
only be properly understood in the context of the theoretical arguments for its 
protection.47  This is not a requirement that the judiciary should ‘indulge in 
philosophical speculations’48 but rather that since the text of the constitutional 
document (in this case the European Convention on Human Rights) leaves many 
questions unanswered (such as the extent to which Article 10 protection should apply 
equally to commercial, artistic or pornographic expression),49 judges ‘cannot, in 
short, avoid, confronting difficult questions of political philosophy’.50  Thus greater 
engagement with established theory has practical value.  Therefore, given that the 
concept of freedom of speech is such a minefield,51 the judiciary’s task must be to 
map a way through: this can only be achieved by engaging with, not ignoring, the 
                                                 
46
 ProLife, fn. 7; ADI, fn. 9; R. v. Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247; Sanders v. Kingston [2005] EWHC 1145 
(Admin); Reynolds v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127; Hammond v. DPP [2004] EWHC 69 
(Admin); Connolly v. DPP (2007) EWHC 237; Attorney General v. Scotcher (2005) UKHL 36. 
47
 Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (1st edn.), fn. 3, 1-8. 
48
 Ibid., 2. 
49
 See discussion in Chapter Five. 
50
 Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (OUP, 2005, 2nd edn.), 6. 
51
 Indeed, for that reason, several commentators have doubted whether a coherent principle of free 
speech can be elucidated.  Paul Horton and Larry Alexander, ‘the Impossibility of a Free Speech 
Principle,’ (1983) 78 Northwestern University Law Review 1319; Larry Alexander, Is There a Right of 
Freedom of Expression?, (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stanley Fish, “There’s no such thing as 
free speech, and it’s a good thing, too,” in There’s no such thing as free speech, and it’s a good thing, 
too, (OUP, 1994) 
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debate.  In order to match the pre-HRA expectations discussed in Chapter One, 
engagement with debate was necessary.  Arguably, this dialogue has not occurred.  
The consequence of this failure is that the courts are not maximising protection.  If 
the UK judiciary is not always matching the Strasbourg jurisprudence52 nor 
consulting established theory in order to develop the right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 differently to the Strasbourg jurisprudence then what is the UK 
courts’ strategy for Article 10?  Is there any discernible strategy?  The following 
subsection addresses this question in more detail. 
 
b) Strategy? 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to put the UK judiciary’s approach to 
Article 10 under the microscope.  If the lens is focussed specifically on the treatment 
of political expression by the higher courts (particularly), then, as set out in Chapter 
Five and Six, there does broadly seem to be a strategic approach in place: speech is 
most likely to be protected if it can be demonstrated that the benefit of the speech to 
the democratic process outweighs any associated harm it may cause.  As noted in 
previous chapters, this type of narrow approach has strong resemblances with Bork’s 
version of the argument from participation in a democracy.53  However, if the lens is 
pulled back to include all types of speech then the nature of this strategy seems more 
uncertain.  The finding that commercial expression implicates ‘important issues of 
                                                 
52
 See discussion about ADI set out in Chapters Two and Four. 
53
 Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” [1971] 47 Indiana Law 
Journal 1 
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free speech’ and that pornography may be a form of protected expression contradicts 
the basis of Bork’s narrow thesis and is not obviously supported by Meiklejohn’s 
broader thesis54 without further argument.  Although it has been doubted whether the 
inclusion of commercial speech follows from self-fulfilment,55 others have argued 
that protection ought to follow on that basis.56  The protection of speech based on 
these broader rationales is, however hardly evident where the speech involved is 
political, as Chapters Five and Six demonstrate.  This suggests some confusion about 
which justificatory theories are operational and when they should be applied or, 
alternatively, may also suggest that a deep understanding of the justificatory theories 
has not yet been applied.  Moreover, it suggests that a fully worked out strategy is not 
yet in place. 
However, when the jurisprudence is examined differently – through the lens 
of s. 2, for example – then a clearer impression of strategy emerges.  As discussed in 
Chapter Four, the UK judiciary has made it clear that they intend to mirror the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence so as to ensure the UK human rights jurisprudence is neither 
ahead nor behind.  Speaking extra-judicially, Baroness Hale has noted that the Ullah 
principle tends to made most strongly in cases that would involve instructing 
Parliament to leap ahead of Strasbourg rather than in cases which would involve the 
common law leaping ahead.57  This might explain the judiciary’s motivation in 
wanting to ensure parity with the Strasbourg case law even if it does not resolve the 
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 Meiklejohn, fn. 45. 
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 Barendt, fn. 50, 400. 
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 See commentators listed at fn. 43. 
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 Baroness Hale of Richmond, ‘Law Lords at the Margin: who defines Convention rights?’ (Lecture at 
the JUSTICE Tom Sargant memorial annual lecture 2008, 15 October 2008) 
<http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/annuallecture2008.pdf> accessed 18 August 2009.   
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dilemma of why the UK courts ought not to develop human rights beyond the 
limitations encountered at Strasbourg level.58  Thus, the strategy of the UK courts’ 
toward Article 10 may be described as an intention to replicate the ECtHR approach 
but cautiously, especially where conflict with statutory provisions arises.  Naturally, 
this explains the UK courts’ basic approach toward coverage, i.e., that Article 10 
extends to not only political expression but also artistic, commercial, even 
pornographic speech.  Furthermore, this also explains the UK courts adherence to a 
consequentialist rationale at the expense of valuing expression for its intrinsic worth.  
As Chapter Three explains, this consequentialist rationale is a hallmark of the 
Strasbourg Article 10 jurisprudence.  However, this strategy may be criticised on a 
number of grounds.  First, and foremost, it does not sufficiently recognise the effect 
of the ECtHR’s limitations as a court.  As noted above, and as discussed in Chapter 
Three, the strong statements of free speech principle within the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence are often ultimately undone by the ECtHR’s relatively weak position as 
a human rights tribunal.  Thus, the Ullah principle lacks clarity on this point: the UK 
courts should be seeking to ‘match’ the statements of principle rather than the 
outcomes.  This point has been made above.   
Secondly, as discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, the UK courts’ 
approach to expression is largely pragmatic.  Consequently, although it is an 
established principle in theory that political expression enjoys a preferred position in 
protection terms,59 this is not necessarily borne out by the case law largely due to this 
pragmatic approach.  Thus, for example, the decision in ADI evidences better 
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 Baroness Hale specifically recognises this issue, ibid. 
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 See discussion in Barendt, fn. 50, 155-162. 
319/385 
treatment of commercial expression than political expression.60  Of course, it is 
recognised that the prohibition on political expression resulted from a statutory 
measure rather than the common law yet the judiciary may still be criticised on the 
basis that the House of Lords refused to issue a declaration of incompatibility in 
recognition of this principle at least.  Moreover, as discussed above, this pragmatic 
approach is concerning because it tends to undermine the protection of free speech on 
the basis of its long-term value.  In other words, it does not provide much scope the 
type of uncompromisingly pro-free speech dicta seen in decisions such as, for 
example, Re X¸61 Brutus v. Cozens,62 Central Independent Television63 or Redmond-
Bate v. DPP.64  To ask, on pragmatic grounds, not what freedom of expression is 
worth to society but what the disputed expression is worth is a risky strategy: the 
treatment of each instance of expression says something about the state of freedom of 
expression overall; it is not possible to disconnect the two as if one does not bear 
upon the other. 
Thirdly, the Ullah principle may also be criticised on an additional ground.  
The UK Article 10 jurisprudence contains examples of free speech claims that are 
fairly spurious in theoretical terms.  Yet since the ECtHR sets a low threshold on 
expression captured by Article 10,65 the courts are required to fully engage with 
Article 10 analysis – albeit often on a fairly shallow basis.  For example, the 
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 ADI, fn. 9.  See discussion in Chapter Four, section 2, c). 
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 Fn. 23. 
62
 Brutus v. Cozens (1973) AC 854. 
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 Redmond-Bate v. DPP (1999) 7 BHRC 375, discussed in Chapter Five, section 2, b). 
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Divisional Court was required to consider an Article 10 claim in R. v. Debnath,66 in 
which a jilted woman, intent on revenge, had harassed her former lover, Mr A.  She 
had sent a number of vicious e-mails, using a variety of accounts, including some of 
Mr A’s that she had hacked into, as part of a campaign over several years to smear his 
reputation at work and at home.  The court accepted that Article 10 was engaged on 
account of the communicative activity involved.  The court then engaged in a rather 
superficial analysis of the Article 10(2) exceptions: it is simply stated in the 
penultimate paragraph of the decision that the interference was prescribed by law, 
furthered a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society.67  A greater 
engagement with established theory would have allowed the court in this particular 
case to ask whether the activity in question amounted to ‘expression’ or instead 
amounted to ‘conduct’: it is a well-established principle in theory that freedom of 
speech clauses do not extend to ‘conduct’.68  The court might have found that 
Debnath’s behaviour amounted to conduct rather than expression notwithstanding the 
use of e-mail, etc and, therefore, Article 10 did not apply.  The fact that this finding 
leads to the same result (of finding the action is not protected by Article 10) is 
irrelevant.  The courts’ approach, as in R. v. Debnath, may be criticised on the basis it 
tends to undermine the significance of Article 10, particularly if the reasoning in one 
spurious claim provides grounds to protect expression made in different 
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circumstances in another spurious claim.  For example, in Livingstone,69 which was 
discussed in Chapter Five in detail, the court found that the abuse directed against the 
journalist was protected.  Consequently, this case provides some level of precedent 
should abuse be at the centre of another Article 10 claim in a different context.   
 
c) Conclusions 
 
 Hare is undoubtedly right; the UK does not have a philosophically coherent 
free speech principle in place.  There are very few cases in which the theoretical 
underpinnings of the concept are acknowledged let alone explored.  The UK 
judiciary’s approach to political expression is particularly concerning.  As set out in 
Chapters Five and Six, the UK judiciary appears to have adopted an unduly narrow 
view of the argument from participation in democracy in which the strongest 
protection is reserved for expression that actually beneficially influences or affects 
democracy.  This thesis observes that one of the paucities of free speech in the UK 
particularly, but also at Strasbourg level, is its heavy dependence on the argument 
from democracy, which neglects a vast array of established literature on free speech 
theory.  It would be a richer free speech right if greater recourse were had to other 
broader theories of free speech.  However, the core argument put forward by this 
thesis is that, regardless of whether the domestic courts are minded to consult these 
broader theories, the one theory that has been accepted, the argument from 
democracy, has been impoverished by the adoption of this narrow view.  There is no 
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need for the judiciary to adopt such a view: the act of participating is the critical 
factor not the significance of such participation or measure of its beneficial effect.  
Instead, the UK courts seem to be treating freedom of speech as a right to beneficially 
influence so that where that influence is uncertain or else not deemed beneficial 
protection is unlikely. 
In critiquing the judiciary’s approach to Article 10 since the inception of the 
HRA, this thesis has covered a broad range of material, including the judiciary’s 
approach to the HRA in more general terms (particularly s. 2) and the operation of 
Article 10 at Strasbourg level.  It is recognised that these areas implicate an array of 
diverse legal (and non-legal) issues and debates.  Consequently, the obvious danger in 
such a critique is that any conclusion reached is too sweeping or overstated or else 
based on oversimplified conclusions and so is simplistic itself (e.g., free speech is not 
protected enough).  Furthermore, given the space constraints, there is also the risk 
that in seeking to argue the point, contradictory evidence has been omitted.  Being 
conscious of these risks, the broad conclusions reached on the UK judiciary’s 
approach to Article 10 so far are that, first, more could have been done to maximise 
protection by means of greater engagement with theory and that, secondly, in the 
absence of such, the courts’ approach so far causes some concern from a free speech 
perspective.  It is submitted that there are several causes which might explain why 
this principled approach has not emerged and, furthermore, that a number of adverse 
consequences follow from this approach not being in place.  The following section 
outlines these potential causes. 
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3. Causes of this approach 
 
a) Introduction 
 
Having established that the UK judiciary broadly adheres to a particularly 
narrow conception of the democratic process value when determining Article 10 
claims, the purpose of this section is to identify what the causes of this narrow 
approach might be in order to understand whether – and to what extent – the judiciary 
might be able to broaden this approach in future.  There may be any number of 
explanations for why the UK courts have developed Article 10 in this way however 
the following discussion will concentrate on three issues in particular that have 
featured heavily in the discussion from preceding chapters.  First, it will be argued 
that the UK courts’ approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, i.e., the strict adherence 
to the Ullah principle (discussed in Chapter Four), is a significant factor in the UK 
courts’ limited approach to Article 10: the instruction to ensure parity with Strasbourg 
jurisprudence does not adequately recognise the dichotomy within the Strasbourg 
decision-making between free speech principle and the limitations of the ECtHR as a 
court.  In other words, ‘mirroring’ Strasbourg jurisprudence does not sufficiently 
recognise that the ECtHR and domestic court have diverse roles to perform: i.e., the 
limitations of the Strasbourg court stem from the fact that it is not a domestic court.  
Secondly, it will be argued that the reluctance to embrace and apply broader 
principles to Article 10 may stem not just from the UK courts’ approach to s. 2 but 
also from previous attitudes toward freedom of speech, evident in the pre-HRA case 
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law.  Thus the judiciary might need to reassess the role of pre-HRA free speech case 
law on Article 10 decision-making (including the extent to which pre-HRA thinking 
has already influenced or tainted post-HRA precedent).  Thirdly, it will be argued that 
the development of other Convention rights in the UK jurisprudence also affects the 
courts’ approach to Article 10.  In particular, the discussion will focus on the 
development of Article 8.  In developing this right, freedom of expression has been 
pinned back.  Yet, moreover, the courts’ approach to Article 8 provides a different 
comparison.  In broad terms, the courts’ have used the domestic introduction of 
Article 8 as an opportunity to look afresh at the question of privacy in the UK and so 
have assessed the scope and limits of the right in detail in order to develop breach of 
confidence into the misuse of private information tort.70  There is not this same sense 
of revision in the UK Article 10 jurisprudence: the approach to Article 10 appears 
more staid as if the UK judiciary has concluded that the inclusion of Article 10 in the 
UK does not require the same overhaul in judicial thinking, i.e., what it means for 
free speech to be a right not a liberty. 
 
b) The Strasbourg dichotomy: principles and limitations 
 
In general terms, it has been argued that the US approach to freedom of 
speech is more sophisticated and more principled than either the UK or ECtHR’s 
approach.71  Barendt argues that the US approach is ‘explicable in terms of a strong 
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suspicion of government and its motives for imposing restrictions on speech’72 and, 
furthermore, that the US courts ‘distrust detailed ad hoc balancing of free speech 
against other competing rights and interests, fearing that the former will inevitably be 
given too little weight in the scales’.73  This distrust thus provides a sturdy platform 
from which the US court is able to strike down interferences with speech.  Of course, 
whether this leads to a ‘better’ free speech right in practice is a question that is 
outside the scope of this enquiry.  However, there are two important and broad 
differences between the European and the US approach to freedom of speech that are 
particularly relevant to this discussion.  First, the US court has had far longer to 
establish its approach to the right of free speech than either the UK or ECtHR.74  
Secondly, the US court is in a comparatively stronger position to take a principled 
stance than the UK or ECtHR is.  Aside from obvious differences, such as the lack of 
power in the UK to strike down legislation incompatible with the Constitution, the 
UK courts seem more reluctant to assume the position of a ‘constitutional court’ for 
fear that it will branded ‘unconstitutional’.75  Furthermore, as Fenwick and Phillipson 
argue76 (see discussion in Chapter Three), the limitations of the ECtHR as a court 
ought to be better recognised: the ECtHR is not a court of appeal; its mandate is 
limited to reviewing decisions but since it is a supra-national tribunal, it 
acknowledges that the Member State is better placed to determine certain standards 
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either because there is no common standard across Europe or because the scenario 
involves particularly sensitive matters.77  Furthermore, as is well-known, the 
Convention itself ‘does not in the main set particularly exacting civil liberties 
standards’.78  Indeed, it has been suggested that the UK courts might look to US 
jurisprudence generally when determining rights under the HRA79 but particularly in 
order to maximise the protection of political expression.80 
The point of this first observation is that it would behove the UK court to 
recognise that it is still ‘finding its feet’ in relation to freedom of speech as a right.  It 
is important to recognise that although the UK judiciary protected freedom of speech 
prior to the inception of the HRA, it did so only to the extent that the common law 
allowed it to and whilst in some circumstances, as the discussion above shows,81 the 
common law was able to afford the type of strong protection expected of ‘rights’ 
status, freedom of speech was ultimately a liberty.  As other commentators have said, 
in order to fully recognise this, the UK judiciary has to adapt its thinking so as to see 
freedom of expression as a ‘walled zone of action’.82  In order to understand what is 
within this ‘walled area’, the judiciary ought to engage with established theory.83  
Furthermore, as argued in Chapter Three, reference to established theory is also 
significant in unlocking the strong statements of free speech principle found in 
ECtHR decisions but not necessarily in their outcomes.  This point connects with the 
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second observation made above.  The nature of the UK judiciary’s engagement with 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence should be guided by its recognition of the limitations of 
the ECtHR as a court.  In other words, the method by which the UK courts ensures it 
‘mirrors’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence should be informed by the dichotomy in the 
ECtHR’s approach to Article 10 claims.  There are two levels on which the UK courts 
could ensure parity with the Strasbourg jurisprudence – at the level of principle or at 
the level of outcomes.  As Chapter Three argues, the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
contains strong statements of free speech principle yet those principles are not always 
realised in the final outcome because of the margin of appreciation operating.  Thus, 
the narrower approach in the UK Article 10 jurisprudence compared to either the 
approach to participation in a democratic society evident in, say, Meiklejohn’s 
theory84 or the ECtHR’s approach to free speech principle may be due to the UK 
courts’ failure to identify this dichotomy and overtly separate principle from 
limitation. 
Of course, recognition that the dichotomy exists in principle is one thing, 
determining the dividing line in each particular case may be another.  The influence 
of the margin of appreciation may be so deeply ingrained into the decision that it is 
not possible to extract it from the verdict.  Thus Singh, Hunt and Demetriou describe 
the margin of appreciation as a ‘conclusory label’ that ‘only serves to obscure the true 
basis’ for the decision and ‘as such it tends to preclude courts from articulating the 
justification for and limits of their role as guardians of human rights in a 
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democracy’.85  Fenwick and Phillipson take Handyside v. UK as the paradigm 
example:86 the decision contains some of the strongest statements made about the 
significance and type of speech that Article 10 protests, including that which shocks, 
offends or disturbs.  Yet because the ECtHR recognises a broad margin of 
appreciation in areas where the protection of morals is implicated, the decision to 
suppress the speech was not interfered with.  Thus Fenwick and Phillipson concede 
that it is difficult to ‘strip away’ the margin of appreciation aspects: ‘the effect of the 
doctrine on the reasoning was so pervasive that this would have been difficult.  Most 
of the reasoning was directed to refuting the arguments that the interference was 
disproportionate to the aim pursued’.87  Consequently, there can be no sharp criticism 
made of the UK courts in every case where the margin of appreciation has not been 
disapplied because of this difficulty; however that does not prevent the judiciary from 
acknowledging that the margin of appreciation is at work in the final decision.  
Indeed, in such circumstances the UK court could decide that the Strasbourg case is 
so heavily influenced by the doctrine that it cannot be meaningfully applied by the 
domestic courts (the margin of appreciation cannot be applied domestically).88  By 
more closely adhering to the principle rather than the outcome, the UK judiciary 
might step closer to realising the ‘rights culture’ that Lord Irvine envisaged: that the 
HRA would engender a ‘culture in judicial decision making where there will be a 
greater concentration on substance rather than form’.89   
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c) The influence of pre-HRA thinking 
 
The reluctance to embrace and apply broader principles to Article 10 may also 
be explainable by reference to the pre-HRA approach to freedom of speech.  As 
discussed in Chapter One, the pre-HRA case law evidences an uneven approach to 
freedom of speech.  Of course, this is explainable by reference to limitations placed 
on the court with regard to civil liberties: the common law could only develop human 
rights so far as the system of negative liberty would allow.  Yet, as also noted in 
Chapter One, commentators had criticised the UK courts’ general approach to 
freedom of speech as inconsistent, sometimes restricting protection ‘on uncertain or 
flimsy grounds’.90  Thus, for example, the mysterious finding in Home Office v. 
Harman91 that the disclosure of sensitive information to a journalist ostensibly on 
public interest grounds had nothing to do with freedom of speech.92  Elsewhere, 
however, the case law contains very strong attachments to free speech such as in Re X 
and Central Independent Television plc, discussed above, or, on the cusp of the 
HRA’s inception, ex parte Simms93 and Reynolds.94  In Chapter Six, it was argued 
that, post-HRA, the UK courts have demonstrated greater receptivity to free speech 
claims of certain speakers over others, particularly the media.  Thus it may be that the 
UK courts’ differential approach to freedom of expression represents a hangover from 
the pre-HRA approach to freedom of speech; that the UK courts have not yet fully 
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made the transition from a liberty-based to rights-based system.  Of course, there is a 
deeper philosophical debate about the nature of rights as compared to liberties.95  Yet 
that debate is not central to the point being made.  The relevance of the pre-HRA case 
law in determining Article 10 cases has not been explicitly questioned in the post-
HRA case law and presently remains unresolved.  As mentioned in Chapter One, it 
had been said on several occasions that the UK case law was compliant with Article 
10.96  However, since Article 10 was not directly enforceable at that time (although 
‘if there [was] any ambiguity in our statutes or uncertainty in our law’ the courts 
‘[could] look to the Convention as an aid to clear up the ambiguity and uncertainty’)97 
that proposition was never fully tested because it did not need to be.  Thus, where 
pre-HRA principles of uncertain compliance with Article 10 influence the outcomes 
of post-HRA decisions, the transition from a liberty-based to a right-based system 
may be stunted. 
In real terms, this may explain the more dismissive attitude to individual 
expression compared to media expression98 since this theme was apparent pre-HRA, 
as outlined in Chapter One.99  Given the argument made in Chapter Six that the media 
still seem to enjoy preferential treatment, it is submitted that the UK judiciary has 
followed the contours established pre-HRA of favouring the media over ‘non-
media’100 speakers when determining free speech cases.  The lesser protection 
afforded to ‘non-media’ speakers was criticised pre-HRA by Fenwick, amongst 
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others, for treating individual dissenters as exercising a form of civil disobedience 
rather than freedom of speech.101  In particular, it seems that the UK judiciary has not 
yet made the transition to affording individual dissenters greater free speech 
protection102 and so in that sense perhaps the courts should view the HRA as a 
‘decisive break from the past’.103  Of course, it has been said that the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence also favour media expression over individual expression.104  As 
discussed in Chapter Three, this view is debatable: certainly the ECtHR has made no 
overt assessment of media expression to this effect.  Indeed, the ECtHR’s view in 
Steel & Morris v. UK105 suggests the opposite: that the claims of individuals to 
freedom of expression should be taken no less seriously than the media’s claim where 
political expression is at stake.  The ECtHR justified this view on the basis that ‘in a 
democratic society even small and informal campaign groups…must be able to carry 
on their activities effectively and that there exists a strong public interest in enabling 
such groups and individuals outside the mainstream to contribute to the public 
debate’.106  Thus the fact that the speaker may not be a journalist is irrelevant in 
determining the level of protection to be afforded to the speech.  Assuming the Ullah 
principle remains unaltered, this principle must be incorporated into the UK 
jurisprudence if the position at Strasbourg is to be ‘mirrored’.  Moreover, it is 
important that this principle is recognised in the outcome of the claim, not just the 
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preamble to the decision.  In Connolly v. DPP,107 Lord Justice Dyson found that the 
sending of the photographs was ‘not the mere sending of an offensive article: the 
article contained a message, namely that abortion involves the destruction of life and 
should be prohibited’.108  Consequently, ‘since it related to political issues, it was an 
expression of the kind that is regarded as particularly entitled to protection by Article 
10’109 yet the ultimate reasoning in the case did not reflect this principle.110 
Thus, in very broad terms, it is arguable that the HRA has not resulted in a 
noticeable sea-change in the manner in which the UK courts approach freedom of 
speech.  It may be said that this was because the UK enjoyed a favourable free speech 
right prior to the HRA, i.e., that freedom of speech was protected by the courts.  
Indeed, it has been argued that the right to freedom of expression ‘exists quite apart 
from the HRA’;111 that the common law ‘has come to recognise and endorse the 
notion of constitutional or fundamental rights.  These are broadly the rights given 
expression in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, but their recognition in the common law is autonomous’.112  However, 
whilst there is something to this claim, it risks overlooking the serious concerns 
raised about the state of free speech in the pre-HRA case law.  Yet it is not far-
fetched to conclude that there has been a general lacklustre approach to the 
development of Article 10 as if the judiciary has concluded the introduction of Article 
10 did not necessitate much change in judicial thinking post-HRA.  If this is the case, 
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then it is particularly disappointing and overlooks the concern expressed by, for 
example, Fenwick and Phillipson that the Strasbourg jurisprudence is not a ‘cure all 
[for] our current speech ills’:113 ‘the Convention cannot be seen as the equivalent of a 
domestic Bill of Rights – the judges have to construct one out of it, if so minded’.114  
In other words, both unquestioning adherence to Strasbourg jurisprudence and pre-
HRA thinking risks the realisation of an effective free speech right.   
 
d) Development of other Rights 
 
The comparative lack of judicial activism in developing Article 10 in the UK 
is also apparent when examining the courts’ approach to other Convention rights, 
such as the Article 8 right to respect to privacy.  It is well-established that the 
common law’s treatment of privacy issues prior to the HRA was woefully 
inadequate.115  This is clear, for example, from the well-known decision in Kaye v. 
Robertson116 in which the actor Gordon Kaye had no right of action against a 
journalist who had harassed him in his hospital bed following a serious car accident.  
Although deficiencies in the state of privacy laws in the UK were recognised prior to 
the HRA,117 such deficiencies were not meaningfully addressed until after the HRA 
was enacted.  Indeed, the case of A v. B plc118 confirms the shortfalls in the level of 
protection afforded privacy that still existed.  Since then, the UK judiciary has 
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discernibly and proactively improved that level of protection.  Fenwick and 
Phillipson argue that the House of Lords decision in Campbell119 ‘has given English 
law a privacy tort’.120  The greater recognition for privacy in English law is 
discernable by comparing the decision in Kaye v. Robertson to Mosley121 and 
Murray122 in particular.123  It is clear from recent case law on Article 8, that there is 
an impetus to map out the scope and limits of this new right encompassed within the 
misuse of personal information tort.124  As discussed above, that same impetus is not 
apparent in the UK Article 10 jurisprudence. 
Moreover, this impetus to map out the limits of these other Convention rights, 
directly impacts upon the scope of Article 10.  This is particularly apparent in relation 
to Article 8 and the cases discussed above: the growth of Article 8 protection has 
meant proportionate restrictions of Article 10 in these areas.  This is not to say that 
this growth represents an unwelcome development: curbs on media freedom, in 
particular, to expose private lives is not necessarily lamentable.  However, it does 
have the potential to affect the rationales underpinning freedom of expression.  For 
example, as discussed in Chapter Two, the argument from truth, self-realisation and 
participation in democracy place great emphasis on freedom to disseminate 
information that is true whereas the Article 8 right so developed would interfere with 
the right to speak precisely because the information is true.  Where the information 
has no conceivable bearing on the public interest, this suppression is not problematic 
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(i.e., Naomi Campbell attending narcotics anonymous meetings,125 Max Mosley 
having sex with prostitutes,126 J.K. Rowling walking down an Edinburgh street with 
her son127).  However, difficulties arise where the question of public interest is more 
uncertain.  For example, in Tonsbergs Blad as and Haukom v. Norway,128 it will be 
recalled from Chapter Three that the Norwegian government had strongly argued that 
there was no public interest in discussing the holiday home of a prominent 
businessman and also that of a well-known singer.  The ECtHR disagreed with this 
assessment.129  In this context, the recent judicial finding that Prince Charles’ view on 
Hong Kong was not in the public interest is contentious.130 
The development of other rights under the HRA is significant in another 
respect.  Where Convention rights conflict, the courts’ approach is to balance the two 
rights.131  Thus this might lead to the type of pragmatic assessment outlined above in 
relation to Re W, i.e., that both rights in conflict might be preserved with some 
modification of the manner in which the free speech right is exercised.  Additionally, 
this approach may explain why certain types of speech – such as individual 
expression – are more at risk than others: where the speech in question is not 
perceived as particularly valuable, the reason why it should impinge upon another 
right may not seem pressing.  In this way, artistic expression may be particularly 
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vulnerable since the value of such cannot be meaningfully quantified.132  Although it 
has been said that where art depicts a moral vision it is a form of political expression 
since morality is political,133 demonstrating that the art should be protected as a form 
of political expression may be treated as a weak proposition, particularly given that 
the opposing right is unlikely to contain any such conceptual uncertainty and, further, 
that the court may decide that even if it is a form of political expression, the speaker 
is not prevented from putting that expression in a different or less objectionable form 
that would not interfere with the rights of others.134 
 
4. Consequences of this approach 
 
Having set out in greater detail what may be the causes of the UK courts’ 
approach to Article 10, this section makes the case for why this approach has adverse 
consequences.  It is recognised that it is not enough to conclude that any mismatch 
between free speech in theory and free speech in practice settles the argument.  It is 
also realised that some of the cases in which free speech protection has been denied 
so far do not readily inspire much sympathy.  Perhaps Connolly v. DPP,135 which has 
been cited many times throughout this thesis, is the paradigm example of this.  Mrs 
Connolly had sent photographs depicting a dead 21-week-old foetus whose face and 
limbs were clearly visible.  Another photograph showed an abortion taking place.  It 
is no wonder that the pharmacist employees who opened her letters were distraught.  
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It may be said that this is hardly valuable speech deserving of special treatment.  Yet 
the use of the word ‘valuable’ encapsulates the issue.  Why should only valuable 
speech be protected?  It is freedom of speech that is valued but this is not realised if 
only valued speech is free.  Thus, as Chapter Five establishes, the key issue with the 
decision in Connolly, is not the outcome so much as the court’s reasoning in that 
case, in particular the suggestion that the speech was unimportant.  To reserve the 
highest Article 10 weight only to speech that shows great consequential value to 
society at large is an elitist betrayal of freedom of speech’s essential premise.  Singh 
has previously argued that the courts should treat freedom of speech as ‘a zone of 
action protected by a high wall…that the state may not enter…even when it is 
enforcing an otherwise legitimate rule’;136 the present approach to Article 10 in the 
UK does not equate to this vision. 
The court’s approach to the ‘balancing act’ is largely responsible for the 
invasions into this walled zone.  By treating societal interests and non-Convention 
rights as of apparently equivalent weight to the Article 10 right, there is a significant 
risk that this zone of protected action may be infringed whenever an audience 
member is shocked, upset or insulted by the speech.  Thus Mill’s principle that since 
an individual dissenter cannot silence the masses so the masses cannot silence 
him/her is not recognised by the present law in the UK.137  Geddis argues that the 
treatment of individual dissenters acts as ‘a canary in a coal mine’: ‘the overall health 
of our body politic may be judged by how far our legal ordering provides her with the 
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space to make her opinions known to the public.’138  In finding Mrs Connolly’s 
conviction was ‘convincingly shown [to be] necessary’, Lord Justice Dyson summed 
up in the following terms:  
 
‘Her right to express her views about abortion does not justify the distress and anxiety that 
she intended to cause those who received the photographs.  Of particular significance is the 
fact that those who work in the three pharmacies were not targeted because they were in a 
position to influence a public debate on abortion.  The most that Mrs Connolly could have 
hoped to achieve was to persuade those responsible in the pharmacies for their purchasing 
policies to stop selling the ‘morning after pill’...In any event, even if the three pharmacies 
were persuaded to stop selling the pill, it is difficult to see what contribution this would make 
to any public debate about abortion generally and how that would increase the likelihood that 
abortion would be prohibited.’139 
 
His last sentence is unconvincing.  If Mrs Connolly had convinced three pharmacies 
to stop selling the ‘morning after pill’ on the strength of her speech then that would 
represent an enormous victory for her cause.  It takes very little imagination to see 
that there would be media interest in such a coup or that it would have provided a 
platform for an organisation like ProLife Alliance to springboard a campaign from, 
encouraging other like-minded individuals to follow her example.  Of course, it is the 
photographs that are the main issue in this case.  They were shocking and distressing 
and sent to people who were not in a position to influence a public debate on it.  This 
finding, whilst sensible in isolation, does not ring true when one considers the bigger 
picture.  For example, national media events such as Red Nose Day or Children in 
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Need Day depict shocking images of, typically, children in squalid conditions who 
are dying from starvation in the former or suffering from abuse in the latter.  These 
images are transmitted directly into the homes of people who may have no means of 
directly influencing a debate on preventing this horrible treatment or, even, no 
financial means by which to contribute to the cause.  Yet the abortion context looms 
large in Connolly.  Abortion is a sensitive subject and the anti-abortion position is 
unattractive to many people who find it unpersuasive or are uncomfortable about it or 
offended because they have undertaken an abortion themselves (a decision which 
they are likely not to have taken lightly).  All these reactions are both understandable 
and available to anyone who hears an anti-abortionist speak but these are not 
convincing reasons to suppress that speech: as Barendt argues, ‘free speech is of 
value precisely because it enables radicals to challenge established orthodoxies and 
received wisdom, including our conventional understandings of what is tasteful and 
decent’.140 
 Furthermore, the differential treatment between the individual dissenter and 
the media ought to be re-evaluated.  As set out in Chapter Six, the media is afforded 
high levels of protection, as it should be.  The conceptual device that seems to 
separate the media and ‘non-media’ is the ‘public watchdog function’, which has 
been used in a number of Strasbourg cases to justify Article 10 protection,141 the 
essential premise of which is that the media deserve special protection because of the 
valuable contribution it makes to society in acting as a public watchdog: in other 
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words, the idea that the media is the fourth estate.142  Yet the individual dissenter may 
also occupy this role.  As noted above, the Strasbourg jurisprudence recognises ‘the 
legitimate and important role that campaign groups can play in stimulating public 
discussion’.143  The UK judiciary should follow suit.  It might be thought that the 
‘public watchdog function’ device should be reserved for the media because 
differences exist between them and the ‘non-media’.  The two advantages that the 
media might be perceived to have over individual dissenters is a greater strength in 
reaching its audience and greater credibility.  Admittedly, the media has a natural 
advantage in being able to reach its audience and it may be also be a more trusted 
source of information for certain individuals (and these are reasons for protecting the 
media).  Yet the definition of the media is highly unstable144 and it is important the 
judiciary are alive to this issue.  Since it describes the delivery vehicle rather than the 
actor it encompasses all forms of communication.  Of course, the term resonates most 
with traditional forms of information: newspaper, radio and television.  Yet to this 
must now be added the internet.  As Fenwick and Phillipson recognise, the internet is 
‘the first democratic mass communications media’,145 which, with very little effort or 
resources, allows individual dissenters ready access to a worldwide audience.  
Furthermore, as Fenwick and Phillipson also recognise, the rise of Google and other 
                                                 
142
 See Louis Blom-Cooper, ‘Press freedom: constitutional right or cultural assumption?’ (2008) Public 
Law 260. 
143
 Steel & Morris, fn. 106, [95]. 
144
 See Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom, fn. 8, 2-4. 
145
 Ibid., 3. 
341/385 
search engines allows that audience to find speech it wants to receive, enabling some 
websites to obtain greater viewing figures than some magazines or newspapers do.146   
 In fact, the survival of, particularly, the print media is under threat due to the 
advent of the internet and 24-hour broadcast news channels.  As set out in Chapter 
Six, it has been said by the judiciary that the survival of the print media is a reason to 
protect such speech:147 ‘the courts must not ignore the fact that if newspaper do not 
publish information which the public are interested in, there will be fewer newspapers 
published, which will not be in the public interest’.148  Of course, this smacks of 
Barnum: give the people what they want.  This argument has been resisted in other 
decisions.149  Yet the observation is important since it demonstrates judicial 
recognition that the traditional print media must have regard to commercial interests 
in order to secure its future, including increasing resort to celebrity gossip150 and this 
may impinge upon the capacity to devote resources to serious investigative 
journalism.  Into this gap may step the non-traditional journalist who may discover 
stories of public interest that regular journalists miss.151  Of course, this is not an 
argument to say that non-journalists should replace traditional journalists as the 
Fourth Estate, it is instead to say that they should not be excluded: it should be better 
recognised that non-journalists serve an important purpose as well.  This would better 
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realise the word ‘everyone’ within Article 10: everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. 
 
5. Towards a remedy? 
 
Since the issues highlighted in this thesis are wide-ranging, the ‘remedy’, such 
as it is, cannot be put in simple terms without seriously risking its usefulness.  Yet if 
the solution to the challenge of maximising free speech protection under Article 10 is 
a jigsaw puzzle then some of the pieces may clearly be identified.  First, a shift in 
judicial attitude is critical if these issues are to be addressed, including the cultivation 
of the rights culture that Lord Irvine promised.152  It is asserted that the opportunity to 
establish a more principled approach has been missed but it has not been lost.  The 
opportunity still exists should the judiciary wish to take it.  Realisation of this shift in 
judicial attitude need not be radical and it need not, necessarily, conflict with the 
Court’s conclusions about their obligations under s. 2.  A critical aspect of this 
realisation would be to recognise that the democratic process value can be broader 
than the Court currently acknowledges so that broader conceptions of the argument 
from participation in democracy and the arguments from self-fulfilment and truth are 
included.  Furthermore, the Court should address its own competence to determine 
what speech is valuable and what speech is not: presently this approach conflicts with 
the strong principle that government should distrust its own capacity to make such 
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judgments.153  Should the judiciary realise this, a broader free speech right might 
emerge.  Another significant piece of the jigsaw would be for the courts to dispense 
with the apparent current approach of treating societal interests and non-Convention 
rights as ‘equal’ in the balancing process.154  Of course, in order for these changes to 
be realised then a champion for a more principled approach to free speech must 
emerge in the House of Lords and there are a few candidates who might fill this role.  
Lord Scott,155 Baroness Hale156 and Lord Hoffmann157 have all demonstrated this 
principled approach to free speech before. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A.V. Dicey wrote that ‘freedom of discussion is in England little else than the 
right to write or say anything which a jury, consisting of twelve shopkeepers, think it 
expedient should be said or written’.158  Aside from relocating the decision from 
jurors to judges, Dicey’s statement of the law is eerily familiar.  It captures two 
concerns in particular: that a narrow consequentialist approach dominates (‘what 
should be said or written’ will be protected) and the centrality of the judge to 
                                                 
153
 See Schauer, fn. 72. 
154
 See Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 259. 
155
 R. (on the application of Rusbridger) v. Attorney General (2003) 3 WLR 232, [46]; his dissent in 
ProLife, fn. 7. 
156
 Belfast City Council v. Miss Behavin’ Ltd (2007) UKHL 19; Campbell, fn. 20; Jameel, fn. 18.  See 
also, Baroness Hale of Richmond, ‘Law Lords at the Margin: who defines Convention rights?’, fn. 57. 
157
 In addition to the cases cited for Baroness Hale, ibid., his view in Central Independent Television 
plc, fn. 28 in particular.  Of course, his connection to Greenpeace may act as a double-edged sword: 
McGovern v. Attorney General (1982) Ch. 321; R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate 
and Others ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (2000) 1 AC 147. 
158
 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (London: Macmillan, 1915, 8th 
edn.). 
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determining this assessment.  Whilst it is important not to exaggerate these concerns 
about how freedom of expression is treated, it is likewise important not to be 
complacent.  The media seems to be strongly protected and it should not be forgotten 
that Members of Parliament have a near absolute right to freedom of speech in 
Parliament159 yet the principle of free speech extends beyond these sources.  It resides 
in the principle that every citizen is entitled to express their opinion and that all forms 
of government should distrust its ability to know what ‘should be said or written’ and 
what should not.  The goal of the HRA was to create a rights based culture160 in 
which the effective enjoyment of free speech would be realised.161  There is still some 
work to be done before that goal is realised. 
 
  
                                                 
159
 A v. UK (2003) 36 EHRR 51 
160
 Lord Irvine, fn. 89 
161
 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Developing constitutional principles of public law’ (2001) Public Law 
684 
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